Macro and Credit - Easy Come, Easy Go

"There are many harsh lessons to be learned from the gambling experience, but the harshest one of all is the difference between having Fun and being Smart." - Hunter S. Thompson

Looking at the return of the "D" trade, "D" for "Deflation" that is with the return of the strong "bid" for bonds, marking the return of the duration trade on the back of "goldilocks" for "Investment Grade" which we foresaw, pushing more inflows into fixed income relative to equities, when it came to selecting our title analogy, we decided to go for a cinematic analogy "Easy Come, Easy Go". It is a 1947 movie directed by John Farrow, who won the Academy Award for Best Writing/Best Screenplay for Around the World in Eighty Days and in 1942, and was nominated as Best Director for Wake Island. "Easy Come, Easy Go" is the story about Martin Donovan, a compulsive gambler. His gambling habits leave him constantly broke and under arrest from a gambling-house raid. He places bets as well for the tenants of his boardinghouse, who lose their money and ability to pay the rent. Martin, came upon a sunken treasure but his philosophy is "easy come, easy go," promptly squanders all the loot. Looking at the various iterations of QE and the return to more dovishness from central bankers around the world, which lead no doubt to rise of so called "populism" with the asset owners having a field day, particularly the renters through the bond markets, over "Main Street", it is clear to us that the "treasured" support provided by central bankers to politicians has been all but "squandered". For example, French politicians have done meaningless structural reforms leading to unsustainable taxation creating the rise of the "yellow jackets" movement hence our pre-revolutionary stance. As we say in France, c'est la vie.  As in the move, with Martin's daughter Connie not knowing what else to do, she tries to solve her dad's debts by taking bets on a horse race. In similar fashion, central bankers have decided to add more dovishness on more debt, resulting in even more debt being created. Caveat creditor but we ramble again...

In this week's conversation, we would like to look at the return of Bondzilla the NIRP monster made in Japan given Japan's Government Pension Investment Fund GPIF is likely to come back strongly to the Fixed Income party.

Synopsis:

• Macro and Credit -  Once again the money is flowing "uphill" where all the "fun" is namely the bond market.
• Final charts - The deflation play is back in town

• Macro and Credit -  Once again the money is flowing "uphill" where all the "fun" is namely the bond market.

In our most recent conversation we pointed out again that we advocated our readers to go for quality (Investment Grade) rather than quantity high yield given rising dispersion. To repeat ourselves, we continue to view rising dispersion as a sign of cracks in credit markets and not as a sign of overall strength. You have to become much more selective we think in the issuer profile selection process.

"Bondzilla" the NIRP monster which we indicated on numerous occasions has been "made in Japan" as we pointed out again in our most recent conversation. We also indicated as well:

Back in July 2016 in our conversation "Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind" we indicated that "Bondzilla" the NIRP monster was more and more made in Japan due to the important allocations to foreign bonds from the Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF) as well as other Lifers in conjunction with Mrs Watanabe through Uridashi and Toshin funds (Double Deckers) being an important carry player. In the global reach for "yield" and in terms of "dollar" allocation, Japanese investors have been very significant hence the importance of monitoring the flows from an allocation perspective.

Not only Japanese Lifers have a strong appetite for US credit, but retail investors such as Mrs Watanabe, in the popular Toshin funds, which are foreign currency denominated and as well as Uridashi bonds (Double Deckers), the US dollar has been a growing allocation currency wise in recent years so watch also that space.

For Japanese investors increasing purchases in foreign credit markets has been an option. Like in 2004-2006 Fed rate hiking cycle, Japanese investors had the option of either increasing exposure to lower rated credit instruments outside Japan or taking on currency risk. During that last cycle they lowered the ratio of currency hedged investments to take on more credit risk. " - source Macronomics, March 2019

"Bondzilla" the NIRP monster should not be underestimated in our macro allocation book. On this particular point we read with interest Nomura's FX Insights note from the 29th of March entitled "GPIF: sustained aggressive foreign buying more likely":

"Annual plan for new FY unveiled

The Government Pension Investment Fund’s (GPIF) annual plan for the new fiscal year suggests the fund can manage its portfolio more flexibly. This should allow the fund to continue purchasing foreign bonds aggressively, while reducing exposure to negative yielding domestic bonds. This shift is also likely to lead a higher share of foreign bonds in the updated target portfolio, which will be announced by end-March 2020. Given the significant size of the GPIF’s AUM, this flexible stance will be crucial for Japan’s financial market and yen-crosses. We expect pension funds’ foreign bond purchases to support yen-crosses during the new fiscal year.

The GPIF announced its annual plan for the new fiscal year. In the annual plan, the GPIF noted that it will manage its portfolio according to the basic portfolio, as usual. However, the GPIF added two important points for its portfolio strategy in the new fiscal year, in relation to the allowable range of the target portfolio.

First, the GPIF repeated that automatically reinvesting redemptions from exposure to domestic bonds may not be appropriate in the current market environment. Thus, for now, the fund will manage its domestic bond portfolio more flexibly in relation to the allowable range. The fund will maintain the total amount of domestic bonds and cash within the allowable range of domestic bonds (25-45%). The GPIF has already announced the temporary deviation in domestic bond exposures from the allowable range last September and thus, this point is not entirely new (see “Equity flows supporting yen-crosses”, 26 September 2018). However, flexibility has now been extended into the new fiscal year that commences next week, and the fund can continue to reduce exposure to domestic bonds for a longer amount of time.

Second, the GPIF added a new sentence, stating: “the fund will examine the application of allowable range for asset classes as necessary, as the fund is formulating its new target portfolio (Figure 1).

In April 2014, the GPIF stated that it would flexibly manage its portfolio in relation to the allowance rage, as it started reviewing its target portfolio for the next medium-term plan (see “GPIF: Time for whale-watching”, 4 December 2018). Owing to the increased flexibility, the fund could begin investing in equities and foreign bonds before it announced the new target portfolio in October 2014. Although the communique this year differs from five years ago, this additional comment could provide the fund with more opportunity to manage the portfolio more flexibly in the new fiscal year.

We think these statements are significant for Japan’s financial market and yen-crosses this year. As of end-December, the share of domestic bonds had declined to 28.2%, closer to the lower bound of the current allowable range (25%, Figure 2).

In contrast, the share of foreign bonds increased to 17.4%, closer to the upper range of the current allowable range (19%). The fund has recently been purchasing foreign bonds aggressively, as it likely judges negative-yielding domestic bonds as unattractive (Figure 3). Historically, the pace of foreign bond purchases in Q4 last year was at the highest pace (see “Three important JPY flow stories”, 1 March 2019). Without the two additional points above, the GPIF would need to start liquidating foreign bonds, while accumulating exposures to domestic bonds again.

However, as the fund can manage its portfolio more flexibly in the new fiscal year, it should be able to continue purchasing foreign bonds, even if the share exceeds the upper limit (19%).

As the BOJ’s negative rate policy will be extended further, in our view, we think it would be reasonable for the GPIF to continue reducing the fund’s exposure to domestic bonds, while shifting into foreign bonds. At the moment, both domestic and foreign equity shares central of the GPIF’s target portfolio are at 25%, but the central target for foreign bonds is just 15%. Thus, there is room for the fund to further shift from domestic bonds into foreign bonds.

The GPIF will release its new basic portfolio by end-March 2020, while the announcement could take place by end-2019. We see a strong probability that the GPIF would raise the share of foreign bonds then, and its flow could lead to JPY selling.

As of end-December, total AUM managed by the GPIF was at JPY151.4trn (USD1.4trn), and 5% portfolio shift into foreign bonds could generate JPY7.6trn (USD65-70bn) of JPY selling.
In comparison with 2014, market interest in the GPIF portfolio change seems much lower (Figure 4).

Nonetheless, we believe the annual plan released today shows the fund’s investment in foreign bonds will remain significant this year, and the diversification should support cross-yens well (Figure 5).

- source Nomura

So, from an allocation perspective, you probably want to "front run" the GPIF and its lifers friend, given they play "Easy come, Easy Go" particularly well in adding US dollar credit exposure we think.

When it comes to flows, and all the "fun" going into the bond market, it is already happening as per Bank of America Merrill Lynch's note from the 29th of March entitled "Bonds over stocks":

"Dovish central banks revive the bond market

As global central banks continue on their dovish path, more money is flowing into credit and fixed income funds more broadly.

It feels that this trend is here to stay amid low inflation and lack of growth in Europe, and continued political headwinds (Brexit, trade wars). As macroeconomic data trends are bottoming out and central banks continue to remain dovish, we think that credit gap wider risks are limited.

Over the past week…

High grade funds recorded an inflow for the fourth week in a row, albeit at a slower pace than last week. However we note that one fund suffered an outflow of almost $1bn. Should we adjust for that the inflow would have been more than $2.7bn.

High yield funds enjoyed their fifth consecutive week of inflow. Looking into the domicile breakdown, Global-focused funds gathered half of the inflows, with the other half favouring US-focused funds more than European-focused funds.

Government bond funds saw inflows for a second straight week, while the pace has been ticking up over the past couple of weeks. Money Market funds recorded an outflow last week, the strongest over the last five weeks. All in all, Fixed Income funds enjoyed another week of strong inflows.

European equity funds continued to record outflows; the seventh in a row. Note that the pace of outflows shows no sign of slowing down.

Global EM debt funds recorded their fifth consecutive week of inflows. Note that last weekly inflow was the largest in seven weeks. Commodity funds saw another inflow last week, the fourteenth over the past sixteen weeks.

On the duration front, short-term IG funds underperformed whilst mid and long-term IG funds recorded strong inflows amid a broader reach for yield trend." - source Bank of America Merrill Lynch

Follow the flow as they say, but follow Japan when it comes to credit markets exposure, given that they are no small players when it comes to global allocation.

So should you play "defense" allocation wise or continue to go "all in"? On that very subject we read with interest Morgan Stanley's Cross Asset Dispatches note from the 31st of March entitled "Improving the Cycle Indicator – Countdown to Downturn":

"Cycle inflection argues for more cautious portfolio tilt – pare back exposure in US stocks and HY, add allocation to US duration, RoW stocks

But just because a shift in our cycle indicator is imminent, it doesn't mean that broad asset rotation needs to occur now:

Looking at the optimal allocation for the ACWI/USD Agg porfolio, we find that weighting between global equities and bonds doesn't really change materially until a downturn starts. However, rotation within asset classes occurs throughout expansion and into the cycle turn – for example, US equities see weighting fall throughout expansion in favour of RoW stocks, and fixed income portfolios rotate towards long-duration away from intermediate maturities over the same time. In other words, downturn may trigger the broad cross asset allocation, but investors should still look to tilt more defensive within asset classes throughout expansion.

What would this defensive tilt look like? Examining the optimal allocations for: i) USD Agg/ACWI; ii) Multi-asset; and iii) USD Agg portfolios through various cycles over the past 30 years, using realised next one-year returns, these shifts need to occur for a more defensive positioning:

• Pare back equity risk, especially US versus RoW: Optimal weight to stocks tends to fall from expansion to downturn as stocks go from seeing a boost in returns to a drag.
• Reduce US HY to max underweight: Allocation to lower-quality (BBB and HY) corporates typically collapses in expansion, given the unattractive returns profile; downturn only sees performance deteriorate further, taking HY (and BBB) to its lowest weighting in the cycle.
• Tilt towards long-duration in late-cycle, add cash: UST and cash combined have the largest allocation in downturn.

These are largely in line with our current recommendations, based on our cross-asset allocation framework of which the cycle indicator forms one of the three pillars, along with long-run fair value models and short-run expectations from our strategy colleagues.

With long-run capital market assumptions which are below average for most assets, unenthusiastic 12-month forecasts from our strategists and a cycle model that's about to turn, we reiterate our stance to be EW in stocks, with a preference for ex-US equities, EW in bonds, with a tilt towards USTs, and UW in credit, in particular low-quality corporates. For investors looking for late-cycle hedges, we also recommend vol trades like buying credit puts, USDJPY puts and long Eurostoxx calls versus S&P calls to take advantage of dislocations in the vol space." - source Morgan Stanley.

Of course everyone is looking at the inverted US yield curve as a good predictor of a downturn to show up and markets are already pricing rates cut from the Fed. From a lower volatility positioning, it makes sense to be overweight US Investment Grade and adding duration and somewhat reduce exposure to US High Yield. In Europe, when it comes to financials, credit continues to benefit from the ECB support, financial equities, not so much, regardless of the price to book narrative put forward by many sell-side pundits. We continue to dislike financials equities and rather play exposure through credit markets, even high beta offers better value. 

But what about the cycle? Is it already turning in the US given the inversion of the US yield curve? On that specific point Morgan Stanley in their note pointed out the following:

"New cycle indicator, still same old cycle (for now)

Our revamped US cycle indicator suggests that the market is still in expansion. But our model also says there's a high chance (~70%) of a shift to downturn within the next 12 months.

Our market cycle indicators are a central part of our cross-asset framework, launched with our initiation of coverage nearly five years ago. While prior builds have served us well over this time, generally pointing to continued cycle expansion amid bouts of volatility, we have looked to continually improve these indicators. This is the latest iteration.

The main changes to the methodology revolve around index composition, weighting system and the way we systematically categorise cycle phases, relying on breadth of change across metrics instead of moving averages. The result is, in our view, an improved cycle indicator which can better flag turns in real time, with greater confidence and less lag. Currently, the revised US cycle indicator ('v2019') ( Exhibit 22 ) points to continued expansion, driven by many key macro indicators being above-trend ( Exhibit 23 ).

…but a market cycle peak is imminent

We don't think that this expansion can be sustained for long:

Exhibit 26 shows our real-time downturn probability gauge, which estimates the chance of our cycle model inflecting to downturn from expansion within the next 12 months, based on historical experience.

What this chart suggests is that, given the level of the cycle indicator, the chance of a shift to downturn over the next 12 months is elevated at close to 70%, up from ~60% from end-2017 when we last checked up on the cycle.

What's been behind this prediction? The strong unbroken run of improving data over the last year has been the main 'culprit':

Since April 2010, we've not had a six-month period where a majority of the components of the cycle indicator were not improving; it is, to our knowledge, the longest streak in history ( Exhibit 27 ).

Historically, such an environment of data improvement breadth and depth (with the likes of unemployment rate and consumer confidence hitting extreme levels in recent months) has meant a high probability of cycle deterioration in the next 12 months – after all, what goes up must come down. Indeed, the latest disappointing consumer confidence data pushes the number of cycle indicator components deteriorating over the last six months to seven now – enough to be considered 'critical mass'. If such deterioration persists, our rules-based approach to identifying cycle phases could very well call a switch from expansion to downturn as early as next month. At any rate, our market cycle indicator and the probability gauge are very clear – an inflection from expansion to downturn is on the horizon." - source Morgan Stanley

As we indicated on numerous occasions, the cycle is slowly but surely turning and rising dispersion among issuers is a sign that you need to be not only more discerning in your issuer selection process but also more defensive in your allocation process. This also means paring back equities in favor of bonds and you will get support from your Japanese friends rest assured.

It doesn't mean equities cannot rally further, there is still the on-going US-China trade spat yet to be resolved. Right now Macro continues to deteriorate, particularly in the Eurozone with its Manufacturing PMI falling to 47.5 (49.3 - Feb). Germany and Italy were notable contributors to the stronger decline:

• Germany : 44.1 vs 47.6-Feb
• France : 49.7 vs 51.5-Feb
• Italy : 47.4 vs 47.7-Feb
• Eurozone : 47.5 vs 49.3-Feb 

This is a reflection of world trade growth further slowing as highlighted by DHL's Global Trade Barometer from March 2019:

"Key findings:

• Overall GTB index for global trade falls by -4 points to 56 compared to December, signaling only a slight growth and coming ever closer to stagnation.
• Prospects weakening for most surveyed countries – but remain above neutral 50, still indicating positive growth, apart from South Korea
• Outlook for global air trade is sluggish, dropping by -3 to 55 points. Growth of global ocean trade is also slowing down, reflected in an index value of 56, a decrease by -5.

According to the latest three-months forecast by the DHL Global Trade Barometer (GTB) global trade is foreseen to grow only slowly. The overall growth index decreased by -4 points compared to the last update in December, scoring 56 points in March. The slowdown is especially attributed to the significant decelerating growth prospects of India (-18) and South Korea (-12).

Also in the US, trade growth is expected to lose momentum (-5 points), whereas the GTB forecasts for China (-1), Germany (+2), Japan (-2) and the UK (+2) are largely in-line with the previous update.

The outlook for global air trade is sluggish, dropping -3 to 55 points. All surveyed countries are forecasted to slowdown in air trade except for Germany (+9). The largest declines are expected for South Korea (-14), India (-13) as well as Japan (-5). China and US dropping moderately with -3 and -2 points. Moreover, the index for South Korea and UK air trade drops below 50 points, suggesting a contraction of air trade growth.

Global ocean trade outlook is also modest, seeing decelerated growth (-5 points to 56). The largest downturns are found in India (-20), South Korea (-10) and US (-7). German ocean trade further weakened, as the country’s index falls slightly by -2 to 46 points. China (-1 point) is forecasted to decelerate slightly. Meanwhile, ocean trade in the UK (+4 points) and Japan (+2 points) is picking up some steam." - source DHL - Global Trade Barometer, March 2019

With China’s Caixin March manufacturing PMI beating expectations at 50.8 from 49.9 last month (50.0 expected), optimism that China can once again provide the heavy lifting for global growth has been renewed, hence the latest positive tone from financial markets. 

Could it be that we will see weaker growth for longer? In that case bonds could continue to perform in that environment where bad news is good news again thanks to the renewed "Easy Come, Easy Go" stance from central banks.

We can therefore expect US Treasury Notes 10 year yield to fall further in that context. It seems that bond bears were a little bit too hasty in 2018 in the demise of the long duration trade.

We have been asked recently by one of our readers on  the rise in interest rate volatility seen recently through the MOVE gauge index responding by posting its biggest two-day gain since 2016. We replied that it didn't change our recommendation of playing "quality", Investment Grade that is, over "quantity", US High Yield. On that specific point we read with interest Barclays US Credit Alpha note from the 29th of March entitled "Rates Moves Dictates Credit Moves":

Rates Moves Dictating Credit Moves

Interest rate volatility remains high, with consequences for the credit market, as spreads have widened modestly. In addition to the decline in yields, the 3m10y Treasury spread has inverted, and the market is implying a rate cut by the Fed for the first time since the beginning of 2013. The last time 3m10y was inverted and the market implied a significant rate cut was in late 2006, as the prior economic cycle reached maturity. As Figure 2 shows, equities rallied at that point, and credit spreads held in despite concerns about a weaker economy.

An obvious question is whether the current inversion signals the end of the cycle, since, in the past, recessions have occurred on average four quarters after the 3m10y inverts. However, the 2y10y curve has typically already been inverted, which is not the case today. We believe more caution is warranted based on recent curve moves, consistent with our forecast for wider spreads at year-end.

Digging deeper into the relationships of credit markets around the 3m10y inversions in 2000 and 2006, we notice significant differences compared with this year. In both instances, high yield was outperforming investment grade and the BBB/A spread ratio was flat or lower. This seems to support our short-term view that BBBs should outperform their beta.

We had also been advocating owning BBBs versus BBs recently, and the gap between those spreads has moved almost 20bp higher from the recent lows. While a sizable move, it still does not make BBs look particularly cheap. However, we think that differences in trading conventions for the high yield and investment grade markets are behind a lot of the BB underperformance and expect some bounce-back for BBs in spread terms as soon as rates stabilize. Traders are quoting BB prices broadly flat over the past week, as rates rallied and spreads moved 20bp wider. In contrast, BBB bonds are quoted more or less unchanged on spread, but their prices jumped more than a point. Underscoring the technical nature of the move, we note that even within capital structures that have both BBB and BB rated bonds, such as Charter Communications, the basis spiked. As a result, we believe there could be some near-term tactical spread outperformance for BBs." -source Barclays

We could see a continuation in the high beta rally yet it doesn't seem to us vindicated by recent flows, so we would rather stick with our defensive call for the time being.

Given all of the above, we are more inclined towards credit markets and "coupon clipping" and playing it safe through Fixed Income and credit markets as warranted by current fund flows we are seeing and Japanese support coming from overseas. As well our final chart displays the defensive positioning as we enter the second quarter.

• Final charts - The deflation play is back in town

Looking at the dismal macro data which has tilted central banks towards a much more dovish stance, the positioning and fund inflows for the second quarter appear to be more geared towards "deflation assets". Our final chart comes from Bank of America Merrill Lynch The Flow Show note from the 28th of March entitled "Pavlov's Dog Bites Fed" and shows "Deflation vs Inflation flows":

"Positioning into Q2: consensus starts Q2 long “secular stagnation” & “deflation”; YTD $87bn inflows into “deflation assets” e.g. corp & EM bonds & REITs, and $42bn redemptions from “inflation assets”, e.g. EAFE equities & resources (Chart 4); investors are discounting neither recession (they love corporate bonds) not recovery (they don’t like cyclical equities).

Weekly flows: $8.6bn into bonds, $0.4bn into gold, $12.5bn out of equities.

Credit inflows: $5.2bn into IG, $2.2bn into EM debt, $0.9bn into HY.

Max deflation: record redemptions from TIPs ($1.3bn).

Equity outflows: $7.7bn out of US, $4.8bn out of EU, $2.0bn out of EM.

Cyclical outflows: $1.5bn out of financials, $0.4bn out of consumer, $0.2bn out of
tech.

Q2 catalyst: Positioning & Policy were positive catalysts in Q1; Profits will be the catalyst in Q2; we say consensus global EPS numbers remain too high (BofAML Global EPS model forecasts -9% EPS growth in the next 12 months vs. analyst consensus 0% - Chart 5).

Q2 scenarios: evolution of BofAML global EPS model forecasts will determine whether Stagnation, Recession, Recovery the dominant Q2 outcome.

Stagnation: global EPS forecast stagnates @ -5-10% as US growth dips below 2%, global PMIs vacillate around 50, US rates fall toward anchored/negative Japanese & Eurozone rates, secular “Japanification” trade of past 10 years hardens; the big tell...credit bid, volatility offered; the big trades...long 30-year UST, biotech, short resources, volatility.

Recession: global EPS forecast drops to -15% as surge in US unemployment claims indicates US consumer joining manufacturing recession in China, Japan & Eurozone where PMIs drop to 45; the big tells...oil <$50/b, JNK <$33, INJCJC4 >300k; the big trades...short tech & corporate bonds, long T-bills, US dollar & VIX.

Recovery: global EPS forecast turns positive as “green shoots” in Asian exports (Chart 1) & Chinese growth blossom, while lower US rates boost US housing data; credit spreads prove once again they are better lead indicator for risk assets than government bond yields (Chart 6); the tells...SOX >1450, XHB >$42, KOSPI >2350, yield curve steepens; the trades...long global banks, short bunds & US dollar.

Next up: big 5 datapoints in coming week to set course for Q2 (see table 1); tactically we are in Q2 “Recovery” camp; H2 we expect big top in markets before debt deflation/policy impotence leads risk assets lower."  - source Bank of America Merrill Lynch

"Easy Come, Easy Go", we believe that US equities face headwinds coming from a more defensive stance from CFOs ready to defend their balance sheet and start reducing buybacks, CAPEX and even dividends in some instances. This would be more beneficial in that context to credit investors. Earnings are already facing EPS "headwinds". The continuation of the rise in oil prices though is still supportive for US High Yield. Yet, given the "high beta" nature of High Yield, we would prefer to play it safe rather than going all in à la Martin Donovan. 

"There is no gambling like politics."- Benjamin Disraeli, British statesman

Stay tuned ! 

Macro and Credit - The Zeigarnik effect

"Both poker and investing are games of incomplete information. You have a certain set of facts and you are looking for situations where you have an edge, whether the edge is psychological or statistical." -  David Einhorn

Looking with interest at the continuation of the rally in both equities and credit, including the high beta space while looking at the continuation in worsening macro data coming out of Europe, when it came to selecting our title analogy, thanks our fondness for behavioral psychology, we decided to go for the "Zeigarnik" effect given most investors are focusing these days on the uncompleted task of the Fed's balance sheet reduction. In psychology, the "Zeignarnik effect" states that people remember uncompleted or interrupted tasks better than completed tasks. In Gestalt psychology, the Zeigarnik effect has been used to demonstrate the general presence of Gestalt phenomena: not just appearing as perceptual effects, but also present in cognition. If a task is interrupted, the reduction of tension is impeded. Through continuous tension, the content is made more easily accessible, and can be easily remembered. The Zeigarnik effect suggests that students who suspend their study, during which they do unrelated activities (such as studying unrelated subjects or playing games), will remember material better than students who complete study sessions without a break (McKinney 1935; Zeigarnik, 1927). The results of the study of the "Zeigarnik effect" suggest that a desire to complete a task can cause it to be retained in a person’s memory until it has been completed, and that the finality of its completion enables the process of forgetting it to take place. In similar fashion the desire of the Fed to complete its balance sheet reduction could generate we think, a "Zeigarnik effect" in investors mind. After all it seems to us that the Fed's balance sheet contraction is more influential on assets prices than rates hike, hence the importance of the "Zeigarnik effect" but we ramble again...

In this week's conversation, we would like to look at the state of credit markets and US in particular given the significant rise in leverage in recent years versus Europe, as well as the state of the US consumer. 

Synopsis:

• Macro and Credit - R is for "recession" and D is for "deleveraging". 
• Final charts - Central banks to markets: let's be friends again...

• Macro and Credit - R is for "recession" and D is for "deleveraging". 

The central banking cavalry came late to the rescue with both the Fed and the PBOC coming to support risk assets in general and high beta in particular. Given the even weaker tone coming out of Europe we think it won't take long until we see more support coming from the ECB particularly given the grim growth outlook for the likes of Italy and its continuing ailing financial sector. Given that the European Banking Union remain "unfinished business", it is we think another case of "Zeigarnik effect" as the "doom loop" aka the nexus between the sovereign and the banks is yet to be meaningfully addressed. 

In our previous conversation we pointed out to the more pronounced slowdown affecting Europe including France as well. With French Services PMI at 47.5 in January, at the lowest level in the last 4 years versus 49 in December it doesn't bode well for French GDP going forward:

- graph source Bloomberg

This is what we had to say about France in our last conversation about France:

"The situation for French corporate treasures when it comes to cash flows from operations is deteriorating to a level close to 2012-2013 follow the Euro crisis. This we think, warrants close monitoring, given we think that the ongoing "attrition warfare" between the French government and the "yellow jackets" is taking its toll on the French economy as a whole, which as we reminded you last week is very much "services" orientated relative to other countries of the European Union (80% for France vs 76% of GDP on average)." - source Macronomics January 2019

Sure there is global weaker tone when it comes to macro data, but it is no doubt more pronounced in some places and in Europe in particular hence our concerns and the use of the dreaded "R" word, "R" for recession when it comes to Europe, with Germany coming close to it recently.

But, the latest dovish tone from the Fed is very supportive for high beta, bearish US dollar, bullish Emerging Markets equities, bullish gold and gold stocks as well.

With global "easing" on its way back, following investors fears of a policy mistakes and with a Fed more S&P 500 dependent thanks to the wealth effect, credit could see a return of "goldilocks" thanks to low rates volatility. 

The "R" word has been rising as of late thanks to the global deceleration in global trade on top of a flattening yield curve, but when it comes to credit markets in general and US credit markets in particular, it seems that the "D" word, "D" for deleveraging is staging a comeback as indicated by Bank of America Merrill Lynch in their Situation Room note from the 29th of January entitled "The (soft) floor on credit fundamentals":

"The (soft) floor on credit fundamentals

Our view is that large capital structures in the corporate bond market will go to great length to defend their IG ratings as it could become prohibitively expensive to operate in high yield. That (soft) floor on fundamentals remains one of the reasons we are overweight BBB-rated names. We make a couple of timely observations. First, although the situation remains evolving, we note that General Electric – the 6th largest BBB-rated issuer - is now again trading like the BBB-rated name it currently is, which is a remarkable turnaround after trading in line with BB-rated names during its weakest period last October/November (Figure 1).

Second, when Verizon – the second largest BBB - reported earnings this morning they managed to disappoint and the stock declined more than 3%. However with the company’s emphasis on deleveraging credit investors where not disappointed as spreads tightened about 2bps. AT&T – the largest BBB – was downgraded to BBB-flat in June last year. We would argue that for very large issuers BBB-flat is effectively the floor on ratings, as with further downgrades Fallen Angel risk would be too high for many investors. Since June 30, 2018 – when AT&T became BBB-flat rated in the indices – credit spreads in the Telecom sector, which is dominated by Verizon and AT&T, have tightened 12bps even as the overall IG market widened 10bps (Figure 2).

While we appreciate the longer term challenges to the Telecom industry from technological change, for the next several years we are comforted by relatively stable cash flows and the financial flexibility to support BBB ratings afforded by high dividend yields in the 4.5%-6.6% range. Hence our overweight stance on the Telecom sector." - source Bank of America Merrill Lynch

If there is indeed a slowly but surely rise in the cost of capital, yet at more tepid pace thanks to the latest dovish tone from the Fed, then indeed, this could be more supportive for credit, if companies choose the deleveraging route in the US to defend their credit ratings. In this kind of scenario, it would be more "bond" friendly than "equity" friendly from a dividend perspective we think.

In addition to a potential "D" for deleveraging story playing out for the US, Europe as well could also see a more defensive balance sheet stance coming from CFOs given the weakening growth outlook more pronounced on European shores. On that very subject we read some interesting additional points made by Bank of America Merrill Lynch in their note mentioned above:

"Credit Strategy/Equity Strategy: Who are the refi “losers”?

From the era of hubris… to the reality check

Between 2012 and 2017, European corporates basked in ever-declining debt costs, thanks to unprecedented support from the ECB. The result was a steady boost to Earnings Per Share estimates. Buoyant credit markets thus led equity markets higher. But now the tables have turned, and the equity market should be prepared for a reversal of this symbiotic relationship. European credit spreads have doubled over the last year and companies are finding that they must now pay large concessions on bond deals to attract the requisite demand. Moreover, bond refinancing is a pressing need for a number of companies that failed to term-out their debt maturities during the good times. We think that credit markets now signal that EPS downgrades lie ahead.

A walk into the future - who are the refinancing "losers"?

Table 1 screens for European issuers that could see the greatest EPS downgrades from refinancing their 1-5yr debt. Based on today's credit landscape, we calculate EPS hits of up to 4%. Which names tend to be captured by our screen? Those with plenty of frontend debt still, and those where credit markets have already priced-in steep credit curves.

While Table 1 highlights a variety of names, reflecting these mix of themes, (peripheral) utilities, autos, industrials and telecoms feature prominently. And while there may be mitigants to EPS hits for utilities (regulatory regimes) and autos (financial debt), if debt costs continue to rise in Europe, these sectors would be impacted in other ways.

The canary in the credit mine for stocks

At the height of ECB QE, interest costs for European companies had dropped to 20yr lows. However, interest expenses returning to pre-QE levels will likely become a reality, and will be a further headwind to an already slowing profit cycle. EPS Revision Ratios have been trending down since 2017, when credit spreads turned, and our top-down profit cycle model is predicting 0% EPS growth this year. While operational leverage is undoubtedly the key profitability driver, a 100bps rise in interest costs could lead to a ~2% hit to European EPS. Our strategic view on equity styles and sectors is to focus on quality companies with higher profitability and lower leverage - names that we think will be less vulnerable to rising interest cost and widening credit spreads.

Defend the debt…not the dividend

Companies manage to shareholders, not bondholders. That is the unspoken rule. But we believe that this narrative may no longer hold in today's world of tougher debt rollovers. Equity investors should be prepared for companies to "defend" their debt more than their dividend going forward. Equity investors should therefore be mindful of companies with a high quantum of front-end bonds, and with high dividend payout ratios.

Who are the refi "winners" still?

The silver lining for equity investors is that while debt costs are rising everywhere, some companies have been relatively slow to refinance their bonds over the last few years, and are thus paying higher-than-market coupons on their existing debt. When refinancing time comes, we believe these companies (Table 2) will likely see a small EPS boost.

- source Bank of America Merrill Lynch.

Whereas 2018 was not a good vintage for European stocks, then indeed there might be more additional pain for some equities holders should CFOs in Europe as well embrace a more defensive balance sheet stance, though, leverage in Europe has been creeping up at a much slower pace with the exception of France, being the outlier when it comes to corporate credit leverage overall.

We pointed out in our previous conversations that corporate treasurers in France were becoming more cautious given the deterioration they were seeing in their operating cash flows and slowdown in activity. We could therefore see more dividend cuts coming from French local players, if indeed CFOs adopt a more credit friendly approach when it comes to their balance sheet. The French "leverage" is highlighted in the below Barclays chart from their European Equity and Credit Strategy report from the 30th of January entitled "How worried should we be about Credit?":

- source Barclays

In relation to the European situation we read with interest Bank of America Merrill Lynch's Credit/Equity Strategy note from the 29th of January entitled "Who are the refi losers":

"Canary in the credit mine for stocks

The end of all-time lows on interest charges, as QE ends Since the inception of ECB QE in 2015, corporate borrowing costs have been falling up until 2017, when we saw the Euro cost of debt drop to all-time lows (Chart 5).

With ECB QE coming to an end, we have seen widening corporate credit spreads amid a widespread economic downturn and trade tensions. In periods of declining macro conditions, although safe-haven government bond yields tend to fall amid expectations of looser monetary policy, corporate credit spreads tend to widen due to the perception of rising default risks.

Interest expenses returning to pre-QE levels becomes especially important when EPS Revision Ratios in Europe have been trending down since May ’17 (chart 6) and our topdown earnings model predicts 0% EPS growth in Europe over the next 12 months (chart 7).

Unsurprisingly, investors are increasingly demanding that companies preserve cash to pay down debt rather than spend it on dividends or capex (chart 8).

We prefer more defensive High Quality names with lower relative quantities of frontend debt (or flatter credit curves). These are names that are less likely to see a hit to EPS from future debt refinancing, we think. Also similar to the list, we are strategically overweight the Food & Beverages equity sector in Europe.

European stocks dropped 18% last year, peak-to-trough, but have recovered the majority of December’s losses this year. Recent Fed action has clearly brought short-term relief, but so far has failed to generate large inflows back into Euro corporate credit. The key question is whether we can see a repeat of 2016, when the Fed took a long pause – and helped credit markets. However, in Europe, we think the ECB are unlikely to be able to offer new big stimulus, given the political constraints of QE.

We would note that equities have 88% correlation with credit spreads. But credit markets can also serve as useful leading indicators for equity investors. Large declines in EUR HY credit spreads have reliably signaled major troughs in equities in the past. With global growth in question, central banks are the only game in town (chart 9).

The credit market-equity market nexus

Note as well, that our analysis shows that a rise in European high-yield spreads of 100bp leads to an approximate 2% hit to market EPS in Europe (from the current levels). Given that our top-down model for European earnings suggests 0% EPS growth in 2019, we think that this is quite a meaningful number." - source Bank of America Merrill Lynch

If indeed the Fed's dovish pattern has been more positive for US equity holders including the high beta space, we do agree with Bank of America Merrill Lynch that, in Europe, the story might play out differently, with equities benefiting less from the ECB than credit markets overall. With slowing growth we continue to dislike European banks equities. From a credit perspective, it is more on a case by case basis we think but we would rather own selected credit from European banks than their stocks as far as we are concerned regardless of the high beta/cheap valuation put forward by some pundits or "confidence men" out there. 

So does it mean a return for "goldilocks" for credit? Sure they are many external factors such as Brexit and other geopolitical factors that come into play but, given the Fed has been in the driving seat in the most recent "risk-on" mood, there is a potential for a continuation of the rebound but probably not as significant as the one we saw during the second part of 2016 thanks to the rally in oil prices. We have touched this subject before on numerous occasions but when it come to a sustained rally for US High Yield, oil prices do matter a lot given the exposure to the Energy sector. 

With a notable slowdown in global growth on the back of rising angst surrounding the outcome of the trade war between the United States and China, with central banks coming to the rescue there is indeed a potential for credit to continue to perform on the back of the stabilization of fund flows in the asset class. In relation to US corporate credit's potential for pushing the United States into recession, as we stated before, earnings will be essential in 2019. On this subject we read with interest UBS's take from their Global Macro Strategy note from the 28th of January entitled "Credit Perspectives - US Corporate Credit - What we worry about and what we don't":

"While US growth is coming lower, rest of the world growth is still falling even quicker. Much as we think that at the aggregate level there are mitigating factors that imply US corporate debt won't itself lead to a US recession, there seems to be little doubt higher leverage means the US economy is more vulnerable to a profits slowdown, even one that has its origin abroad. The lack of willingness and ability from China to give a major stimulus this time has compromised growth both in Asia and Europe. Given that Asia has been a big driver of the demand for both tech and energy, key sectors for the US LL and HY markets, a slowdown here could have a big impact on US spreads. Energy issuers are still amongst the most vulnerable, even if the breakeven price for shale has fallen to USD 40-50 per barrel on WTI (Figure 24).

At those levels HY energy spreads could rise to 800-1000bps, we estimate. For the IG space, the big risk is European financials, to which US financials display a very tight correlation (Figure 25), and which have widened but less than would have been expected in the face of a sharp growth slowdown in Europe.

However, the decline in credit market liquidity means a sign of relative calm should not be read as a signal of health. Things could change dramatically with a few downgrades, or an uptick in NPLs." - source UBS

Given the significant rally in European credit since the inception of QE in Europe and with the ECB purchasing directly corporate credit, should a new TLTRO materialize in the coming months to continue to support the European financial sector, we do not think the upside will be as significant as seen before. We do have to agree with UBS namely that the "Zeigarnik effect" of our "generous gamblers" will probably be less potent than previously in engineering a significant rebound in credit markets à la 2016.

Moving back to the subject of earnings and risk-on/Goldilocks, we think there is limited upside in 2019 and we did warn in 2018, that when it came to earnings estimates, analysts were being overly optimistic in their outlook. December has clearly set the tone for vicious EPS revisions and cuts in many instances. If indeed CFOs become much more defensive of their balance sheet, then we could see more dividend cuts in 2019, which would be more credit positive, no wonder we suggested to seek higher quality in US Investment Grade versus high beta credit, performance wise, it has been more supportive to play quality (ratings) over quantity (high beta/yield) as highlighted in the below charts from Bank of America Merrill Lynch from their Credit Market Strategist note from the 25th of January entitled "High grades to IG":

"High grades to IG

While equities and high yield ended this week roughly flat (Figure 1) the strong rally in investment grade continued with credit spreads tightening at a roughly 5bps weekly pace (Figure 2).

This makes sense as the key economic data release this week – Jobless Claims – at the best level since the 1960s (Figure 3) confirms recession risk remains remote. Moreover, the Fed remains clearly on hold for an extended period of time (Figure 4) on the negative GDP impacts of tighter financial conditions and uncertainties surrounding trade war and the government shutdown.

For IG, the material decline in rate hiking risks in reaction to just some tenths cuts to economic growth is a good tradeoff. Being relatively more sensitive to economic growth for high yield and equities the tradeoff is a bit different.

The most likely scenario for how this year plays out, in our view, is continued improvement in the macro – US government reopens, Brexit resolves, US–China relations de-escalate and the US economy continues to grow above trend. As financial conditions ease this environment eventually puts the Fed in a position to resume its rate hiking cycle – probably sometime in the middle part of the year – which is going to be a more formidable challenge for IG. For now, we expect tighter credit spreads – although obviously the first big step has already been taken – but over time IG outperformance fades and turns to underperformance. We remain overweight IG corporate bonds." - source Bank of America Merrill Lynch

So yes, clearly, there is room for slightly more tightening with the Fed's dovish tilt and lack of interest rates volatility with falling inflation expectations. In terms of upside, it is a question of not having "great expectations" and being very selective hence the return of global macro and active management at this stage of the cycle with continued rising dispersion. 

Our final charts below clearly highlight the importance of central banks and in particular the Fed in driving asset prices, with its balance sheet policy reduction being the most important factor at play when it comes to the "Zeigarnik effect".

• Final charts - Central banks to markets: let's be friends again...

With the most recent dovish tilt coming out of the US Federal Reserve, no surprise "risk-on" lives on. It is all about after all a question of "growth sensitive assets" as indicated in our final charts from Bank of America Merrill Lynch The Inquirer note from the 30th of January entitled "Wanted: Monetary easing, not Verbal flexibility":

All indicators point to weak global growth, and suggest EASING monetary policy

1) Only 5 out of 38 economies are seeing rising OECD leading economic indicators (LEI). The net proportion of countries with rising LEI is in the bottom decile of its history since 1988. 2) The world's monetary base shrunk 1.7% YoY in November, only the sixth time since 1980. All prior five occurrences of a shrinking monetary base were associated with recessions in Asia/emerging markets, and ALL were eventually associated with global monetary easing. The Fed's plan to "watch paint dry" and shrink its balance sheet by USD50bn/month this year, is likely to shrink the global real monetary base by 5% YoY by end-2019. Global central banks are implying a massive rise in the money multiplier to counteract this, and/or a rise in monetary velocity to keep nominal GDP growth humming. We think these assumptions are heroic. 3) The global 1m earnings revisions at 0.5 (i.e. for every upward revision there are two downward revisions) is in its bottom decile. 4) Asset prices that have an opinion on global growth (Dr Copper, Dr Sotheby's, Dr. Halliburton etc.) are in their lowest decile. Again, prior instances of such analyst pessimism and weak asset prices were followed by monetary easing. Policymakers seem to be flexible, and the markets like this flexibility if data weakens. Next stop easing?" - source Bank of America Merrill Lynch

Given the "Zeignarnik effect" states that people remember uncompleted or interrupted tasks better than completed tasks, it seems that markets are more than happy to remember an incomplete balance sheet reduction from the Fed at this stage but, we ramble again...

"An educated person is one who has learned that information almost always turns out to be at best incomplete and very often false, misleading, fictitious, mendacious - just dead wrong." - Russell Baker, American journalist.

Stay tuned!

Macro and Credit - Zollverein

"An empire founded by war has to maintain itself by war." -  Montesquieu

Watching with interest the evolution of the Brexit negotiations in conjunction with the tone down stance between Italy and the European Commission surrounding the budget, while waiting for the next G20 and potential US and China ease in trade war tensions, when it came to selecting our title analogy, we reminded ourselves of the Zollverein, or German Customs Union. The Zollverein was a coalition of German states formed to managed tariffs and economic policies within their territories, organized under the Zollverein treaties in 1833 and formally starting on the first of January 1834. The foundation of the Zollverein was the first instance in history in which independent states had consummated a full economic union without the simultaneous creation of a political federation or union. The original customs union was not ended in 1866 with outbreak of the Austro-Prussian War, but a substantial reorganization emerged in 1867. The new Zollverein was stronger, in that no individual state had a veto. The Zollverein set the groundwork for the unification of Germany under Prussian guidance. After the defeat in 1918, the German Empire was replaced by the Weimar Republic and Luxembourg left the Zollverein. The rest, as we usually say, is history...

In this week's conversation, we would like to look at what the latest widening in credit spreads mean in terms of outlook for 2019.

Synopsis:

• Macro and Credit - So, you want to short credit?
• Final charts -  Change is in the air for global asset markets

• Macro and Credit - So, you want to short credit?

While we touched in our previous conversation on the widening of credit spreads in general and the impact of falling oil prices on high beta US High Yield CCCs in particular, there has been a lot of chatter recently around the lofty valuations in leveraged loans in conjunction with the fall in prices of the asset class.

Sure no doubt US High Yield CCCs is in the line of fire when it comes to its exposure to the Energy sector:

- source Bank of America Merrill Lynch

Oil prices and US High Yield are highly connected (15%). CCC bucket is feeling the pain right now with 20.1% of exposure to the Energy sector:

- graph source Bloomberg

For sure US High Yield being "high beta" no wonder they raced ahead of the pack when it was a good time to be long Oil. Given the recent unwind of the speculative long positioning in oil and clear deterioration in the global growth narrative, no wonder credit in general and high beta in particular is starting to feel the heat and there is more "heat" to come as per the below chart from Factset displaying the S&P 500 Energy Forward 12-months EPS vs Price of oil for the last 20 years:

- graph source Factset

As well, we argued in the past that the growth divergence between US and Europe were due a difference in credit conditions. 

The divergence between US and European PMI indexes is all about credit conditions. This is why the US is ahead of the curve when it comes to economic growth compared to Europe. We have shown this before but for indicative purposes we will show it again, the US PMI versus Europe and Leveraged Loans cash prices US versus Europe - source Bloomberg from our  November 2013 conversation "In the doldrums":

- graph source Bloomberg

There is a clear relationship we think between credit and macro from our perspective. Today the picture is more contrasted. 

While previously the data for Europe's aggregate PMI was more easily available, the below charts points to a faster deterioration in global growth in Europe (red line), while in the US given the credit cycle is more "advanced", Leveraged Loan prices have started in the US to fall faster than in Europe (blue line):

- graph source Bloomberg

Many financial pundits and central bankers are clearly worried, for good reason about the froth in the Leveraged Loan markets as we are seeing not only prices falling rapidly, but the growth of the sector has been significant as per the below chart from LCD, an offering of S&P Global Market Intelligence displaying the rapid growth in US Loan Funds Assets Under Management:

- graph source LCD, an offering of S&P Global Market Intelligence 

As we pointed out again in our last conversation, our readers know by now that when it comes to credit and macro, we tend to act like any behavioral psychologist, namely that we would rather focus on the "flows" than on the "stock".  As pointed out by the website "LeveragedLoan.com", outflows in both leveraged loans and high yield are starting to "bite":

"Investors Withdraw $2.2B from US High Yield Bond Funds, ETFs

U.S. high-yield funds reported an outflow of $2.19 billion for the week ended Nov. 21, according to weekly reporters to Lipper only. This result reverses positive readings in the prior two weeks, and brings the year-to-date total outflow to roughly $26.5 billion.

The year-to-date total exit continues to mark an unprecedented outflow from high-yield funds, outpacing last year’s total outflow of roughly $14.9 billion, which stands as the largest exit on an annual basis to date.

Mutual funds led the way, posting their largest outflow since February at $1.51 billion. ETFs saw another $682.4 million pulled by investors during the observation period. The four-week trailing average narrowed marginally to negative $427 million, from negative $470 million in the prior week.

The change due to market conditions was a decrease of $1.49 billion, according to Lipper. Total assets at the end of the observation period were roughly $193.4 billion. ETFs account for roughly 22% of the total, at $41.8 billion. — Jon Hemingway

US Leveraged Loan Funds See Hefty $1.7B Cash Outflow

U.S. loan funds reported an outflow of $1.74 billion for the week ended Nov. 21, according to Lipper weekly reporters only. This is the second major outflow of the past four weeks, and just the eighth negative reading of 2018.

Last week’s outflow was the heaviest since the week ended Dec. 16, 2015 ($2.04 billion) and comes just three weeks after a $1.51 billion exodus over the last week of October (this excludes a nominal $1.3 billion mutual-fund outflow for the week ended Nov. 8, which came as the result of a reclassification at a single institutional investor).

With that, the four-week trailing average slumps to $767.8 million, its lowest level in nearly three years.

As with the other recent outflow, mutual funds led the way with $1.07 billion pulled out, while the total for ETFs was roughly $673 million. For ETFs that is the largest exit on record behind the $551.5 million loss for the week ended Oct. 31. Of note, ETF flows were positive in the weeks between, whereas mutual fund flows were negative for the fourth consecutive week.

While last week’s outflow puts a dent in the year-to-date total inflow, it remains a substantial $8.6 billion.

The change due to market conditions last week was a decrease of $774.3 million, the steepest decline since Dec. 16, 2015. Total assets were roughly $105.5 billion at the end of the observation period and ETFs represent about 11% of that, at roughly $12.1 billion. — Jon Hemingway - source LeveragedLoan.com

The S&P/LSTA US Leveraged Loan 100, which tracks the 100 largest loans in the broader Index, lost returned –0.52% in the month to date and 3.46% in the YTD. Sure some pundits would like to point out that contrary to the dismal performance of credit in 2018, in similar fashion to 2008 as indicated by Driehaus on their Twitter feed:

"YTD return is negative on each of the main US credit indexes (High Yield, Investment Grade and Aggregate). 1st time since 2008 that returns for all 3 indexes are negative through mid-November.  Lately, I find myself saying “first time since 2008” a lot more frequently" - graph source Bloomberg - Driehaus - Twitter feed.

Sure, the S&P/LSTA U.S. Leveraged Loan 100 Index is roughly around +3.5% YTD, so still overall unscathed some would argue.  Also in 2008, the index was down by a cool -28%, for perspective but we do think that if you want to go "short" credit, then indeed Leveraged Loans are a "prime" candidate" as pointed out by Peter Tchir in a July 2018 tweet:

"Many forget LCDX traded worse than HYCDX during 2008 due to positioning and then loans were more clearly senior." - source Peter Tchir, Twitter

Given the considerable size in Cov-Lite Loans in this credit cycle, then indeed, if the credit markets start unravelling, Leveraged Loans are clearly in the front line:

- graph source Bank of America Merrill Lynch

Of course Leveraged Loans, are starting to follow the painful path of other segments of the credit markets already in conjunction with global growth decelerating:

"Those of you glued to action in US equities to guide investment positions may want to devote some attention to this chart of returns to senior leveraged loans (SRLN) in excess of T-bills. Likely to be an epicenter of action in the next crisis, and currently breaking trend." - source Adam Butler - Twitter feed

Clearly if indeed credit markets start "breaking bad" in 2019, then for those of you not having the necessary ISDA to short the synthetic LCDX index could use ETFs to express their "short" view on Leveraged Loans as indicated by IHS Markit by Sam Pierson on the 26th of November in his article "ETF lending continues to thrive":

"Not all ETFs can be created out of borrowed securities, in particular those with exposure to illiquid asset classes. One such example is the Invesco Senior Loan ETF, BKLN, which consists of a basket of leveraged loans. The fund has seen increased demand from short sellers in Q4, with over $800m in current loan balances. Only a small handful of the underlying loans have any availability in securities lending, so borrowing shares from long holders of the ETF is essentially the only means of sourcing the borrow. Lenders have attempted to pass through increased rates, though the increased fees in late October and early November saw an immediate response of returned shares, driving fees lower. Once the borrow fee declined the balances picked up and fees have started to move up again. It's worth noting that BKLN has a 67bps expense ratio, which means that if short sellers can borrow for less than that rate there is an arbitrage assuming no movement in the underlying asset class. Additionally, the YTD increase in OBFR means that short selling any easy-to-borrow asset will result in a positive rebate to cash proceeds."

The $BKLN ETF is a popular way to hedge/short the asset class, in part owing the 67bps expense ratio (short sellers benefit from higher expense ratio, all else equal), though increased borrow costs over the last week may, again, dampen demand." - source Sam Pierson, Twitter feed.

As we have argued in our recent November conversation "Stalemate", Housing markets turn slowly then suddenly, same thing goes with Leveraged Loans as pointed out by Peter Tchir. 

The question that everyone is asking when it comes to credit markets as we move towards 2019 and the sell-side is sending out their outlooks is asking ourselves if we will be entering indeed a "bear" market in credit. On this subject we read with interest Morgan Stanley's synopsis and note from their 2019 Outlook for North America published on the 25th of November and entitled "The Bear Has Begun":

"We believe the credit bear market, which likely began when IG spreads hit cycle tights in Feb 2018, will continue in 2019, with HY and then eventually loans underperforming, as headwinds shift from technicals to fundamentals.

A more challenging macro backdrop: In 2018, weakening flows and tighter liquidity conditions served as the key headwinds in credit, but as an important offset, the US economy remained solid. In 2019, we think it gets tougher on both fronts – monetary policy will likely near restrictive territory for the first time this cycle, while the tailwind from a booming economy fades as growth decelerates and earnings growth potentially slows to a standstill. As that happens, late cycle risks may morph into end-of-cycle fears, continuing to break the weak links along the way, especially the more levered parts of corporate credit markets.

Late cycle and beyond: A turn in the credit cycle is not a specific point in time, but instead occurs in stages, over multiple years, beginning when growth is strong. With credit flows turning, financial conditions tightening, and idiosyncratic risks rising, we think that process has already started, slowly for now. And remember, the vulnerabilities in a cycle are always ignored on the way up. As this process continues to unfold and credit conditions tighten, the bull market excesses - this time centered around non-financial corporate balance sheets - should become increasingly clear.

A few silver linings: While we certainly do not think the consensus has embraced the idea that end-of-cycle risks are rising fairly quickly, at the least, sentiment is much less uniformly bullish than it was at the beginning of 2018. Additionally, while spreads are nowhere near where they will likely peak when the cycle fully turns, after the recent sell-off, valuations are not as extreme in places. Both of these factors help at the margin. That said, we very much stick to our bigger picture view that the credit bear market is under way, and until valuations have truly priced in long-term fundamental risks, investors should use rallies to move up-in-quality.

2019 forecasts: In our base case we forecast a -0.8% IG excess return, a 0.5% HY total return and a 1.3% loan total return. We expect $1.24tr, $183bn, and $436bn in IG, USD HY, and institutional loan gross issuance, respectively. Lastly, we project a 2.9% HY default rate.

Recommended positioning: In IG we prefer As over BBBs, Fins over non-Fins, the front-end of the curve, low $- priced bonds, US over European banks, and European over US BBBs. In HY and loans we remain up-in-quality, and prefer short-duration HY bonds. We have a modest preference for loans over HY, but think that view may change later in the year. In derivatives we prefer long CDX risk to cash, owning long-dated vol, positioning for decompression, and buying BBB CDS protection vs index." - source Morgan Stanley

As we pointed out in our previous note, credit mutual flows matter and it's probably matters as well for the Fed as well given the most recent dovish rhetoric coming from its chairman Jerome Powell. The latest price action in both the US dollar and Emerging Market equities is giving some much needed respite to the Macro tourists, which have been on the receiving end of the Fed's QT and hiking policy. 

Weakening flows clearly have been a trend this year in credit markets as indicated by Morgan Stanley in their long interesting outlook note:

"Restrictive Fed Policy and Decelerating Growth – a Tougher Combination

Tightening liquidity conditions should remain a headwind in 2019, at least initially, as the Fed pushes rates near restrictive territory, while continuing to shrink its balance sheet at the maximum rate, for now. Taking a step back, for most of 2018, we argued that a tightening in Fed policy, especially in the current cycle, was a material headwind for credit. In a nutshell, central bank stimulus was massive in this cycle, and highly supportive of credit. We thought the process in reverse, at the least, would weaken the flows into credit markets, driving higher volatility, with less of a “liquidity buffer” to cushion the shocks. In our view, these headwinds have materialized, just slowly and in stages. As we show in Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 3, flows into credit markets did weaken in 2018 across multiple sources.

Weakening flows clearly hit global credit markets this past year, one-by-one. For example, Exhibit 4 shows the spread widening in 2018 in US IG, in EM credit, in European credit, and most recently in US high yield, with financial conditions tightening in the process.

As we have frequently argued, fundamental issues are easier to hide when liquidity is flooding into markets, and it is not anymore. As liquidity conditions get squeezed, it is natural for dispersion in performance across asset classes, regions, sectors, and single names to pick up, with the weak links breaking first. US high yield was more resilient for most of the year than other markets, in part due to very low supply, and in part given its close ties to the strength in the US economy. But even HY, the "resilient" credit market, has only managed a roughly flat total return YTD, despite very strong earnings growth, a solid US economy, and supply down ~30%, which we think speaks to the importance of this tightening in liquidity conditions.

Looking to 2019 – two points are key to remember: 1) The liquidity withdrawal is going to accelerate, at first, and 2) unlike in 2018, it will happen as growth is decelerating. We think this will create an even more challenging backdrop, with the outperformance of higher beta credit fading as a result. On the first theme, as we alluded to above, our economists expect two more rate hikes in 2019 (after one more hike in December 2018).

We can debate where monetary policy sits in relation to neutral, but in our view, the flattening in the Treasury curve this past year, the tightening in financial conditions, as well as some of the weakness in key interest rate-sensitive parts of the economy, such as housing and autos, tells us that monetary policy is already pretty close to ‘tight.’ And remember, this tightening will not be just a US phenomenon going forward, as we see it. The ECB will be done buying bonds next year and hike in 4Q19, and the BoJ and BoE will hike in 2Q19, with the BoJ likely to reduce JGB purchase amounts as well, according to our economists.

But remember, throughout 2018, investors could consistently fall back on the idea that the US economy was booming with extremely strong earnings growth. Hence, it was easier to write off the multitude of macro headwinds (i.e, tighter Fed policy, tariffs, China/EM weakness, Italian politics, etc…) as “noise.” Going forward, these dynamics are changing. We expect US growth to decelerate notably, from 3.1% in 2018 to 1.7% in 2019, (with GDP growth of just 1.0% in 3Q19) as fiscal stimulus starts to fade, the interest rate-sensitive parts of the economy (i.e., autos/housing) continue to soften, financial conditions tighten, and tariffs weigh on business investment.

As we show in Exhibit 9, the global economy has already slowed, with the US bucking the trend so far, thanks in part to atypical late-cycle fiscal stimulus, but we think the US will converge to the downside as 2019 progresses.

Even more importantly, our equity strategists expect a material slowdown in earnings growth, with the likelihood of an outright earnings recession for a quarter or two in 2019 reasonably high. In their view, comps get very challenging next year, and margins will compress, with slower top-line growth and costs rising in many places, despite consensus expectations for margin expansion. We think markets are finally waking up to these earnings/growth risks with this recent sell-off.

Yes, 1.7% GDP growth is still manageable, and far from recessionary levels. In fact, one could make the case that this level of growth is ideal for credit – not too hot, not too cold. While we don’t disagree at a high level, we think details matter. In our view, slower growth in the middle of a cycle, which drives very accommodative central bank policy, is ideal. A slowdown in growth near the end of a cycle as a result of a restrictive Fed is not, and we think runs the risk that investors start to price in a higher likelihood that the cycle is coming to an end.

With growth slowing, and financial conditions tightening, will the Fed stop hiking? For now, we think the Fed "put" is fairly deep out of the money. Unlike at past points in this cycle, the Fed’s hands are more tied, with growth well above trend, unemployment at ~40 year lows, and core PCE now at 2%. That said, our economists expect the Fed to pause its rate hike cycle in 3Q19 and to end balance sheet normalization in Sep-19. For a short period of time, these dynamics could certainly boost sentiment. Longer term, we are not sure that they would be so bullish for markets. If the Fed stops hiking because they are at their perceived neutral rate and they believe inflation trends are benign, that may be positive. But if they stop hiking because the economy is weakening, that may be quite negative. In fact as we show in Exhibit 12, the biggest bouts of spread widening in a cycle, especially in HY, happen from the point when the Fed stops hiking, until deep into the rate cutting cycle, as that is when growth is rolling over.

Regardless of exactly when the Fed pauses, in this cycle, buying when growth is booming has not worked well (Exhibit 13), and we think this time will be no different as the macro backdrop reverts back down to, or even below, trend.

Adding everything up, we think macro challenges will grow in 2019. Monetary policy will continue tightening, with global central banks committed to removing stimulus, for now. All while the environment of very strong US growth and very robust earnings growth will fade. We think that backdrop will become even tougher for credit, especially some of 2018’s outperformers like US HY and loans, and continue to expose the fundamental challenges in the asset class built up over nearly a decade-long bull market." - source Morgan Stanley

Rising dispersion has clearly been the theme in 2018 when it comes to credit. The Fed's tightening stance in conjunction with QT and the surge in the US dollar have clearly been headwinds for the rest of the world. Yet the US have shown in recent months that it wasn't immune to gravity and deceleration as the fiscal boost fades in conjunctions in earnings and buybacks. 2018 also marks the return of cash in the allocation tool box and many pundits have started to play defense by parking their cash in the US yield curve front-end. Clearly the narrative has been changing and as we stated in our previous conversation:

"When the Credit facts change, I change my Credit mind. What do you do, Sir ..." - source Macronomics

Our final chart below indicates that change is in the air for global asset markets and that 2019 could prove to be even trickier than 2018 as the credit cycle continues to gradually turn.

• Final charts -  Change is in the air for global asset markets

The latest "dovish" take from Fed Jerome Powell's speech is clearly enticing to trigger some short term rally , we do think that 2019 will eventually be even more challenging as global growth is decelerating. Our final charts come from Bank of America Merrill Lynch from their Commodity Strategies 2019 outlook from the 18th of November and show that there is a trend for higher interest rates and volatility ahead of us:

"Equity markets are sowing winds of change

While higher real interest rates have been a clear headwind to gold, the rise in the global risk free rate also seems to push up equity market volatility. Our equity derivatives team has been warning about this trend of higher interest rates and higher volatility for some time (Chart 134).

True, global equity markets have been a tale of two cities this year, with US equity markets rising and the rest of the world lagging (Chart 135). But the pickup in volatility suggests that change is in the air for global asset markets

A rising VIX will eventually force the Fed to slow...

It is easy to forget that the S&P500 total return index posted a Sharpe ratio of 3.0 last year, but it is running just on 0.5 this year. Of course, the large pick up in equity market volatility (VIX) is hurting risk-adjusted equity market returns (Chart 136).

But also equity markets have struggled to break higher this year on a number of factors. The most important issue for gold here, however, is that a further drop in equity market values could eventually encourage the Fed to slow down its monetary tightening path (Exhibit 6).

So higher equity vol will likely lend support to the yellow metal going forward." - source Bank of America Merrill Lynch

When it comes to our Zollverein analogy, while Italy continues to be a concern, we believe that France should clearly be on everyone's radar as the situation is deteriorating in conjunction with its public finances. It remains to be seen if 2019 will see the New Zollverein aka the European Union coming under pressure as it did in 1919, leading in Germany to the introduction of the Weimar Republic but, we ramble again...

"Look back over the past, with its changing empires that rose and fell, and you can foresee the future, too." - Marcus Aurelius

Stay tuned !