Showing posts with label US Lending Standards. Show all posts
Showing posts with label US Lending Standards. Show all posts

Wednesday, 1 November 2017

Macro and Credit - Euphonium

"Indeed, bull markets are fueled by successive waves of prior skeptics finally capitulating as their fears fade. Eventually, fear turns to euphoria, and that's the stuff of bubbles." - Kenneth Fisher

Listening to "Le Chiffre" aka Mario Draghi confirming lower QE for longer and watching a continuation of the rally with outperformance of beta, while thinking for this week's title analogy and given the start of a euphoric mood in financial markets, we decided to go for a musical reference "Euphonium". If one needs to keep dancing while the music is playing, it seems to us that the large conical-bore, baritone-voiced brass instrument deriving its name from the Ancient Greek word εὔφωνος euphōnos meaning "well sounding" or "sweet-voiced" is appropriate.  The euphonium is a valved instrument; nearly all current models are piston valved, though rotary valved models do exist.  A person or a central banker who plays the euphonium is sometimes called a euphonist. As a baritone-voiced brass instrument, the euphonium traces its ancestry to the ophicleide and ultimately back to the serpent. Our previous reference to "Ouroboros", the ancient symbol of a snake consuming its own body makes it even more interesting. On a side note, the most popular professional models of "Euphonium" in the United Kingdom are Besson Prestige and Sovereign models. It seems to us that the Sovereign models have been particularly popular with our "Generous gamblers" aka our dear central bankers, when it comes to playing the music everyone has been dancing to namely the QE tune. The euphonium has historically been exclusively a band instrument (rather than an orchestra or jazz instrument), whether of the wind or brass variety, where it is frequently featured as a solo instrument. Because of this, the "Euphonium" has been called the "king of band instruments" which fits perfectly the central banking narrative of these days. It has also been called the "cello of the band", because of its similarity in timbre and ensemble role to the stringed instrument. "Euphoniums" typically have extremely important parts in many marches (such as those by John Philip Sousa), and in brass band music of the British tradition. In many instances we think our "Generous gamblers" have been trumpeting their achievements with much fanfare and the wealth effect, this particularly loud music they have been playing with their various instruments, ZIRP, QE, NIRP and more but we ramble again...

In this week's conversation, we would like to look at consumer credit in particular and the US consumer in general given that no matter how loud our "Generous gamblers" are playing their "Euphonium", income growth is becoming a concern in the "land of the free" with rents eating a larger portion.


Synopsis:
  • Macro - With the lack of "Income growth" is the Euphonium justified?
  • Credit - Revisiting previous record tights thanks to the Euphonium
  • Final charts - Keep up with the "melt-up" play the Euphonium via options

  • Macro - With the lack of "Income growth" is the Euphonium justified?
Back in May in our conversation "Orchidelirium", we asked ourselves if the US consumer was somewhat "maxed out":
"The "wealth effect" has globally lifted all boats but, in our book a credit cycle's length is around 10 years, so we do believe we are entering the last inning and that the final melt-up in asset prices could be significant before the usual "Bayesian" outcome. From our credit perspective, it appears to us that "cracks" in credit in the US are beginning to show up, particularly in the form of slowing loan demand. While we are not yet sounding the alarm bell, we think in the coming months it is going to be paramount to monitor credit demand and in particular consumer credit." - Macronomics, May 2017
From our credit and macro perspective, given we live in a credit world we indicated the importance of tracking loan demand as per the quarterly Fed Senior Loan Officer and Opinion Survey (SLOOs). We concluded at the time it was too early to envisage some clear headwinds for the US economy, but it is clear to us that we are late in the credit cycle. It remains to be seen how many hikes it will take before the Fed finally breaks something, but, clearly a December hike is on the cards. Yet there are growing signs that the credit cycle continues to slowly but surely turn as per the breakdown in the relationship between incomes and savings as indicated in Megan Greene, Chief Economist at Manulife Asset Management in Bloomberg's article from the 31st of October entitled "You Wanna See Something Really Scary? Try These Market Charts":
“The breakdown in the relationship between incomes and savings suggests that the consumer -- who drives every U.S. economic recovery -- may be near the end of the credit cycle.” - source Megan Greene, Chief Economist at Manulife Asset Management in Bloomberg.
We think it's too early to call it a day for the US consumer, although, no doubt, the tightening of lending standards appears to be slowly grinding tighter. Overall, financial conditions remain fairly loose. On the subject of the credit outlook for 2018 relating to consumer credit we read with interest Bank of America Merrill Lynch's take from their Consumer ABS Weekly note from the 27th of October. 
"The broader view – employment and debt service ratio are key
The level of economic activity should be supportive of credit performance of consumer debt, while the levels of consumer debt and interest rates may be less supportive. The positive trends in employment, net worth, saving, and income levels should be positive for credit performance. The level of spending and the willingness to borrow and lend remain primary factors driving consumer debt levels and credit performance.
In our view, the favorable economic environment should have positive impacts on the willingness to borrow, while weaker credit performance could have a negative impact on willingness to lend and/or lending standards in certain consumer loan segments. We believe the net impact will lead to higher levels of overall consumer debt. In other words, we still view the overall lending environment as favorable, despite some headwinds.
By loan segment, auto lenders may be willing to lend but they likely will leave lending standards unchanged to tighter, while credit card lenders likely will be willing to lend and loosen lending standards. Education loan and personal loan lenders likely will be willing to lend but will leave standards unchanged.
The growth rate for consumer debt seems to be stabilizing in the 6% to 7% range, while the rate for home mortgages has been steadily increasing since reaching a low of negative 4.6% YoY in December 2010. Some of the differences between the post-crisis growth rates can be explained by fewer opportunities, if any, for homeowners to monetize the equity in their homes.

Also, over the last few years, credit card lenders have begun to focus more on revolvers than rewards-driven convenience users. The growth in consumer debt has contributed to the increase seen in the related debt service ratio (DSR), although the ratio remains well below the peak seen in 2001.
Similar to prior periods, the willingness to borrow/lend has contributed to higher consumer debt levels (recall spending has been growing at a modest pace), which has contributed to a higher consumer DSR.

The higher consumer DSR, along with the employment situation, can have significant impacts on the level of charge-offs. We believe tighter standards are needed to slow growth in consumer debt, reduce the consumer DSR and, ultimately, lower charge-offs.

Auto loans should see lower growth as origination volume related to increasing sales of off-lease vehicles partially offsets volume lost to declining new vehicle sales and tighter lending standards. Credit card loans should see higher growth as the number of open accounts and credit limits have increased and lenders increasingly focus on revolvers. Education loans should see steady growth as expected increases in college enrollment and costs should offset expected increases in prepayments. Other or personal loans also should see steady growth as traditional lenders and relatively new “marketplace” lenders continue to offer loans and relative new products continue to gain traction (e.g., mobile device payment programs).
Consumer debt stood at record levels at the end of June 2017, after steadily increasing since June 2011 to reach $4.2tr. Among the various loan types, only auto loans and education loans have reached record levels, as relatively strong vehicle sales push auto loan origination volume to higher levels and needs-based lending standards push education loan origination volume to higher levels. The current outstandings for credit card loans is 91% of the peak seen at the end of December 2008, while the same for other loans is 78% of the peak at the end of June 2003.


Healthy economic environment but higher debt loads
The positive trends in employment, net worth, saving, and income levels should be positive for credit performance. Despite these trends, weaker standards have led to higher consumer debt balances, higher debt service ratios and, ultimately, weaker credit performance.
- source Bank of America Merrill Lynch

While overall, we cannot conclude that it's time to panic in true Halloween fashion. You would be wise to remember that the interest rate for most credit cards is floating with margins benchmarked to the related bank card issuer’s prime rate. Therefore the expectation for higher interest rates could place pressure on credit metrics.

As we stated above, how many hikes it will take before the Fed finally breaks something? This is the question Wells Fargo tried to answer this question in their Interest Weekly note from the 25th of October entitled "Is Consumer Credit a Concern with Rates on the Rise?":
"Is Consumer Credit a Concern with Rates on the Rise?

Consumer credit as a percent of disposable income is at an all-time high. With the Fed expected to continue hiking rates, readers may be concerned that an uptick in defaults could have an outsized impact in this cycle.
Dig a Little Deeper
At first blush, the below graph may raise concerns among those who correctly notice that the outstanding amount of consumer credit is at an all-time high as a percent of personal income.

This concern is perhaps more amplified against the backdrop of a Federal Reserve that is prepared to raise the fed funds rate in December and continue tightening policy through 2018. And although not all consumer credit is attached to a floating rate, delinquency rates may be expected to pick up as new credit becomes more expensive to pay back.
However, while the ratio in the top graph does has some interesting implications, it must first be acknowledged that this ratio includes a stock number (consumer credit) being divided by a flow number (disposable personal income). A stock refers to the value of a series at a point in time while a flow refers to the total value of the series over a period of time. Thus, stocks and flows are not easily comparable and therefore are not always useful in deriving conclusions.
Instead, we turn to the debt service ratio (below chart), which compares the flow of consumer credit to the flow of disposable personal income over the same period.

In this instance, the most recent data point is well below the all-time series high reached in late 2001. Despite the relatively subdued debt service ratio, the recent upward trend since 2013 is worth monitoring. The growing amount of auto and student loans being financed with credit is partially responsible for this trend as payments for these consumer debt categories continue to become due. Interestingly, the debt service ratio for mortgages has not seen an increase despite a modest rise in the federal funds rate. The fact that fixed-rate mortgages are much more common than adjustable-rates mortgages is perhaps partially responsible for the recent trend difference. Mortgage payments are consistent regardless of the interest rate environment, whereas credit card rates are largely floating.
Household debt delinquencies, largely, are still continuing their downward trend (bottom graph).

The exceptions to this are student loans, which have been essentially flat since 2013, and auto loans, which have slowly climbed for 12 consecutive quarters. As we have stated in past pieces, we do not think the auto loan market poses a threat to household finances, as auto loans comprise just 9.2 percent of total household debt. Additionally, as the Federal Reserve continues to tighten policy we would not be surprised to see delinquency rates modestly tick up and loans with floating rates become marginally more difficult to pay back. However, if the Fed continues to raise rates in the ‘slow and steady’ manner in which they have over the past year, then a sharp uptick in consumer debt delinquencies will likely not occur, all else equal, as Fed policy would likely lag income gains." - source Wells Fargo
When it comes to assessing credit, the distinction between stocks versus flows is paramount. We have made this point on numerous occasions. What matters is the rate of change of credit.

Yet, higher consumer debt balances and higher debt service ratios, make this cycle particular vulnerable to a sudden change in the narrative. As well with credit risk and duration risk extended thanks to the Euphonists at the Fed, there is a potential for heightened risk if, as we mused last week there is a sudden unexpected return of the "Big Bad Wolf" aka inflation. Put it this way, there is a very small margin for error or for a "policy mistake", the interest rate buffer is razor thin.

We are clearly not there yet. We have remained short-term "Keynesian" given the large inflows pouring into various asset classes, while longer term we do remain "Austrian". The "wealth effect" from the Euphonium has globally lifted all boats but, in our book a credit cycle's length is around 10 years. We still believe we are entering the last inning and that the final melt-up in asset prices could be significant before the usual "Bayesian" outcome.

While we have pointed out for the risk of an unexpected return of inflation which would trigger some acute repricing and renewed volatility as discussed last week, we also pointed out that Financial Stability matters for the various Euphorists. So far the investor crowd has been oblivious to the change of tune of their baritone-voiced brass instrument. When it comes to credit spreads, thanks to low rates volatility we are no doubt going to hit the level 11 on the amplifier in true Spinal Tap fashion.


  • Credit - Revisiting previous record tights thanks to the Euphonium
The beta rally has once again been very impressive since the market took a turn during the second semester of 2016 following a dismal first semester largely impacted by credit oil woes particularly in the High Yield sector. High beta returns so far this year have been impressive. Many are questions the hefty valuations levels reached in various asset classes. But thanks to the Euphonium tune, we do think records are made to be broken. The technical bid remain in place, particularly for the naysayer in European High Yield. This is due to the fact that there is a shrinking universe in the European junk bond market. This is the conjunction of several factors such as upgrades as well as a competition rateching up from the loan market. Bond-to-loan refinancings has the favor of private equity players coming back into play. Longer-dated fundings can be provided. This clearly shows that the table has turned at least in Europe thanks to the CLO market heating up creating a hefty demand for loans versus bonds. Structured credit is back into play.

On the subject of record being broken, while many eyes are watching the equity space march upwards, in similar fashion, things are heating up in the credit space hence our veiled analogy to a state of "Euphoria" developing in earnest. On this subject we read with interest Bank of America Merrill Lynch's take from their High Yield Strategy note entitled "Quantifying HY Risk Premiums"":
"Could we revisit previous record tights?
We do not take a sub-300bps HY spread forecast lightly. Many things need to go right for this projection to materialize and any one of them going wrong could upset it. And yet when we look at the macro environment as it exists today, we can’t help but think we are in this rare goldilocks scenario which could deliver such an unusual outcome. In a recent interview, Michael Milken described the current market environment as the “golden age for private equity”(See Bloomberg News, a story by Steve Dickenson, “Michael Milken Says Private Equity's ‘Golden Age’ Will Continue”, September 14, 2017). He went on to qualify this description by pointing out the ease at which issuers can presently get leverage in the market and borrow without covenants, allowing PE firms to achieve very unusual rates of return at times of low yields and tight spreads.
As we listened to that interview, we caught ourselves thinking how long it has been since we last heard someone in a similar position of authority and respect in our market describe it in these words. It has been about ten years or so, if memory serves us well. 
And so this is where we think the market finds itself today: as open and as supportive of credit risk, as it was in the last couple of years of the previous credit cycle. With many new deals coming as oversubscribed and priced at the tight end, we think the “golden age” description of today’s capital markets feels appropriate. Taken a step further, if one defines a default trigger not as a fundamental balance sheet issue but instead as mostly a liquidity event (in which a weak issuer is finally cut off from its ability to refinance or close a negative cash flow hole by issuing new debt), then in our opinion today’s environment presents little opportunity to see many defaults materialize. It is not that there are not enough overlevered balance sheets out there, but rather that the market is willing to provide leverage and do so on issuers’ terms.
A two-handle HY spread goes against our consciousness as long-term investors, and our best judgment of long-term value, and yet it appears appropriate in the context of the one year forecasting horizon. In fact, a question we have heard on a number of occasions recently is if the market is so accommodative, volatility remains low, and defaults continue to be rare, what is it going to take for us to retest all-time tights? It is going to take time.
This view has a precedent in the last cycle, where it took three-plus years after the volatility collapse in late 2003 for us to reach the tights in spreads in early 2007 (see the distance between grey and yellow vertical lines in Figure 7).

It has been almost two years since the last time we had a major spike in volatility in late 2015/early 2016; thus, we think time is still on our side." - source Bank of America Merrill Lynch
This "goldilocks" low rates volatility environment is exactly what is needed to have a "golden age for private equity". This could lead of course to a return of significant LBO transactions which would no doubt create anxiety for bond investors given their propensity in impacting significantly CDS spreads. Do you need to dust up the LBO screeners used in the heyday of the credit excesses of 2006-2007? Probably.

Although some sell-side pundits are pointing towards exhaustion in spread compression, we do believe that we can go further. Wells Fargo in their Global Macro Credit Outlook from the 25th of October points towards spread compression running out of steam:
- source Wells Fargo

With close to $11 trillion in negative-yielding bonds globally, you have a strong technical bid in place thanks to the mesmerizing tune from the "Euphonium". As we stated many times, the "wealth effect" is leading to flows going where all the "fun" is, namely the bond market, not really downhill, towards the "real economy", making the US recovery pretty tame in this cycle thanks to central banking meddling with asset prices. 

A lot of foreign flows into US credit are "Made in Japan". Back in July 2016 in our conversation "Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind" we indicated that "Bondzilla" the NIRP monster was more and more made in Japan due to the important allocations to foreign bonds from the Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF) as well as other Lifers in conjunction with Mrs Watanabe through Uridashi and Toshin funds (Double Deckers) being an important carry player. In the global reach for "yield" and in terms of "dollar" allocation, Japanese investors have been very significant hence the importance of monitoring the flows from an allocation perspective. Bondzilla the NIRP monster is "is a critical support of US credit markets. As we posited in our conversation "The Butterfly effect", during the 2004-2006 Fed rate hiking cycle, Japanese foreign investors lowered their ratio of currency hedged investments and sacrificed currency risk for credit risk. As pointed out by Wells Fargo in their report, demand for US Corporate Credit remains incredibly strong thanks to the Euphonium:
- source Wells Fargo

Strong demand, strong earnings, strong economic data, you have the recipe for a final melt-up. This bull market will continue to be the most hated bull market in history even though we agree that one can rightly question the fundamental basis of the rally thanks to a credit binge induced by the Euphorists. So, sorry for the perma-bear crowd, this hated rally, unfortunately, for the frustration of many, has more room to go as per our final charts. 

  • Final charts - Keep up with the "melt-up" play the Euphonium via options
The Euphorists are still keeping the dancing at the party with their loud music, although they have started to withdraw some of the alcohol within the credit punch, but at a very slow pace, still making the investor crowd properly inebriated. Thanks to the Euphonium and the central banking euphonists, as per our final charts, should you want to keep up with the "melt up" in equities, you might want to think about playing it through cheap options as indicated in our final charts from Bank of America Merrill Lynch from their Global Equity Volatility Insights from the 31st of October entitled "The equity melt-up may have already occurred given today's low vol":
"Sharpe Ratios near 80yr extremes suggests using cheap options to capture US equity upside
While US equity returns over the last 12 months have been far from historical highs, the Sharpe Ratios of US equities are in fact near 80-year highs for the Dow Jones Industrial Average and not far behind for the S&P 500 – a consequence of today’s near-record low volatility and low interest rates. With equity Sharpes in such “rare air” and option costs near all-time lows, we like using SPX call spreads to capture potential US equity upside into year-end with limited risk.
  • A melt-up in US equity Sharpe Ratios: Over the past 12 months, the Dow Jones Industrial Average has rallied nearly 29% (not including dividends) on 7% realized volatility, good for a Sharpe Ratio of 4 (Chart 7).

  • Since 1935, the 12M Sharpe Ratio of the Dow has been higher only 1% of the time. Similarly, the S&P 500 has recorded a Sharpe of 2.8 over the past 12 months (96th percentile; Chart 8) while generating a relatively pedestrian 12M return of 21% (77th percentile; Chart 8).

  • Moreover, with a 12M Sharpe of 2.5, the Nasdaq 100 is approaching Tech Bubble peaks in risk-adjusted returns despite nominal returns only ¼ as large.
 Ultra-low vol turning good equity returns into historically great Sharpes:
  • The common factors transforming today’s good equity returns into stellar Sharpe Ratios? Historically low equity volatility and interest rates. Chart 9 isolates all historical 12M periods since 1935 in which the S&P 500 recorded a Sharpe Ratio of at least 2.8 (= S&P Sharpe over the past 12M).

  • Among these “high Sharpe” periods for US equities, the most recent 12M period has witnessed the lowest S&P 500 price return and nearly the lowest realized volatility in history. The last historical period with higher S&P 500 Sharpe Ratios was the mid-1990s (Chart 9); while realized volatility was also in the single digits, this occurred against a different macro backdrop of flat to falling short-term interest rates (Chart 11).

  • One has to go back to the early-1960s to find a period with (i) Sharpe Ratios exceeding today’s levels, (ii) equity volatility as low or even lower on a sustained basis, and (iii) a gently rising rates cycle (Chart 10).
Extremes in Sharpe motivate using cheap options to capture further upside:
Interestingly, the mid-1990s and mid-1960s featured the three longest streaks on record of consecutive trading sessions without a 5% or more pull-back in the S&P 500 (the current streak of 339 days is fourth-longest). Curiously, the eventual 10% sell-off that ended the 387-day streak in June-1965 seemed largely driven by sentiment rather than fundamentals. Given today’s equity Sharpe Ratios are in “rarefied air”, we continue to advocate using historically cheap options to capture upside with less risk. For example, owing to low volatility and flat call skew, S&P 500 3M 40-delta / 10-delta call spreads (roughly 2600/2700 ref. 2573) cost 1%, near the lowest level recorded since Jan-2001 (Chart 12).
- source Bank of America Merrill Lynch

So all in all, you can probably see we are not part of the "permabear" camp, though we are acutely aware of the lateness stage we are in the credit cycle. As a bonus chart to illustrate further our Euphonium analogy, the final chart below comes from Credit Suisse Gobal Cycle Notes from the 31st of October and is entitled "To Euphoria and Beyond":
"Our credit risk appetite index has moved into euphoria, and a further surge in global IP growth would, based on history, make a full-fledged global risk appetite euphoria much more likely. Of course, euphorias need not be driven by higher risky asset prices alone. Falling safe asset prices – that is, rising yields – can lead to the same place."  -source Crédit Suisse

Of course when it comes to Bayesian learning history shows the final phases of rallies have provided some of the biggest gains. But we are driveling again given in January 2012 in our conversation "Bayesian thoughts" we quoted Dr. Constantin Gurdgiev, from his post entitled "Great Moderation or Great Delusion":
"when investors "infer the persistence of low volatility from empirical evidence" (in other words when knowledge is imperfect and there is a probabilistic scenario under which the moderation can be permanent), then "Bayesian learning can deliver a strong rise in asset prices by up to 80%. Moreover, the end of the low volatility period leads to a strong and sudden crash in prices."
There you have it, the euphonists have been playing louder, the investor crowd is already intoxicated and even if they have been removing some of the alcohol content from the credit punch bowl, some drunk punters are still dancing to the loud music coming from the euphonium. Unfortunately they remain oblivious to the fact that some are already leaving the dance floor, but we ramble again...

"This world's a bubble." -  Saint Augustine
Stay tuned!

Saturday, 28 February 2015

Guest Post - Equity volatility - Going Higher

"When dealing with people, remember you are not dealing with creatures of logic, but creatures of emotion." - Dale Carnegie, American writer
Please find below a great guest post from our good friends at Rcube Global Asset Management. In this post our friends go through the numerous factors pointing towards a volatility regime shift.

Equity investors are about to face a volatility regime shift. The low volatility regime US equities have enjoyed since 2010 is over. This document will try to demonstrate why.

(Notes to Readers Source for all charts: Rcube, DataStream, Bloomberg, Fred)

Equity volatility can be explained (with a lead) using 3 different sets of inputs:

Corporate balance sheet leverage, credit availability, and earnings revisions.

Our VIX model’s fair value has recently spiked to above 26, more than 10 points above spot, and 7 points above forwards. This is meaningful. As we will explain below, we strongly believe that equity volatility, which we view as an asset class, is a now a buy.



Corporate balance sheet leverage

When corporate balance sheet leverage rises, default probability increases down the line. We use two sets of indicators to track it.

The first one is our own definition of the financing gap. The FED only looks at the difference between internal funds and capital spending. We prefer adding to that equation the net amount of equity issuance (positive when issuance > shares buyback and negative when it is the opposite). The logic is straightforward. Shares buybacks drain liquidity away from balance sheets while share issuance replenishes coffers. When, like in 2007 or today, debt issuance is used to buy back shares, the impact on leverage is very substantial. In our model, it is captured by our second input tracking balance sheet strain: private sector credit growth. In the financial account of the United States, we look at non‐financial corporate business total credit instrument liability year on year growth rate.

The two mentioned indicators give us information on the financing needs of the private sector (rising leverage = rising financing needs) and debt accumulation. 

Today, shares buybacks equal 25% of cash flows.


The financing gap as we measure it has risen back to around 4% of GDP.


Private sector credit growth is rising fast, bank loan growth is running at almost 15% yoy, while total credit market instrument is rising at close to 10% above the last 3 years’ trend. In 2000 and 2007, it had reached 14% and 13% respectively. Since it works with a lag, the rapid debt accumulation over the last 6 years should only now start to impact balance sheet health.



Credit availability

Credit availability is another important input since, as long as credit is cheap and available, companies can roll over debt, minimizing default risk in the short term.

Bank lending behavior used to be the main indicator that we used, simply because banks were until recently the main suppliers of liquidity to the private sector through loans (this is still the case in Europe but not anywhere else). To track this supply side of the credit channel, we use the senior loan officer survey.


Bank lending behavior remains ample. The % of banks tightening lending standards is negative (banks on average are still easing terms). Nevertheless, there is no better indicator than the financing gap to anticipate bank lending attitude. The recent sharp releveraging implies that loan officers will soon react to this balance sheet health deterioration.


As they should, since rising financing needs cripple corporate profits down the line….


Our bank lending behavior model sees lending standards in the US being tightened this year:

However, as the BIS recently highlighted, the ratio of loans to corporate bonds has collapsed over the last 20 years in the US. This is why, now that investors have become the main providers of capital to the private sector, it is essential to look at risk appetite/sentiment set of indicators to evaluate that part of the supply dynamic.

On the investors’ sentiment front, the picture is we think quite worrying. The best measure of investors’ risk appetite is high yield corporate credit spreads. They have been widening since last summer in part due to the oil crash, but not only.



If we look at FX volatility, which is another good proxy for risk appetite, it is the same story. FX volatility is, in our opinion, a major input. When it rises, hedging overseas profits becomes more expensive, and overall visibility for global CEOs gets much more blurred.

We have used EURCHF as a risk appetite proxy for a very long time. Back in Q3 2010, we warned that Europe was in a meltdown as evidenced by the massive capital inflows into Switzerland. The EURCHF was crashing and its implied volatility soaring. Six months later, equities were plummeting and risk appetite completely gone.


This is exactly what is happening today. Just like back then, most investors we speak to tell us that European QE, which is responsible for the EURCHF turmoil, is a good thing for risk appetite. We agree, but we would add that the CHF strength, just like a host of historical indicators of risk aversion, tell us that at the global level, there has been no appetite for risk since last summer.

The MSCI World is flat since July, corporate credit spreads are widening everywhere, commodities and FX volatility have soared since then, and financial conditions have tightened globally as a result.



Retail investors’ sentiment is also important since they hold a lot of corporate debt through mutual funds or ETFs. Their sentiment remains bullish but it is probably the most volatile of all, and one that should be looked at more from a contrarian point of view, especially at extremes like is the case today.



Earnings revisions

Cash flows are the last variable bloc of our model. To repay debt, a company needs stable to rising cash flows. Earnings thus need to be watched closely. We look at earnings revisions (the one month change on 12mth forecasts) as the best leading indicator for expected cash flow momentum. Negative earnings revisions imply weakening cash flows and inversely.



It is astonishing to realize that today, earnings revisions are the most negative since 2008, and almost equal to the peak level of the 2002 bear market, while US equities have just printed a new historical high. Earnings forecasts are being revised lower at an alarming pace, mostly because of the dollar’s strength but also because capital goods spending are being cut aggressively. In the meantime US equities are being lifted on the back of European and Japanese QE. This tells us that we could be in the very final stages of the equity bull market that started 6 years ago. Complete disconnect between fundamentals (earnings) and prices are a classic signs of a top formation.



The current environment reminds us of 2011 but totally reversed. Back then, US earnings revision were strong, balance sheet were still healthy, and credit availability was large. As a consequence, the VIX fair value was substantially lower than spot level. Fears about the Eurozone sovereign crisis pushed US equity volatility to levels completely unjustified by US fundamentals. In time, the VIX converged towards its fair value. Today, US fundamentals have deteriorated but equities are at historical highs and volatility in the mid 10s. We think that unless earnings estimates are not revised upwards very quickly, a burst of downside volatility will materialize. Between 2009 and 2012, selling equity implied volatility was part of our investment strategy. For the first time in more than 6 years we are now looking to buy it.

While timing a market top can be costly and energy consuming, we are convinced that equity volatility will soon rise very sharply. Equity prices could rotate in a range for a while longer before moving down, but volatility will rise in the process.

Furthermore, the US dollar strength is tightening financial conditions globally. Because cheap dollar funding has infiltrated the corporate world from Moscow to Beijing and Sao Paolo, defaults will inevitably rise together with equity volatility. Implied volatility bottomed exactly when the US dollar started rallying in July 2014. This is because in a world where the stock of dollar credit to non‐banks outside the United States has reached $9.2Trn, to which we should also add sovereign debt in USD, a sharp appreciation of the US currency equals a sharp tightening of financial conditions for non US borrowers. And we know that tighter financial conditions imply increased risks of defaults and hence higher volatility.

All the factors mentioned above (balance sheet leverage, private sector credit growth, credit availability) are even more stretched for Emerging Market equities.

The EM Earnings Revision Ratio is weak.

Private sector credit growth has been buoyant since 2009, dollar denominated debt has spiked, rising at close to 15% every year since 2009. EM corporates balance sheet leverage has significantly risen as a consequence.

The credit channel, as evidenced by the IIF EM lending survey, is tightening domestically. The EM currencies crash vs. the dollar are tightening financial conditions even more. NPLs are on the rise. Rating downgrades are accelerating sharply. In Q4 2014 there were 111 more downgrades than upgrades, up from 26 in Q3. In 2015, there has already been 56 net downgrades.

As downgrades outnumber upgrades, the weakest borrowers are shut from capital access, which exacerbates further the default cycle, which leads to more net downgrades and so on: a classic negative feedback loop.

The situation in China is probably worse than anywhere else. If we had proper data on corporate financing needs, balance sheet leverage and credit availability, the fair value on HSCEI implied vol would be we believe quite elevated. It is also interesting to highlight that all previous housing  downturns triggered a spike on volatility. Housing prices are now down 5.5% yoy, and with 69 out of 70 cities registering negative yoy prices, the momentum on the downside is alive.


Emerging market implied volatilities are interestingly cheap today.

If we look at EEM, the 12mth implied volatility it is at the 8 percentile so is the 12mth implied ratio with SPX (7 percentile)


EEM, KOSPI and HSCEI implied volatilities are cheap on both an absolute and relative basis.

"Logic is the technique by which we add conviction to truth.' - Jean de la Bruyere
 Stay tuned!

Thursday, 24 October 2013

Guest post - Consequences of a US Budget Balance Improvement

"Logical consequences are the scarecrows of fools and the beacons of wise men." - Thomas Huxley 

Please find below a great guest post from our good friends at Rcube Global Macro Asset Management. In this post our friends go through the consequences of a US Budget Balance Improvement.

The US budget deficit which has already shrunk at a pace never seen over the last 50 years is likely to shrink even more going forward given the ongoing republican fight for more spending cuts. This trend is likely to have some consequences on financial markets. We have selected 4 investment themes that we think, should materialize as a consequence.
  • Rising volatility
  • Consumer discretionary stocks underperformance
  • EM assets underperformance
  • Widening US long end swap spreads

The dollar is the reserve currency of the world, hence when the US runs a budget deficit it increases the amount of dollars in circulation, and provides the world with liquidity. When its financing needs shrink like it has been the case since 2010, global liquidity is reduced. This has ALWAYS created or exacerbated some kind of crisis around the world when it happened (Lat Am in the mid 80s, Asia in the late 90s followed by the tech bubble in 2000, the great recession in 2007).

Will it be different this time? QE has provided a necessary buffer to the liquidity shock that the sharp budget balance improvement has created. When QE ends, and if in the meantime spending cuts have intensified (budget ceiling debate) the pain will start being felt.

  • Equity volatility has probably bottomed.

The pace of the deficit reduction is historical. it has shrunk by more than 6% of GDP over the last 3 years. In the past, this has pushed equity volatility upward systematically. Less liquidity means higher volatility, it is as simple as that as the chart below shows.


In previous cycles the trigger for the volatility to spike was bank lending behavior. So far no signs of the cycle being less supportive but there are hints that banks could become less accommodative going forward. Nevertheless this time, the trigger should be around the time investors will price the end of QE.


Another way to look at it is through the strong historical link between the fiscal cycle and corporate profit margins. As the chart below shows, corporate profits have followed the budget deficit momentum closely (with a lag) over the last 40 years. Fiscal gifts have in a way subsidized non]financial corporate profits. It is thus illusory and naive to believe that the ongoing war in Washington over spending cuts wonft have any impact on profits over time.


Earnings growth has also logically been correlated to the budget balance cycle.


The IMF just released global financial stability report highlights the recent rise in corporate leverage which on many counts now exceeds 2007 extremes.


As a result, the IMF baseline scenario for US HY default is to rise to about 10% by 2015. Clearly not priced in by investors at the moment...


Thus it will be particularly interesting to watch the Senior Loan Officer Survey Q3 results early November for clues about bank lending behavior. Both the rise in the financing gap and corporate leverage hint that banks could become slightly less accommodative going forward.

Our US Lending Standard model based on both the financing gap and non-financial corporate leverage suggests so.

  • Consumer discretionary stocks should underperform.

The sector has been the main beneficiary of the fiscal cycle. Now that it has clearly turn, and that republicans will fight for more fiscal austerity, headwinds for the sector are clearly rising. Fiscal largeness or austerity impacts logically ones propensity to spend on discretionary items. As a consequence the relative performance of the sector can be explained by the fiscal cycle.


The urgency of its implementation came from another explanatory driver: interest rates. The spike in
mortgages and short term forward rates, creates further headwinds to an over loved, over owned, and overpriced sector.


Interestingly the same story holds in Europe. The luxury sector has underperformed its benchmark recently by more than 12%. LVMH earnings miss is we think another clear signal that developed markets consumer discretionary equities are set to underperform going forward. Fiscal tightening in developed countries combined with lower growth in Emerging markets are strong headwinds.


  • Emerging market assets will underperform.

Emerging market assets have shown a remarkable negative correlation with the US financing needs. Since proper data began for EM equities, their relative performance versus developed markets has been strongly explained by the US budget balance.

The US budget went from 0 in early 1980 down to a deficit of 5% of GDP in the early 1990s, EM equities enjoyed simultaneously a powerful relative bull market. During the Clinton years, and the US boom, the deficit turned into a surplus of 2.6% in 2000, EM stocks crashed on a relative basis. From 2000 until early 2010 the budget balance nose-dived, and turned into a deficit of 10% of GDP. EM equities which were in the early 2000s extremely cheap on top, outperformed DM equities by close to 300%. Since then, the 6% shrinkage of the deficit has left EM equities underperforming by 35%. During that phase the underperformance was realized with a flat equity market. The MSCI EM is at the same level it was trading at in late 2009. We fear the next phase will see EM equities underperforming in a bear market.



Additionally, as we have mentioned more recently, we believe that China’s massive investment and property bubble is also at risk of rolling over. Private sector credit can’t rise at 40% of GDP every year for ever.

So, emerging markets could be hit from both sides. First by the liquidity withdrawal that the budget deficit reduction and the end of QE imply, second by the coming weakening investment cycle in China. Countries running a budget and current account deficit, together with a large export (to China) GDP ratio are at a particular risk here.

IBM results were we think very interesting; their sales in China were down 20% yoy. 20% is a big number. LVMH painted a similar message the day before. Caterpillar earnings next week will be another interesting read.


  • US Long end swap spreads will widen

Long end swap spreads are a function of relative financing needs between the private and the public 
sector. At this time, the private sector is re-leveraging through increased shares buybacks, dividend 
payments and Capex spendings, while the public sector deleverages. This classic inverse relationship 
implies just like it did in the late 1990s that long end US swap spreads will widen from current levels.






"The consequences of an act affect the probability of its occurring again." -
B. F. Skinner 

Stay tuned!
 
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