Showing posts with label John Taylor. Show all posts
Showing posts with label John Taylor. Show all posts

Monday, 18 September 2017

Macro and Credit - The Two Who Stole The Moon

"Three things cannot be long hidden: the sun, the moon, and the truth." - Buddha

Watching with interest the continuation of the beta trade in conjunction with new record highs in US equities, we listened with great interest to the interview on Bloomberg of the always wise real Gandalf of central banking namely William White from the OECD. In this must see interview, the former great wizard of the BIS goes through the "end game" and the current state of affairs. Given recent discussions in the central banking world of helicopter money and also the growing discussions about universal basic income, while thinking about our title analogy, we reminded ourselves of the 1962 Polish children's film based on  Kornel Makuszyński's 1928 story "The Two Who Stole the Moon". The film stars the Kaczyński twins, two of the country's future political leaders of Poland incidentally. Despite having been known to Polish children for many generations, the film gained renewed fame in the 2000s because it starred two of the country's future leaders: Lech Kaczyński, who served as President of Poland from 2005 until his death in a 2010 plane crash, and his identical twin brother Jarosław Kaczyński, the Prime Minister of Poland from 2006 to 2007, Chief of Office of the President of Poland from 1990 to 1991, and current chairman of the Law and Justice party. The twins were thirteen at the time. The story of the film we are using as a title analogy is about two twins, Jacek and Placek who are two cruel, greedy and lazy boys whose main interest is eating, eating anything, including chalk and a sponge in school. One day they have the idea of stealing the moon; because, after all, it is made of gold:
"If we steal the moon, we would not have to work""But we do not work now, either...""But then we would not have to work at all".
After a few small adventures, they really manage to steal the moon. Immediately a gang of robbers notices the little thieves and captures them. The two regain their freedom, and one of the twins devises a plan to enter the "City of Gold". The plan works, but when the robbers try to collect the gold, they turn into gold themselves. The twins escape and then run home and promise to help their parents with their work as farmers. In similar fashion, our central bankers have been stealing the "printing press" and the idea of "helicopter money" or universal basic income is doom to fail given as posited by Adam Smith:
"Labour was the first price, the original purchase - money that was paid for all things. It was not by gold or by silver, but by labour, that all wealth of the world was originally purchased." - Adam Smith
No matter how our central bankers or bitcoin followers would like to play it, even after "stealing the moon", as the Polish children story goes, the twins ended up having to work with their parents as farmers, labour being the first price, the original purchase, but we ramble again...

In this week's conversation, we would like to look at the financial conditions versus the upcoming update of the Fed's dot plot.

Synopsis:
  • Macro - Losing the dot plot
  • Credit - US Investment Grade - putting the brakes on leverage
  • Final chart - The only easy day was yesterday

  • Macro - Losing the dot plot
In our previous conversation "Aleatoricism", we discussed how immune the US yield curve has been to the Fed's "Jedi tricks" given the on-going flattening stance and the recession predictability of an inversion of the US yield curve. A very important point mentioned we think was that with a December hike, the threshold for a 69.2 percent chance of a recession during the next 17 months (average lead time) according to the study we quoted and made by Wells Fargo would be reached. Their framework has predicted all recessions since 1955 with an average lead time of 17 months, therefore one wants to be extra careful in 2018 for any signs of slowdown/recession. What is of interest and in continuation to our last conversation relating to the Fed's dot plot with the upcoming update is that the Taylor rule has fallen about 20 bp since the June update. Financials conditions matter particularly when looking at the Taylor rules used by the Fed. On this subject we read with interest Deutsche Bank's Fed Notes from the 13th of September entitled "Can loose financial conditions save the Fed's dots?":
"With an announcement to begin tapering balance sheet reinvestment viewed as nearly a done deal at next week’s FOMC meeting, focus will be on any signs of a shift in the Fed’s views about the expected policy rate path as represented by the “dots.” While the recent string of soft inflation prints argues for some downgrade to the dots, one key question is how much, if at all, loose financial conditions can counterbalance disappointing inflation and support the Fed’s rate hike expectations.
Taylor rules and financial conditions
Financial conditions have eased considerably in recent months. After bouncing around near zero just prior to the US election – a level indicating that financial conditions were broadly neutral for growth – our high-frequency financial conditions index (FCI) rose to its highest (i.e., most growth-supportive) level in several years in August (Figure 1).

Our FCI has declined slightly over the past month but continues to indicate that financial conditions are loose, signaling solid growth in the coming quarters.
As our FCI has risen, traditional Taylor rules, which do not account directly for financial conditions, have fallen sharply. In recent years, the predicted fed funds rate from a Taylor rule espoused by Chair Yellen in a March 2015 speech has implied a fed funds rate above the Fed’s actual policy rate. However, the recent decline in measures of the neutral fed funds rate, or r-star, and recent soft inflation, have led to a collapse in the prescribed fed funds rate towards the actual policy rate. Indeed, after peaking near 2% at end-2016, the fed funds rate implied by Yellen’s preferred rule has fallen to near 1.2%, just above the current effective fed funds rate (Figure 2).

And the predicted fed funds rate from this Taylor rule has fallen about 20bp since the Fed last updated their dots in June.
Does the easing in financial conditions alter this story? In previous work, we constructed an FCI-augmented policy rule to quantify how movements in financial conditions would affect fed funds rate prescriptions from traditional Taylor rules. In that work, we converted the level of our FCI into a fed funds rate equivalent at each point in time, and then incorporated this value into the Taylor rule that
Yellen mentioned.
According to this FCI-augmented Taylor rule, loose financial conditions in recent months have consistently added between 30 and 50bp to the typical Taylor rule prescriptions (Figure 3).

Nevertheless, the FCI-augmented Taylor rule has also fallen considerably. After peaking at around 2.25% in February 2017, with core PCE inflation near 1.9% and the Laubach-William’s measure of r-star around +0.1%, the FCI-augmented Taylor rule has fallen nearly 60bp to 1.69%. It has also fallen by about 5bp since the Fed last updated their rate expectations at the June FOMC meeting. In other words, loose financial conditions are only able to partially offset the decline in the fed funds rate predicted by traditional Taylor rules.
Do Fed officials care about financial conditions?
There is correctly some skepticism about how important financial conditions are for the Fed outlook. Some officials, such as NY Fed President Dudley, clearly put meaningful weight on financial conditions. But financial conditions are less of a focus for other Fed officials, and in fact, the traditional Fed view has been that financial conditions and financial stability considerations are typically better dealt with via supervision and regulation tools, not monetary policy.
In this context, it is important that the FCI-augmented rule can also be interpreted as capturing a forward-looking element to monetary policy expectations. Financial conditions provide an important signal about economic growth in the upcoming quarters (Figure 4).

In turn, FCIs provide information about future developments in the Fed’s dual mandate – full employment and 2% inflation. Fed officials that are less inclined to place significant weight on financial conditions may therefore still want to consider the impact of financial conditions on growth, the labor market, and inflation when setting their expectations for rate increases in the coming quarters. That is, current loose financial conditions can provide some support for a view that growth will remain solid, the labor market will continue to tighten, and inflation should rise from current low levels.
Financial conditions alone unlikely to save the dots
Recent soft inflation prints have been a critical driver of the decline in Taylor rule predictions for the fed funds rate. As such, a rebound in the inflation  trend in upcoming months would produce a meaningful increase in rule-based prescriptions. This Thursday’s US CPI print could also be critical for the September dots. A stronger print that is in line with our expectations and consensus, could give the Fed some confidence in their central narrative that inflation should rebound and return towards the Fed’s 2% objective after recent weakness.
We will detail our expectations for the dots more precisely in a September FOMC preview note later this week. But while loose financial conditions are likely to help keep rate hike expectations stable for some key Fed officials, like Dudley, the conclusion from our analysis here is that financial conditions alone are unlikely to be enough to save at least some Fed dots from falling." - source Deutsche Bank
US CPI came out at 0.4% month-on-month and 1.9% year-on-year, which was above expectations of 1.80%. It's too early to expect a rebound inflation towards the Fed's 2% target we think. On that point we disagree with Deutsche Bank. Deutsche Bank in their Japan Economics Weekly note from the 25th of August entitled "The decline in labor share touched a very important point relative to our Norwegian Blue parrot aka the Phillips Curve when it comes to wages and productivity relative to the end of an economic expansion:
"Financial markets think that a strong economy tightens the labor market, driving wages up, but people who are hired closer to the end of an economic expansion phase have lower productivity and are hence paid lower wages. Thus, the preconception that the rise in per-capita wages accelerates in an economic expansion is doubtful." - source Deutsche Bank
This is exactly what we have been saying when discussing recently the Phillips curve, the deflationary bias of capitalism and the Experience Curve. As we move towards the end of an economic expansion in the US, productivity has been falling, and jobs have been mostly created for lower skills workers, hence the lower wages conundrum weighting on inflation expectations.

Also, when it comes to including Financial Conditions in the Taylor rules, this is a subject we discussed in our conversation "An Extraordinary Dislocation" given we would prefer the Fed used a Wicksellian Differential:
"Before we start our usual Macro and Credit musing we would like as a reminder to discuss Wicksell Differential and the credit cycle (linked to the leverage cycle). Wicksell argued in his 1898 book Interest and Prices that the equilibrium of a credit economy could be ascertained by comparing the money rate of interest to the natural rate of interest.  This simply equates to comparing the cost of capital with the return on capital. In economies where the natural rate is higher than the money rate, credit growth will drive a positive disequilibrium in an economy. When the natural rate of interest is lower than the money rate which is the case today (rising Libor), the demand for credit dries up (our CCC credit canary are being shut out of credit markets) leading to a negative disequilibrium and capital destruction eventually. In a credit based global macro world like ours, the Wicksellian Differential provides a better alternative estimation of disequilibrium than the more standard Taylor Rule approach of our central bankers. At the Bank for International Settlements since 1987, Claudio Borio and his colleague Philip Lowe wrote in 2002 a very interesting paper entitled “Asset prices, Financial and Monetary Stability: Exploring the Nexus”, BIS Working Papers, n. 114. In this paper the authors made some very important points that are worth reminding ourselves today:
"Widespread financial distress typically arises from the unwinding of financial imbalances that build up disguised by benign economic conditions […] Booms and busts in asset prices […] are just one of a richer set of symptoms […] Other common signs include rapid credit expansion, and, often, above-average capital accumulation" - source BIS 
So when we hear Janet Yellen at the Fed saying the following:
  "Asset values aren’t out of line with historical norms." -Janet Yellen, 21st of September 2016
We reminded ourselves that Wicksell used just the housing sector to illustrate his theory. Excess lending dear Mrs Yellen, always lead to "overinvestment". Just because the Taylor Rule used by the Fed doesn't include asset prices, it doesn't mean in our book that asset values are not out of line of historical norms
Why is the Wicksellian Differential so important when it comes to asset allocation? Either profits increase due to an increase in the return of capital and/or a fall in the cost of capital (buybacks funded by a credit binge)." - source Macronomics, October 2016
Of course the Wicksellian Differential is an ex-post measure, so, it isn't that helpful for investors as a predictor (or the Fed but still better than a crude Taylor rule).

The leverage ratio and the rate of profit or changes in general price level or output per worker are much better factors to take into account for designing a predictive tool. We also pointed out in our previous conversation the importance of the Fed's quarterly Senior Loan Officer Opinion Surveys (SLOOs) in terms of credit impulse and credit availability guides for the US credit markets. As we pointed out last week, we do monitor as well the shape of the High Yield credit curve through its proxy the CDX High Yield CDS index. We also look at the ability of the CCC rated US High Yield segment's ability in tapping the credit markets as a sign of tightening financial conditions:

- source Bank of America Merrill Lynch

Overall the market is pretty much open still for the CCC rating bucket (the Energy sector and Healthcare being the most prominent sectors in the US), yet for the last 12 months, the trend of the market has been somewhat a tad tighter as per the above graph.

What is of interest to us is the importance of comparing the cost of capital with the return on capital from a Wicksellian Differential perspective hence the importance of tracking the evolution of the cost of capital as pointed out by Wells Fargo in their Interest Rate Weekly note from the 13th of September entitled "Evolution of the Cost of Capital Over the Business Cycle":
"Equity capital is one factor in financing economic growth and yet the cost of equity capital varies over the business cycle.
Top Line Growth: The Reward for Capital Investment
Nominal GDP growth provides a starting point to judge the top-line growth opportunities for business and thereby a measure of incentives to balance against the cost of capital.
As illustrated in the below graph, nominal GDP growth provides evidence of a linear downward trend over time.

This downward trend in growth signals that nominal GDP growth is not a mean-reverting series. This observation stands against the claim that somehow nominal growth and capital returns will come back to some average value over time.
The Price-Earnings Ratio: Another Non Mean Reverting Series
Commentators frequently argue that equity price-earnings ratios are either above or below some average value and that this difference indicates the equity market is under or overvalued. However, as illustrated by the below graph, an average value can be calculated for any time series, but that does not indicate that the behavior of that series will return to some average value. Mean-reverting behavior for a series cannot simply be assumed. 

In fact, the P/E ratio is not mean reverting. There have been significant shifts in the series in October 1987 (downward) and in October 1991 (upward) and then down again in July 2002. In fact, the P/E ratio is dependent on the behavior of several economic fundamentals such as expected nominal growth and interest rate polices as well as regulatory changes and exogenous shocks that alter the risk/reward calculus. The P/E ratio is not independent of the economic cycle and, instead, a product of the many forces of the economic cycle.
CAPE Ratio: Another Product of Economic Fundamentals
Cyclically adjusted price/earnings (CAPE) is another measure to judge the pattern of equity finance costs relative to a recent past (bottom graph). This series, as well as the P/E ratio itself, is subject to many exogenous forces that result in a pattern of behavior that reflects the influence of economic, political and regulatory forces.
The CAPE ratio is not mean-reverting, thus there is no single number that is the standard of value. Second, the CAPE ratio is subject to several shocks that shift the behavior of the series (Sep. 2001, Oct. 2008, Nov. 1998) such that the ability to judge the cost of equity finance relative to the recent past will have to adjust to the many structural shifts in the CAPE series.

Since the 1970s, the CAPE ratio does evidence peaks prior to a recession but the series also provides evidence of declines such that the CAPE ratio does not appear to provide a reliable leading indicator. Instead, the CAPE ratio itself is an endogenous part of the economic cycle and is a function of ongoing changes in economic activity as the business cycle matures." - source Wells Fargo
Of course there have been so many articles relating to lofty valuations in many various asset classes from the usual perma-bear crowd, which will be right in the end. But, what matters we think, is the potential change in the central banking narrative. For us, as we pointed out in various musings, for a bear market to materialize, you would need a buildup of inflationary pressure that would reignite the volatility in bonds via the MOVE index. This would create the necessary conditions for a change in the direction of markets. In our recent musings, we pointed out that in the on-going credit "Goldilocks" scenario, already expensive asset classes would become even more expensive, going to 11 that is, in true Spinal Tap fashion.

On another note, whereas the first part of the year saw a significant rally in Emerging Markets equities thanks to  US dollar woes and our correct January call, we are wondering if indeed the US dollar is not due for a bounce, should some tax reforms be passed by the US administration.

When it comes to credit and the lowering of quality we have witnessed in US Investment Grade, leverage in recent years has been going up thanks to buybacks and M&A. As of late there seems to be a pause at this stage, which is "credit friendly".

  • Credit - US Investment Grade - putting the brakes on leverage

The latest rafts of earnings report, in conjunction with the SLOOs we mention, have shown us that Financial Conditions are still loose. Richer equity valuations have somewhat dampened the appetite of CFOs in pursuing buybacks as well as M&A for the time being. When it comes to the current stability of credit spreads, this is a welcome respite given leverage is higher in the US than in Europe as indicated by Société Générale in their Market Wrap-up note from the 29th of August entitled "Where US leverage is rising the most":
"US balance-sheet leverage has risen
Chart 1 shows the change in US debt/equity. The weighted average is shown in blue; the median is shown in brown. Both have risen since around 2013, and while the weighted average is not quite back to 2002/3 levels, the median is within a whisker of these points.
How did we get here? Chart 2 shows the breakdown of the median leverage numbers by industry. Two sectors – Real Estate and Utilities – have seen only modest increases. Other sectors have risen more sharply, and the biggest rise has been in Mining & Energy, still the sector with the lowest overall leverage.

US income-sheet leverage has also risen 
Chart 3 shows the weighted average of US net debt/EBITDA;

Chart 4 shows the median level. Of the two, Chart 4 is more worrying.

The weighted average level of income-sheet leverage is nowhere near the 2001 peak (let alone the late-2008 peak) and has been declining since early 2016. The median figure keeps climbing and is now close to the 2002 peak.
Looking at net debt/EBITDA by sector confirms the concerns with the median figures. Chart 5 shows that leverage has dropped slightly in the Mining & Energy sector but continues to rise in the Consumer and Industrials sectors, while Telco leverage has been flat.

The Consumer and Industrial sectors are among the most cyclical in the index, so if the economy turns down and EBITDA starts to decline, we should expect these leverage ratios to jump much more sharply.
Income-statement leverage has also been rising in the Real Estate and Utilities sectors, which we show separately in Chart 6 to make both charts more legible. 
US cash-flow leverage is up as well
Finally, we turn to interest coverage, our cash-flow leverage indicator. Charts 6 and 7 show the weighted average and median levels of the indicator across the IG and HY universes.

Net interest coverage, which we plot in reverse to make these charts comparable to the preceding ones, has been falling, but this fall has stabilised on an average basis and is declining in median terms. This is comforting, but remember that interest coverage is probably going to be the last leverage indicator to flash warning signs.
It’s worth noting moreover that the worsening in interest cover since 2010 has largely been limited to two sectors – Mining and Real Estate. In addition, real estate interest coverage remains high in absolute terms:
Conclusion: reasons to worry about the cyclicals 
What should we conclude from these numbers? Balance-sheet leverage and income-sheet leverage are both near the top of their historical ranges, so both are giving warning signals. A drop in EBITDA and net income would lead to historical highs both in income and cash leverage. This, combined with relatively tight spreads, should make investors more defensive on the US credit market.
The sectors where we are most wary are first Mining & Energy and second the Consumer and Industrial sectors. The problems of the Mining & Energy sector are well known; by contrast the cyclical Consumer and Industrial sectors are probably more vulnerable than investors realise. Telecoms are also showing higher leverage and could be challenged if interest rates rise and refinancing conditions become more difficult. The most defensive sector is certainly Utilities, with Real Estate fairly defensive too in comparison to historical leverage levels." - source Société Générale
As we are slowly but surely moving towards the end of this long credit cycle, we do agree that it is time to start building up defenses and move up the quality ladder, yet there is no denying that we are currently seeing some respite not only through better SLOOs but also with CFOs tempering their appetite for increasing leverage in the US as indicated by Bank of America Merrill Lynch Situation Room note from the 13th of September entitled "Spending less on stocks":
"Spending less on stocks
With even the late reporters 2Q results in by now, data from US non-financial high grade issuer cash flow statements shows that companies have again reduced spending on both share buybacks and acquisitions during the quarter (Figure 1, Figure 2).

This spending has been trending down as a share of free cash flow as well (Figure 3).

The decline is notable because buying your own or other company equity is typically the biggest drivers of leverage for the high grade market (Figure 4).

The reason for the decline is likely a combination of richer equity valuations as well as better growth globally that allows companies to deliver EPS growth without resorting to financial engineering. Finally, robust supply volumes in the first half despite decelerating cash needs supports our view that issuance was front-loaded this year.
Aggregate data for our universe of high grade issuers shows expenditure on net share buybacks declining from $84bn in 4Q-16 to $73bn in 1Q and $64bn in 2Q. Similarly spending on acquisitions fell from $99bn in 4Q-16 to $72bn in 1Q and $62bn in 2Q." - source Bank of America Merrill Lynch.
Although this is a welcome respite, US Investment Grade spreads benefit from a bigger interest rate buffer than European Investment Grade spreads, so if and when the ECB decides to taper its purchases the impact will be different. But, given the cyclical exposure to US Investment Grade, slower growth would probably have a more meaningful impact in the US thanks to the leverage difference. We might not be heading for the bunker yet and don a kevlar helmet, but, we are keeping a close eye on 2018 for potential signs of exhaustion in the credit and business cycle.


  • Final chart - The only easy day was yesterday
Whereas Financial Conditions matter for Taylor rules as per our macro bullet point, it remains to be seen how accommodative the Fed is going to be at its next FOMC meeting, whether it will keep a somewhat dovish stance or adopt a more hawkish tone, relative to its worries about Financial Stability, meaning they would start indicating they are about to drain some alcohol out of the credit punch bowl they have been serving for so many years. After all, in our book the Fed is the "credit cycle". Our final chart comes from Bank of America Merrill Lynch and displays the National Financial Conditions Index from the Chicago Fed, as goes the saying, the only easy day was yesterday, for tomorrow, we are not too sure:
"The best high level metric that reflects these benign conditions is the Chicago Fed’s National Financial Conditions Index seen in Chart 3. It’s tightened ever-so-modestly in the past month, going from -0.88 to -0.85. But the long term perspective shows that we are still in record territory as far as easy financial conditions. A slightly lower level of - 0.898 was observed in June 2014, but we have to go all the way back to August 1993 to the all-time low of -1.0 – not very far from where we are today; it was six months later, in early 1994, that a dramatic and disruptive hiking cycle began, but those were different times. Financial conditions don’t really get much easier than they are today.
With that in mind, the question is whether the Fed is ready to shift the framework at next week’s meeting, and deliver a more hawkish message than markets expect. As one gauge of the market’s dovish view of the Fed, there is currently a 53% probability assigned to a December rate hike (up from about 20% a week ago, but still well below 100%), and there is still about a 75 bp spread between what the market thinks for YE 2018 versus the Fed’s last dot plot. As we noted last week, this disconnect seems to represent a source of near-term risk for securitized products spreads; it’s the #1 reason we think spreads are more likely to widen than tighten in September-October. With financial conditions as easy as they are, and with a 10yr breakeven inflation expectation of 1.85% (in other words, pretty close to 2.0%), the Fed seems to have a great opportunity to deliver a hawkish message. Obviously, though, hawkish has not really been the MO for the Yellen Fed, so it seems reasonable to assume a “balanced” outcome is most likely.
If the Fed is dovish next week, securitized products spreads will probably tighten, but modestly. If the Fed confirms the market view, and December hike probability is still at about 50% a week from now, spreads will likely remain range-bound. If the Fed is hawkish, and hike probabilities increase materially, we expect spread widening. We think there is some asymmetry around spread widening potential relative to tightening potential, so we retain our defensive posture for September-October. If it’s a dovish Fed next week, we’ll give up on the defensive posture. If it’s hawkish, and spreads begin to widen, we will eventually look to add on spread weakness. Longer term, for fundamental and technical reasons, we remain constructive on securitized products." - source Bank of America Merrill Lynch
The major big question we have these days is relative to the direction of the dollar. Will it continue to "break bad" or are we due for some important rebound which would have implications for the rally seen so far this year in Emerging Markets equities? We wonder but, we are not lazy enough to go and steal the moon just yet...

"Don't tell me the moon is shining; show me the glint of light on broken glass." -  Anton Chekhov

Stay tuned ! 

Saturday, 23 April 2011

"Arx tarpeia Capitoli proxima" or the recent US Downgrade threat and the Fed dual mandate issue

"Arx tarpeia Capitoli proxima"

The price of continued US lax fiscal policies has seriously risen with S&P putting the US economy under negative watch.
The Fed has now kept the benchmark at zero to 0.25 percent since December 2008 while proceeding to two rounds of Quantitative Easing.
Whereas in Europe, the ECB has started tightening. It is the first time ever the ECB has acted before the FED preemptively in relation to inflation concerns.

This is an important point, as it clearly shows the divide in policies between the US and Europe.

While Trichet and the ECB seems to be sitting in a more classical camp, Bernanke and the Fed, seems to believe in a Keynesian approach in resolving the difficulties faced by the US economy.

It is important to remind at that point the clear differences in mandates between the ECB and the FED. While the ECB's core mandate is of price stability, the FED has a dual mandate, price stability and maximum employment. Hence the current difficulties faced by the Fed. Targeting both unemployment levels and inflation levels is a near impossible task for the Fed currently. It has to promote both “maximum employment” and “stable prices. The Fed’s mandate was extended to "maximum employment" in 1978 as a way of forcing the central bank to "print money". This extension of the mandate made sure the Fed would always be under continuous pressure from the politicians. But, Paul Volcker initially in the early 80s did not play it that way. He clearly understood the risk in not taming the inflation beast. He knew he could not fight on two fronts and initially targeted inflation versus maximum employment. His policy of taming inflation with a rapid surge in interest rates led to a very severe recession but put back the US economy on track. The recession was short but indeed very painful which led Mr Volcker to be hated by both Republican politicians as well as Democrat politician.

One of the main reason of QE2, can be sourced to this ill-fated dual mandate.
The Fed tried to increase jobs by lowering interest rates, weakening the dollar in the process, boosting exports but exporting inflation on a global scale, as well as lifting stock prices, playing on the wealth effect game. I criticised the wealth effect policy in February 2011 (Ben Bernanke - The illusionist and the year of the rabbit - The illusion of wealth).

It is important at this stage to link this post to a previous one I have written: "The Hurt Locker". In this previous post I published in September last year, I discussed the fundamental flaws in Washington’s stimulus policies, linked to the flawed dual mandate imposed on the Fed.
Also, I quoted Jacques Rueff and his analysis of the failings of Keynesian stimulus policies:

"Keynes came up with a subterfuge. The central bank should cause price inflation during a slump, he proposed. Rising prices for 'things' meant that salaries - in real terms - would go down. That was the greasy scam behind Keynes' General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money: inflation robbed the working class of their wages without them realizing it. The poor schmucks even thank the politicians for picking their pockets: "salary cuts without tears," Rueff called them."

What we are seeing right now is a Fed creating price inflation during the current slump ensuring the "poor schmucks" real terms wages are going down.

This is what happened during the big Stagflation period of the 70s:
"Between 1974 and 1984, real wages fell as much as 30%."

In Homage to Jacques Rueff, Bill Bonner added the following:

"But Rueff’s insight comes with a warning. The faith-based, dollar-dependent monetary system is like a loaded pistol in front of a depressed man. It is too easy for the US to end its financial troubles, Rueff pointed out, just by printing more dollars. Eventually, this “exorbitant privilege” will be “suicidal” for Western economies, he predicted."

Bill Bonner concluded:
"Paul Volcker put the pistol in the drawer. Ben Bernanke has found it. And Jacques Rueff must look on in amusement to see what happens next."


"Anterograde amnesia refers to the inability to remember recent events in the aftermath of a trauma, but recollection of events in the distant past in unaltered." This seems to be the position of the classical ECB while the Fed seems to be suffering from Retrograde Amnesia. "Retrograde amnesia is the inability to remember events preceding a trauma, but recall of events afterwards is possible."

It is very important to understand the game played by politicians in relation to creation of the additional mandate of the Fed, namely maximum employment and its fallacy.
Joseph Schumpeter, one the greatest economist we ever had, clearly understood's the role politicians played; He presented in the quote below as "The Intellectual in reality our politicians. I initially referred to Schumpeter in December 2009 in the following post: "Blue pill or Red Pill?"

"Capitalism’s Greatest Enemy: The Intellectual
"The proper role of a healthily functioning economy is to destroy jobs and put labor to better use elsewhere. Despite this simple truth, layoffs and firings will still always sting, as if the invisible hand of free enterprise has slapped workers in the face. Unsettling by nature, capitalism’s churn gives rise to a labor movement designed to protect workers from job loss. That movement is fed emotionally by displaced workers and others who blame the capitalist system for their troubles, but it is led psychologically by a whole other type of person—the intellectual. Intellectuals—with little to do owing to the success of the capitalist economic system but with an intense desire to be seen as caretakers of society’s general well-being—anoint themselves as leaders of the labor movement. They object to capitalism on moralistic grounds and seek its destruction and replacement by another system—socialism—which places them center stage."
"You could replace "intellectuals" in the quote in today's economy by politicians and you would not be far from what is currently happening in many countries today" I argued back in 2009.

Creative Destruction as defined by Schumpeter, is at the core of Capitalism. Politicians for the sake of getting elected or re-elected cannot accept this core feature of capitalism. One could argue that Schumpeter's view of the evolution of Capitalism towards Socialism, is in fact quite accurate in the description of the process.
But I digress, let's go back to the Fed's dual mandate issue and the current situation.

The Fed is trapped in its dual mandate enforced by US politicians. QE2 will make it extremely much tougher for the Fed to eventually reduce its gigantic balance sheet, therefore risking higher inflation.
While the ECB's mandate make it more easier to react to inflationary pressures, regardless of unemployment levels:


"In a clean discussion of what the appropriate role for a central bank is, I can see some merit in looking at a narrower objective," Chicago Federal Reserve Bank President Charles Evans.

"It's interesting," he said in November. "The ECB (European Central Bank) has a price stability mandate ... The only thing a central bank can do in the long run is control the long run rate of inflation, so from that point of view it makes sense to have single mandate"
according to St. Louis Fed President James Bullard.

"With no explicit plan for when or how this quantitative easing will be withdrawn, the Federal Reserve could do more for the American economy by focusing singularly on maintaining the value of the dollar and protecting the purchasing power of Americans,"
Mike Pence, No. 3 Republican in the House.

It looks like Mike Pence care about the "poor schmucks" Jacques Rueff mentioned, who are seeing their real terms wages are going down with the US dollar...

Former U.S. Treasury Department undersecretary John Taylor indicated as well is wish for an end to the dual mandate of the Fed in January 2011:


It would be better for economic growth and job creation if the Fed focused on the goal of “long run price stability within a clear framework of economic stability,’”
Taylor told the House Financial Services Committee.

An excellent post from November 2007 on the blog published by Macro Man can be find below, relating to the subject of the dual mandate:


"Simply put, the Federal Reserve, as a matter of policy, is less interested in protecting the international purchasing power of its currency than other central banks are. Such a policy focus is really quite remarkable for the central bank of THE hegemonic reserve currency, and no doubt explains why the FX reserve managers are, broadly speaking, trying to reduce (or at the very least not increase) their dollar holdings as a percentage of their reserve baskets.

It is also a damned good reason why the dollar pegs of current account surplus countries, particularly those with high inflation, are wildly inappropriate. The Fed's implicit promise to sacrifice the international purchasing power of the dollar (and by extension under current policies, the renminbi, riyal, dirham, etc.) to support domestic employment as a matter of course is wrong, wrong, wrong for China, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, etc."
Recently Dr Hussman, wrote an excellent article related to the trap the Fed has put itself in with QE2:
"A week ago, Charles Plosser, the head of Philadelpha Federal Reserve Bank, argued that the Fed should increase short-term interest rates to 2.5% "starting in the not-too-distant-future," preferably during the coming year. Given the robust historical relationship between short-term yields and the amount base money per dollar of nominal GDP, we can make a fairly tight estimate of how much the Fed would have to contract the monetary base in order to achieve a 2.5% yield without provoking inflationary pressures. While the monetary base will be over $2.5 trillion by the end of this month, a 2.5% interest rate would require a contraction of about $1.3 trillion in the Fed's balance sheet, to a smaller monetary base of just under $1.2 trillion.
In his comments, Plosser discussed a plan to sell about $125 billion in Fed holdings for every 0.25% increase in the Fed Funds rate. That overall estimate is just about right (ten increments of 0.25 each, with an overall contraction approaching $1.3 trillion in the Fed's balance sheet). So Plosser's estimates correctly imply that a 2.5% non-inflationary interest rate target would require the Fed's balance sheet to contract by more than 50%.
The problem, however, is that the required shift in the monetary base is not linear. It's heavily front-loaded. Based on the historical liquidity preference relationship (which explains about 96% of the variation in historical data), and assuming nominal GDP of $15 trillion, the following are levels of the monetary base consistent with a non-inflationary increase in short-term interest rates up to 2.5%. The non-inflationary provision is important. You can't just allow interest rates to rise without contracting the monetary base. Otherwise, as noted earlier, non-interest bearing money would quickly become a hot potato and inflation would predictably follow.
The upshot is that Plosser's estimate of about $125 billion in asset sales for every 0.25% increase in yields is an accurate overall average, but the profile of required asset sales is enormously front-loaded. The first hike will be, by far, the most difficult. In order to achieve a non-inflationary increase in yields even to 0.25%, the Fed will have to reverse the entire amount of asset purchases it has engaged in under QE2. Indeed, the last time we observed Treasury bill yields at 0.25%, the monetary base was well under $2 trillion.
In my view, this is a major problem for the Fed, but is the inevitable result of pushing monetary policy to what I've called its "unstable limits." High levels of monetary base, per dollar of nominal GDP, require extremely low interest rates in order to avoid inflation. Conversely, raising interest rates anywhere above zero requires a massive contraction in the monetary base in order to avoid inflation. Ben Bernanke has left the Fed with no graceful way to exit the situation."
Dr Hussman also added in this must read article:

"The first 25 basis points will require an enormous contraction of the Fed's balance sheet. Risky assets have already been pushed to price levels that now provide very weak prospective returns."
In relation to today's market environment, the outcome is likely to be a very significant risk of unstability and sharp volatility increase. Given the potential for the economy to come to a stalling point in the upcoming quarters due to external inflation pressures (oil prices high prices) already creating serious headwinds on corporate profit margins as well as consumption, it is extremely important to be well aware of the consequences of unbalances which has been generated by a reckless Fed in launching QE2.

Another surge in Gold was clearly expected, I agreed with Martin Sibileau's view when he posted in his blog A View from the Trenches, on April 4th, 2011: "Gold, the Fed, Ron Paul and Napoléon Bonaparte"

"The Fed is not stimulating anything. The Fed is only massively monetizing the US fiscal deficit. Therefore, a lower unemployment rate is actually worse, because a lower unemployment rate implies higher wages, sooner rather than later. And if wages rise, people will have more purchasing power to afford the increasingly higher commodity prices. The higher wages will validate the higher prices of food and oil. In the process, the supply of money, ceteris paribus, will decrease. If the US fiscal deficit continues unabated (our key assumption here), the Fed will be forced to engage again in quantitative easing. For this reason, we think that the unemployment rate announced on Friday was actually bullish of gold."
The release of information related to the access to the discount window of the Fed, thanks to Bloomberg's tenacity in their lawsuit also underlines a very important point between the current relationship between the Fed and the ECB. Martin Sibileau in his post,goes further in the analysis of the access to the Discount Window of the Fed: loans to overseas banks including cross-currency swaps, and their implication in magnifying global leverage worldwide.

"These loans and cross currency swaps are the “leverage of the leverage”, so to speak. With them, other central banks give up their sovereignty and the Fed effectively becomes the world’s lender of last resort. For instance, when the Fed loans US dollars to a German bank, as it did, the European Central Bank can no longer act as lender of last resort, should the German bank default on its obligations with the Fed. But, would this in reality occur? Of course not! If the German bank was not able to repay its US dollar denominated loans, the Fed would simply roll over the liquidity line. This is a very troubling scenario because the Fed in fact expands the supply of US dollars worldwide (global leverage), without any counterbalancing reduction of credit in the US currency zone.

In our view, these “global” discount window operations are the necessary (but not sufficient) step towards the collapse of fiat money. If we are ever going to see the end of fiat money, it will be thanks to global loans from the Fed. Without them, other central banks will always retain their sovereignty and become alternatives to the US dollar. But with them, once the loans are out and a wave of defaults is triggered, the Fed becomes the easy prey for the collective gold longs."
Like Martin Sibileau, I sit in the same camp, outcome will be stagflation.  We both believe in strong stagflationary forces being at play in the current environment.

What will happen when Asian countries as well as Oil rich countries, gorged with USD reserves and facing the rising threat of inflation, will decide it is not wise anymore to invest these reserves in US Treasuries, but to invest in gold, tangible assets and more yielding assets?
As I wrote previously you cannot expect China to bow to American pressure and start revaluating the Yuan versus the dollar. China has learnt the lessons from Japan: Revaluation of Japanese Yen, a historical lesson to draw: analysis - This is an article on the seventh page of People's Daily, September 23, by Pro. Jiang Ruiping, Chairman of the Department of International Economics, Foreign Affairs College, Beijing.

Chinese government officials have stepped up the rhetoric game with the USD stating they might have to diversify their USD 3 trillion of currency reserves away from U.S. dollars. Who would blame them, given the sinking value of the USD, therefore the sinking value of their chips in the game of marbles?


The dollar is 5% away from its all-time low, touched in March 2008, as tracked by the dollar index, which dates back to 1971.

The recent action led by S&P relating to its concern on the US economy, is a stark message sent to the US politicians, they need to put the US house in order and begin to show some long term fiscal discipline.

On the subject:


"Only under the rules of what Jacques Rueff scathingly termed the 'childish game of marbles' by which the winners (the Chinese) return their spoils (the excess dollars) back to the American losers at the end of each round - by buying US Treasury and Agency bonds, in the main - and as a result of what the great Frenchman also dubbed the 'monetary sin of the West' - the fact that the dollar hegemony allows the US to go on mindlessly inflating and blaming others for its own lack of financial virtue - can the Chinese be held culpable for what is at work here."
Sean Corrigan also adds in his article:

"Emphatically, the only 'risks associated with deflation' are those which come from clinging too long in the naive faith that the value of one's money will be preserved by a central bank which can still talk about such an eventuality while the malign effects of its inflationary policies are everywhere increasingly undeniable."

"In a West already displaying symptoms of the extirpation of the middle class, in favour of the governing military-political elite and at the cost of buying off its feckless urban proletariat with a higher dole and more spectacular circuses, the more the state expands in this way, the more success it will enjoy in the only one of its wars on abstract nouns which it wages unremittingly and a outrance - its War on Capital."
The Dollar Standard which succeeded Bretton Woods in 1971, following its collapse, has allowed the deficit countries like US, to consume more than they produce. Whereas surplus countries, such as China, Singapore and others, have been able under the new system to produce more than they consume, therefore accumulating vast USD reserves accordingly.
Between January 2004 and the beginning of 2008, worldwide international reserve assets more than doubled. Asian countries have boosted their reserves by acquiring export dollars. These dollars then moved back to the US, where they funded most of the excesses: subprime mortgages, leveraged buy-out, structured credit markets and so on.

QE2's wealth effect, it can be argued, cannot be branded as a success. The surge of US stock prices has been a mere reflection of the decline of the US dollar, hence the rise in Gold in the process.

The excellent David Goldman clearly illustrates the point:


"The last two weekly unemployment claims prints above 400,000 show how weak the labor market is. I’ve been saying for two years (pardon the broken record) that an entrepreneurial economy can’t do that well as long as there are no entrepreneurs in the picture. If that’s the case, why are stocks doing so well?

Part of the answer is that stock prices reflect the declining dollar: overseas profits increase when translated back into dollars, and American cash flows look cheaper to foreign investors."
Trade Weighted Dollar vs. S&P 500, April 20, 2008 to April 20, 2011

In relation to the current situation, the recent warning shot fired towards the USA by S&P, is an important inflection point as we moved towards what I have previously called relating to Chess, "The Endgame - Fin de partie":
An endgame is when there are only a few pieces left. We are close to the point.

"Artistic endgames (studies) – contrived positions which contain a theoretical endgame hidden by problematic complications".
This is the situation the Fed is currently in.

"You have a choice between the natural stability of gold and the honesty and intelligence of the members of government. And with all due respect for those gentlemen, I advise you, as long as the capitalist system lasts, vote for gold."
George Bernard Shaw
 
 
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