Macro and Credit - The Lady, or the Tiger?

"In waking a tiger, use a long stick." -  Mao Zedong

Watching with interest the collapse of the China trade deal with the US triggering the return of much muted volatility, as the fear of the "sell in May" motto settles in, given the rising tensions between the two powers, when it came to selecting our title analogy, we decided to go for a literary analogy,  "The Lady, or the Tiger?". It is a much-anthologized short story written by Frank R. Stockton for publication in the magazine The Century in 1882. 

The short story takes place in a land ruled by a semi-barbaric king. Some of the king's ideas are progressive, but others cause people to suffer. One of the king's innovations is the use of a public trial by ordeal as an agent of poetic justice, with guilt or innocence decided by the result of chance. A person accused of a crime is brought into a public arena and must choose one of two doors. Behind one door is a lady whom the king has deemed an appropriate match for the accused; behind the other is a fierce, hungry tiger. Both doors are heavily soundproofed to prevent the accused from hearing what is behind each one. If he chooses the door with the lady behind it, he is innocent and must immediately marry her, but if he chooses the door with the tiger behind it, he is deemed guilty and is immediately devoured by it.

The king learns that his daughter has a lover, a handsome and brave youth who is of lower status than the princess, and has him imprisoned to await trial. By the time that day comes, the princess has used her influence to learn the positions of the lady and the tiger behind the two doors. She has also discovered that the lady is someone whom she hates, thinking her to be a rival for the affections of the accused. When he looks to the princess for help, she discreetly indicates the door on his right, which he opens.

The outcome of this choice is not revealed. Instead, the narrator departs from the story to summarize the princess's state of mind and her thoughts about directing the accused to one fate or the other, as she will lose him to either death or marriage. She contemplates the pros and cons of each option, though notably considering the lady more. "And so I leave it with all of you: Which came out of the opened door – the lady, or the tiger?"

Obviously for those who remember our June 2018 conversation "Prometheus Unbound", we argued the following:

"It seems more and more probable that the United States and China cannot escape the Thucydides Trap being the theory proposed by Graham Allison former director of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and a former U.S. assistant secretary of defense for policy and plans in 2015 who postulates that war between a rising power and an established power is inevitable:

"It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable." Thucydides from "The History of the Peloponnesian War"  

- source Macronomics June 2016

Also, in our September 2018 conversation "White Tiger" we indicated that maverick hedge fund manager Ray Dalio came to a similar prognosis in his musing entitled "A Path to War" on the 19th of September. With our chosen title, we reminded ourselves that "The Lady, or the Tiger?" has entered the English language as an allegorical expression, a shorthand indication or signifier, for a problem that is unsolvable and we are not even talking again about BREXIT here...

In this week's conversation, we would like to look at Financials Conditions, given we recently took a look at the latest quarterly Fed Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey.

Synopsis:

• Macro and Credit - Financial Conditions? It's a "Slow grind"
• Final charts - The credit market cycle is very well correlated to the macro cycle.

• Macro and Credit - Financial Conditions? It's a "Slow grind"

Back in February, in our conversation "Cryoseism" we indicated the following in relation to the SLOOs:

"We think we will probably have to wait until April/May for the next SLOOS to confirm (or not) the clear tightening of financial conditions. If confirmed, that would not bode well for the 2020 U.S. economic outlook so think about reducing high beta cyclicals. Also, the deterioration of financial conditions are indicative of a future rise in the default rate and will therefore weight on significantly on high beta and evidently US High Yield." - source Macronomics, February 2019

The latest publication of the SLOOs point towards a slowly but surely turning credit cycle. Yet, with the most recent easing stance of the stance, there are indeed clear signs of slow deterioration. With around 8.1% of credit-card balances held by people aged 18 to 29 being delinquent by 90 days or more in the first quarter of the year, the highest share since the first quarter of 2011, we believe it is essential to monitor going forward any weakness coming from the Fed's SLOOs.

On the subject of SLOOs we read with interest Bank of America Merrill Lynch's take from their Credit Strategist Note from the 12th of May entitled "BBBonvexity in IG":

"April Senior Loan Officer Survey: Back to easing 

Not surprisingly, given the sharp decline in uncertainties this year, as the Fed abandoned the rate hiking cycle/QT and the US economy not going into recession any time soon, banks are now back to easing lending standards for large and medium sized firms (neutral for small firms). The Fed’s fresh April senior loan officer survey released today also showed continued weak demand across the board for C&I, CRE, residential mortgage, auto and credit card loans. In addition, the April survey added special questions on foreign exposure with a moderate fraction of banks expecting deteriorating loan quality from current levels over the remainder of 2019. C&I and CRE loans

A net 4.2% of banks reported easing lending standards for large/medium C&I loans in April, a reversal from a net 2.8% reporting tightening standards in January, while lending standards for small C&I loans were unchanged in the April survey after a net 4.3% of banks reported tighter lending standards in January (Figure 20).

At the same time, the net share of banks reporting tighter standards on CRE loans declined to 10.8% in April from 12.3% in January. Please note that the CRE value reported here is the average for the three separate questions on loans for construction and land development, loans secured by nonfarm nonresidential structures, and loans secured by multifamily residential structures. 

Loan demand continued to weaken as the net shares of banks reporting weaker large/medium, small C&I and CRE loan demand increased to 16.9%, 10.3% and 16.9% in April, respectively, from 8.3%, 10.1% and 11.0% in January (Figure 21).

Mortgages 

Net 3.2% and 4.6% of banks returned to easing lending standards for GSE-eligible and QM-jumbo mortgage loans in the April survey, respectively, following net unchanged standards for GSE-eligible mortgages and 1.6% of banks reporting tighter standards for QM-Jumbo loans in the January (Figure 22).

At the same time, the net share reporting weaker demand for GSE-eligible and QM-Jumbo mortgages declined to 17.5% and 12.3% in April, respectively, from net 41.0% and 31.7% in January (Figure 23). 

Consumer loans 

Net 15.2% and 1.8% of banks reported tightening lending standards for credit card and auto loans according to the fresh April survey. This compares to net 6.4% and 1.9% of banks tightening lending standards on credit card loans and auto loans in the prior January survey (Figure 24).

Meanwhile, the net shares of banks reporting weaker demand for auto and credit card loans declined to 6.8% and 1.8% in April, respectively, from 17.4% and 18.2% in January (Figure 25). 

- source Bank of America Merrill Lynch

Overall, there is tepid loan growth on the back of rising delinquencies, not only from the younger generation but, as well for older generations. Delinquency rates are trending up again, and not just for younger consumers. The report found that seriously delinquent credit card balances have also risen for consumers aged 50–69. For borrowers aged 50–59 and 60–69, the 90-day delinquency rate increased by nearly 100 basis points each. It is indeed a "slow grinding" process when it comes to financial conditions. 

Tracking financial conditions is paramount when it comes to assessing "credit availability. The very strong rally seen in credit in general and high yield in particular, even in Europe where macro data has been very disappointing in the first part of the year. Clearly the rally in European High Yield has been based not on fundamentals but mostly due to strong "technicals" such as issuance levels overall. 

We would like to reiterate what we discussed earlier in 2018 in our conversation "Buckling" in when it comes to our views for credit markets at the time:

"As long as growth and inflation doesn't run not too hot, the goldilocks environment could continue to hold for some months provided, as we mentioned above there is no exogenous factor from a geopolitical point of view coming into play which would trigger an acceleration in oil prices. " - source Macronomics, February 2018.

Unfortunately, as of late, we have seen plenty of deterioration from a geopolitical point of view such as the unresolved trade war between the United States and China, or rising tensions with Iran hence the heightened volatility seen so far, in some way validating somewhat the "sell in may" narrative.

While the rally in high beta has been significant, in our most recent musings we have been advocating favoring a rotation into quality (Investment Grade) over quantity (High Yield). Since the beginning of the year the feeble retail crowd has been rotating at least in the high beta space from leveraged loans to US High Yield.

From the same Bank of America Merrill Lynch's Credit Strategist Note from the 12th of May entitled "BBBonvexity in IG" the "defensive" rotation has been confirmed:

"Outflows from risk 

US mutual fund and ETF investors sold stocks and high yield and bought high grade and munis following the recent pickup in volatility. Hence over the past week ending on March 8th investors redeemed $13.71bn from stocks – the biggest outflow since the week of March 20th. A week earlier stocks instead saw a small $0.36bn inflow. On the other hand buying of bonds increased to $3.85bn from $2.12bn (Figure 26), as stronger inflows to high grade, government bonds and munis more than offset outflows from high yield and leveraged loans.

 

Inflows to high grade accelerated to $3.10bn from $2.47bn. The increase was entirely driven by inflows to short-term high grade rising to $0.92bn from $0.30bn. Flows ex. short-term remained unchanged at $2.17bn. Inflows to high grade funds declined to $1.98bn from $2.97bn, while ETF flows turned positive with a $1.12bn inflow this past week after a $0.50bn outflow in the prior week (Figure 27).

Flows also improved for munis (to +$1.31bn from +$0.92bn) and government bonds (to +$0.04bn from -$1.54bn). On the other hand high yield reported a $0.28bn outflow after a flat reading a week earlier, while outflows from loans accelerated to $0.21bn from $0.17bn. For global EM bonds inflows declined to $1.03bn from $2.36bn. Finally money markets had a $16.32bn inflow this past week and a $13.83bn inflow in the prior week." - source Bank of America Merrill Lynch

The most recent heightened volatility, at least in credit markets, is more due to exogenous factors than solely fundamentals such as financial conditions, given that what we are seeing so far is much more akin to a "slow grind" than a complete change in the narrative and the turn in the credit cycle. 

From a "flow" perspective, we continue to monitor the appetite in particular of Japanese investors, which remain very supportive in particular of US credit markets. As we commented in numerous conversations, they have decided to add on more credit risk on a unhedged basis. We therefore think that FX volatility should be monitor closely and in particular any move in the US dollar against the Japanese yen for instance.

On the subject of Japanese flows we read with interest Nomura's Matsuzawa Morning Report from the 16th of May entitled "Banks hold off on foreign bond investment, while lifers continue to shift to credit":

"While the stock market remains unstable, the credit market was solid globally. In this respect, there were no signs that the market is looking to price in an economic downturn, and in fact it seems to be looking for the right time and catalyst to return to a risk-on flow. We expect Japanese investors to continue shifting out of government bonds to credit both in Japan and overseas. The April International Transactions in Securities data showed that lifers bought foreign bonds in line with levels in typical years, but we see this as a surprise given the drop in foreign yields and flattening along the curve. We believe this is reflected in the gradual, ongoing widening in USD/JPY and EUR/JPY basis since the start of the fiscal year (Figure 1).

By taking credit risk, they are trying to cover currency hedging costs, in our view. 

The International Transactions in Securities data for the week of 6 May, released this morning, showed that Japanese investors were net buyers of foreign bonds at only JPY20.8bn (Figure 2).

Given that they were net sellers in the previous two weeks, they remain cautious. In the week of 6 May, foreign yields fell sharply in response to President Trump’s tweets, but Japanese investors do not yet seem to be trading on the issue of the US-China trade conflict. However, we believe that banks’ short-term trading, not the aforementioned lifers, are primarily responsible for this trend. Banks were net sellers throughout April, and seem to be seeking to lock in profits in the near term. Foreign investors’ net buying of yen bonds remains high, at JPY553.5bn. In addition to the drop in foreign yields (currently, 10yr Bund yields are materially below 10yr JGB yields), widening currency basis also seems to support this trend." - source Nomura

"Bondzilla" the NIRP monster is still very much supportive of global allocation into fixed income and particularly in credit markets given the current levels of Japanese JGB yields and the German Bund 10 year yield.

This is what we recommended in our April conversation "Easy Come, Easy Go":

"As we indicated on numerous occasions, the cycle is slowly but surely turning and rising dispersion among issuers is a sign that you need to be not only more discerning in your issuer selection process but also more defensive in your allocation process. This also means paring back equities in favor of bonds and you will get support from your Japanese friends rest assured." - source Macronomics, April 2019

As we stated in our most recent conversation, Investment Grade is as well a far less volatile proposal and as indicated by Nomura, the stock market remains unstable whereas the credit market continues to be solid globally. Sure the trend in the SLOOs is not very positive with rising delinquencies and interest rates levels on credit cards for the US consumer, but, we do not think the credit cycle has finally turned as per our final chart below.

• Final charts - The credit market cycle is very well correlated to the macro cycle.

After all our blog has been dealing with "Macro" and "Credit" since 2009, and there is a reason for this which can be resumed in the title of our final chapter in this conversation. The credit market cycle follows very closely the macro cycle. Our final chart comes from Bank of America Merrill Lynch's Credit Derivatives Strategist note from the 15th of May entitled "Keep calm and carry (on)" and displays the relationship between the credit cycle and the macro cycle:

"The cycle of risk assets 

The credit market cycle is very well correlated to the macro cycle. As the chart below illustrates, a weakening economic backdrop is typically associated with wider spreads and a weakening market trend. To the contrary, when the economic cycle recovers spreads tend to tighten and market trends to improve.

The cycle of “ratings” beta 

The macro cycle is not only a great tool to assess credit spread trends, but also a tool to track the cycle of “ratings” beta (chart 6). We define “ratings” beta as the slope between the monthly total return observed in high-yield vs. that in high-grade credit market (rolling twelve months). We then present in the chart below the trend of that beta (slope of returns) via a z-score analysis (12m z-score). When the macroeconomic backdrop improves and bounces from the lows, investors can realise higher (than average) betas in the high-yield market.

The cycle of “subordination” beta 

Last but not least, the macroeconomic data cycle is also valuable to assess the trends seen in subs vs. senior bonds space. Using the typical pair of IG corporate hybrids vs. senior non-financial senior bonds, to capture subordination premium trends, one can observe similar patterns between the macro cycle and the “subordination” beta cycle. When the macro cycle rebounds from the lows, subs can realise higher betas (than average). Subsequently, betas tend to normalise as the cycle becomes more mature.

- source Bank of America Merrill Lynch 

Financial conditions overall remain fairly accommodative, the issues we are seeing rising again as of late are from an exogenous nature such as "The Lady, or the Tiger?". Can China and the United States resolved their trade issues? Which door investors should choose? We wonder, but, in a volatile environment such as this one, quality credit markets offers more stability we think at this very moment given the Chinese "tiger" is yet to be tamed.

"An infallible method of conciliating a tiger is to allow oneself to be devoured." -  Konrad Adenauer

Stay tuned !  

Macro and Credit - Fuel dumping

"One of the tests of leadership is the ability to recognize a problem before it becomes an emergency." -  Arnold H. Glasow, American author

Looking at the Dow Jones and the S&P 500 having their worst month since 1931, with cracks clearly showing up in credit markets with weaker oil and outflows from Leveraged Loans, with the Fed hiking by another 25 bps, leading to markets being dazed and confused, when it came to selecting our title analogy, given our fondness for aeronautics ("Dissymmetry of lift" in August 2018, "The Coffin corner" in April 2013, the other being "The Vortex Ring" in May 2014), when it came to our title analogy we decided to go for "Fuel dumping". "Fuel dumping" (or a fuel jettison) is a procedure used by an aircraft in certain emergency situation before a return to the airport shortly after takeoff, or before landing short of its intended destination (or inflation target...) to reduce the aircraft's weight (the Fed's balance sheet with its QT policy, now up to $50 billion per month). 

Aircraft have two major types of weight limits: the maximum takeoff weight and the maximum structural landing weight, with the maximum structural landing weight almost always being the lower of the two. This allows an aircraft on a normal, routine flight to take off at the higher weight, consume fuel en route, and arrive at a lower weight. If a flight takes off at the maximum takeoff weight and then faces a situation where it must return to the departure airport (due to certain mechanical problems, or a passenger medical problem for instance), there will not be time to consume the fuel meant for getting to the original destination, and the aircraft may exceed the maximum landing weight to land at the departure point. If an aircraft lands at more than its maximum allowable weight it might suffer structural damage, or even break apart on landing. At the very least, an overweight landing would require a thorough inspection for damage. 

As a matter of fact, long range twin jets such as the Boeing 767 and the Airbus A300, A310, and A330 may or may not have fuel dump systems, depending upon how the aircraft was ordered, since on some aircraft they are a customer option. As a rule of thumb for the Boeing 747, pilots quote dump rates ranging from a ton per minute, to two tons per minute, to a thumb formula of dump time = (dump weight / 2) + 5 in minutes. In similar fashion, when it comes to the Fed's QT, there is no real rule of thumb when it comes to the pace of the reduction of its balance sheet. We read with interest Stanley Druckenmiller and Kevin Warsh's take on the Fed's policy in the Wall Street Journal yet it seems that as we pointed out in our October conversation "Explosive cyclogenesis":

"As we concluded our previous post, beware of the velocity in tightening conditions. Both Morgan Stanley and as well Goldman Sachs, indicates that given the large sell-off seen in October, investors perceptions have been changing, and that maybe  we have a case of "reflexivity" one might argue. Goldman Sachs Financial Conditions Index shows the equivalent of a 50-basis-point tightening in the past month, two-thirds of which is due to the selloff in equity markets. Early February this year financial conditions tightened about 80bp over a two week period akin to "Explosive cyclogenesis" aka a "weather bomb".

But, the difference this time around we think, even if many pundits are pointing that forward price/earnings ratio of the S&P 500 has tumbled to 15.6 times expected earnings, from 18.8 times nine months ago, making it enticing for some to "buy" the proverbial dip. We think that the Fed's put strike price is much lower than many thinks.

Sure "real rates" have been driving the sell-off but we think many more signs are starting to show up in the big macro picture pointing towards the necessity to start playing "defense". "- Macronomics, October 2018

The big question we think when it comes to Fed having both QT and rate hikes at the same time aka "Fuel dumping" is can you allow interest rates to rise without contracting the monetary base? Clearly the Fed put is still way "out of the money".

In this week's conversation, we would like to reflexionate more on 2019 given the Fed has been clearly telling you, it hasn't got your back anymore and you are on your own...

Synopsis:

• Macro and Credit - 2019: "Mean" mean reversion?
• Final charts  - What the Fed see and what they don't...  

• Macro and Credit - 2019: "Mean" mean reversion?

In our previous conversation we pointed out the weakness seen in credit, given the rise in dispersion witnessed during the course of 2018, leading to cracks showing up in cyclicals and with now leveraged loans weaknesses under scrutiny. Like any behavioral psychologist we indicated in numerous conversations that we would rather focus on the "flows" than on the "stock" given in our credit book, liquidity is what "matters" and when it comes to fund flows, in some segments of the credit markets "outflows" have been significant.

In our credit book, "flows" matter and when it comes to fund flows in credit land there has been plenty of "fuel dumping" as reported by Bank of America Merrill Lynch in their Follow The Flow report from the 14th of December entitled "The CSPP party is definitely over":

"More outflows and no more CSPP

Only three weeks to go before the end of the year, and outflows continued in Europe. Last week we saw a significant risk reduction across European IG, HY and Equity funds. Investors reached for safer assets with strong inflows in Govies and Money Markets. Even Global EM debt funds recorded outflows amid the recent sell off. It seems that this year will end on a negative note as investors are cutting positions across risk assets amid uncertainty around the macro and trade wars front. Italian politics are not helping either, contributing in a flight away from credit and equity funds.

Over the past week…

High grade funds suffered their largest outflow of the year, making this week the 18th week of outflow over the past 19 weeks. High yield funds also recorded a sizable outflow as well, the 11th in a row. Looking into the domicile breakdown, Euro-focused funds led the negative trend, followed closely by Global-focused funds. US focused funds experienced a more moderate outflow.

Government bond funds recorded an inflow this week, the 2nd in a row. Meanwhile, Money Market funds saw a large inflow, putting an end to 4 consecutive weeks of outflows.

European equity funds recorded a sizable outflow, in sharp contrast with the moderate outflow recorded last week, and making it the 14th consecutive week of outflows. During the past 40 weeks, European equity funds experienced 39 weeks of outflows.

Global EM debt recorded an outflow this week, the 10th in a row. Commodity funds recorded a marginal inflow.

On the duration front, mid-term IG funds led the negative trend by far, short-term funds also suffered, while the deterioration was more moderate for the long-end of the curve." - source Bank of America Merrill Lynch

 When the trend in outflows is not your friend...

As per our November conversation "Zollverein", when we talked about the vulnerability of leveraged loans, clearly they have been under the spotlight and some credit investors have indeed resorted in "fuel dumping" so to speak. As per LeveragedLoan.com outflows have been significant and accelerating in the asset class:

"Leveraged loan funds log record $2.53B outflow

U.S. loan funds reported an outflow of $2.53 billion for the week ended Dec. 12, according to Lipper weekly reporters only. This is the largest weekly outflow on record for loan funds, topping the prior mark of negative $2.12 billion from August 2011.

This is also the fourth consecutive week of withdrawals, totaling a whopping $6.63 billion over that span. With that, the four-week trailing average is now deeper in the red than it’s ever been at $1.66 billion, from negative $1.01 billion last week.

Mutual funds were the catalyst in the latest period as investors pulled out a net $1.82 billion, the most since August 2011. Another $704.9 million of outflows from ETFs was the most ever.

Outflows have been logged in six of the last eight weeks and that has taken a big bite out the year-to-date total inflow, which has slumped to $3.7 billion after cresting $11 billion in October.

The change due to market conditions last week was a decrease of $1.231 billion, the largest drop for any week since December 2014. Total assets were roughly $99.3 billion at the end of the observation period and ETFs represent about 11% of that, at roughly $10.9 billion. — Jon Hemingway" - source LeveragedLoan.com

If this isn't "fuel dumping" then we wonder what it is:

"In just the past four trading days, investors have pulled $2.2 billion from all loan mutual funds and exchange-traded funds. That brings withdrawals from the asset class to almost $9 billion since mid-November" - source Bloomberg 

- graph source Bloomberg

It looks like more and more to us the "credit aircraft" may have exceeded the maximum landing weight to land at the departure point given the posture of the Fed with its hiking stance and with its QT on "autopilot".

For Bank of America Merrill Lynch in their Weekly Securitization Overview note from the 14th of December entitled "Mission accomplished; damage assessment", the price action in Leveraged Loans should be watched closely and we agree as we posited back in our November conversation "Zollverein":

"We consider the recent free fall price action for leveraged loans (Chart 5) underlying collateral of CLOs and specifically noted in the FOMC’s September minutes as posing “possible risks to financial stability.” The end result of the Fed’s hawkishness is that less, not more, rate hikes are now expected than in September (see below), so the interest in floating rate instruments such as leveraged loans, and CLOs, has declined. That explains part of the weakness. Another important part of the latest sharp re-pricing of loans is simply that they had lagged the spread widening/risk re-pricing seen in other sectors. This week saw some major catch-up." - source Bank of America Merrill Lynch

 Clearly some pundits are concerned about the "liquidity" factor of Leveraged Loans and decided that "Fuel dumping" was the right strategy given the growing cracks seen in credit with the significant underperformance of US High Yield thanks to weaker oil prices and its exposure to the Energy sector (we have touched on this subject in recent posts). No surprise to see Lisa Abramowicz on her twitter feed commenting on US High Yield spread blowing out today:

"U.S. high-yield bond spreads rose yesterday the most on a percentage basis since August 2011."

- source Bloomberg - Lisa Abramowicz - twitter

Obviously with its QT akin to "Fuel dumping", the Fed has been successful in tightening further financial conditions.

But in relation to Leveraged Loans and the deterioration in both price and flows, comes the question about its impact on the US economy as a whole. On that point we read with interest Wells Fargo's take from their Economics Group note from the 18th of December entitled "Leveraged Loans - A Deathknell for the US Economy?":

"Executive Summary

The leveraged loan market, where the bank debt of non-investment grade companies is traded, has experienced rapid growth over the past few years. But weakness in the market in recent weeks may bring back unpleasant memories of the sub-prime loan debacle a decade ago. Does this recent weakness in the leveraged loan market have negative implications for the macro U.S. economy?

In our view, the leveraged loan market, taken in isolation, is not likely to bring the economy to its knees anytime soon. But its recent weakness may reflect a broader economic reality about which we have been writing. Namely, the overall financial health of the non-financial corporate sector has deteriorated modestly over the past few years. If the Fed continues to push up interest rates and if corporate debt continues to rise, then financial conditions would tighten further, which could eventually lead to a sharper slowdown, if not an outright downturn, in economic growth

Stress Appears in the Leveraged Loan Market

The leveraged loan market in the United States has mushroomed to more than $1 trillion today from only $5 billion about 20 years ago (Figure 1).

 Source: LCD (an offering of S&P Global Market Intelligence) and Wells Fargo Securities

Growth has been especially marked in the past two years with the amount of leveraged loans outstanding up more than 30% since late 2016. But the market has weakened recently. The amount of leveraged loans outstanding declined by nearly $20 billion between late November and mid-December, while prices of loans fell about 2 points over that period (Figure 2).

Source: LCD (an offering of S&P Global Market Intelligence) and Wells Fargo Securities 

Before discussing macroeconomic implications, we first offer a quick primer on the leveraged loan market. A leveraged loan is a loan that is made to a company with relatively high leverage (i.e., companies with high debt-to-cash flow ratios). Usually, these companies are rated as less than- investment grade. Years ago, banks would hold these loans on their balance sheets, but in the  past few decades an active market has developed in which these loans are bought and sold. Often, an investment bank will buy leveraged loans from commercial banks to bundle them into structured financial instruments that are known as collateralized loan obligations (CLOs). CLOs trade like bonds, and they improve the liquidity in the leveraged loan market.

Leveraged loans are floating-rate financial instruments, so investors piled into the market over the past two years when the Fed was in rate-hiking mode. However, some investors have started to sell their holdings of leveraged loans recently as doubts have risen about how much higher short-term interest rates actually will rise. Moreover, the evident deceleration occurring in the economy could negatively affect the ability of some highly levered companies to adequately service their debt obligations, which has also contributed to some nervousness in the leveraged loan market. Could the recent weakness in the leveraged loan market have implications for the U.S. economy?

Does the Leveraged Loan Market Have Broader Macro Implications?

When banks sell their leveraged loans, they then have room on their balance sheets to make new loans. If weakness in the leveraged loan market negatively affects the ability of commercial banks to offload their leveraged loans, then growth in bank lending could slow. Everything else equal, slower growth in bank lending could lead to slower economic growth, which could then lead to further weakness in the leveraged loan market, etc. In short, a vicious circle could be set in motion. Is there any evidence to support the notion that weakness in the leveraged loan market has led to slower growth in bank lending?

Figure 3 plots the leveraged loan price index which was shown in Figure 2 along with the year-over-year growth rate in commercial and industrial (C&I) loans.

Source: LCD (an offering of S&P Global Market Intelligence) and Wells Fargo Securities

The price of leveraged loans collapsed in 2008, and C&I loan growth subsequently nosedived as well. But the U.S. economy at that time was beset by the deepest financial crisis and recession it had experienced in more than 70 years. The weakness in the leveraged loan market in 2008 may have contributed to the swoon in C&I lending that transpired in 2008-2009, but there probably were more important factors that were causing the sharp drop in C&I lending at that time. 

Indeed, over the past two decades there have been two episodes of weakness in the leveraged loan market that have not been associated with marked deceleration in C&I lending. Between early 1997 and late 2000, prices of leveraged loans fell about 10 points. But growth in C&I lending held up reasonably well during that period, before turning negative as the economy fell into recession in early 2001.

Source: LCD (an offering of S&P Global Market Intelligence) and Wells Fargo Securities

More recently, leveraged loan prices fell 8 points between May 2015 and February 2016. Growth in C&I lending edged down a bit, but we would not characterize that episode as one of “significant” deceleration in C&I lending. In short, there does not appear to be overwhelming evidence to support the notion that weakness in the leveraged loan market leads to significantly slower growth in C&I lending.

C&I lending accounts for less than 20% of total bank credit. Perhaps other components of bank credit, such as the securities holdings of banks, residential and non-residential real estate lending or other types of consumer lending, may show more sensitivity to the leveraged loan market than C&I lending. However, Figure 4 shows that growth in overall bank credit generally has had a low degree of correlation with prices of leveraged loans as well.

 Source: LCD (an offering of S&P Global Market Intelligence) and Wells Fargo Securities

Although we acknowledge that the weakness in the leveraged loan market has the potential to eventually weigh on bank credit, there appears to be very little fallout thus far. Indeed, the amount of C&I loans outstanding as well as total bank credit have both risen in recent weeks.

In our view, the weakness in the leveraged loan market at present reflects a broader economic reality about which we have been writing in recent months. That is, the overall financial health of the non-financial corporate sector has deteriorated over the past few years. The phenomenal growth in the leveraged loan market since 2016 reflects both demand-side and supply-side factors. In terms of demand, investors have been attracted to the relatively high returns that leveraged loans and CLOs offer. On the supply side, the marked increased in leveraged loan issuance over the past few years speaks to the steady rise in non-financial corporate debt, especially among non-investment grade businesses, that has occurred.

Taken in isolation, the leveraged loan market is not likely to bring the economy to its knees anytime soon. But recent weakness in the leveraged loan market may be symptomatic of rising concerns that investors may be having about the outlook for the financial health of the business sector. Spreads on speculative-grade corporate bonds have widened in recent weeks, and investment grade spreads have also pushed out. As we have written previously, we do not view the overall financial health of the American business sector as “poor” at present. But investors apparently are starting to react to its modest deterioration. If the Fed continues to push up interest rates and if corporate debt continues to rise, which would put upward pressure on spreads, then financial conditions would tighten further, which could eventually lead to a sharper slowdown, if not an outright downturn, in economic growth." - source Wells Fargo

After the Great Financial Crisis (GFC), many banks retreated from the Leveraged Loans business thanks to heightened regulatory oversight. In this context, Nonbank direct lenders, business development companies as well as collateralized loan obligation funds and private equity affiliated debt funds all stepped in and funded acquisitions and private-equity buyouts as the M&A market rebounded in recent years. US banks one would argue are in a much healthier "leverage" situation than their European peers, though when it comes to the Leveraged Loan market both in the United States and Europe have seen the rise of "disintermediation" aka shadow banking stepping in. Where we slightly disagree with Wells Fargo's take is indeed the rise in "disintermediation" as banks have been facing rising competition from even "new" competitors entering the private lending space.

Yet, when it comes to C&I loans, change in the last three months have been significant we think:

- graph source Bank of America Merrill Lynch

As we mused in our conversation "Ballyhoo" in October, using a more real-time look at financial conditions points towards a higher velocity in the tightening trend of financial conditions. We argued that the velocity seen in greater tightening of financial conditions could be seen as a case of "Reflexivity", being the theory that a two-way feedback loop exists in which investors' perceptions affect that environment, which in turn changes investor perceptions hence the outflows and the acceleration in "Fuel dumping" or outflows from "credit" to the benefit of the US long end of the yield curve as well as US money market funds, in essence some good old "crowding out".

This velocity we think is important given the combination of rates hike and balance sheet reduction given many pundits are already talking about "policy mistake" being made by the Fed. The whole question is about the transmission of the velocity of tightening financial conditions towards the real economy. We have already seen significant weakness in various US cyclicals (Housing, autos, etc.). On the subject of this transmission mechanism we read with interest Bank of America Merrill Lynch's take in their US Economic Watch note from the 19th of December entitled "Fed up":

"Getting ahead of the shocks

One of the many factors the Committee has considers in their policy reaction function is the impact of financial conditions on the real economy. As was clear from the press conference, “The additional tightening of financial conditions we have seen over the past couple of months along with signs of somewhat weaker growth abroad have also led us to mark down growth and inflation growth a bit.”

To understand the transmission of financial conditions onto the economy, we run various financial shocks through FRB/US, the Federal Reserve Board’s large-scale general equilibrium macroeconomic model. These shocks are 100bp increase in the conventional mortgage rate, 100bp increase to the interest rate on new car loans, 50bp increase in credit spreads (proxied by an 50bp increase in BBB term premium) and a 10% decline in household equity wealth. Note that the shocks to the mortgage rate, car loan rate, and BBB term premium have been approximately calibrated to the moves seen since the start of the year while the equity shock has been roughly calibrated to the decline since peak of the equity market over the summer (Chart 1 and Chart 2).

The shocks are run individually through FRB/US and sustained through the simulation period.

The results of the stylized exercise are presented in Table 1. There are several points worth noting:

• Financial conditions work through the economy with a lag. With the exception of the mortgage rate shock, the peak drag to growth from tighter financial conditions hits the economy 2 to 3 quarters after the initial shock.
• The impact of the individual shocks is fairly muted. For example, a 10% decline in household equity would roughly translate to less than 0.1pp drag to growth in the 2H of year 1 after the shock hits. But add up the multiple shocks, there’s a meaningful slowdown in growth that leads to higher unemployment rate and lower core inflation.
• Higher borrowing costs for businesses have the greatest and most persistent impact on the economy. A 50bp widening in the credit spread acts as a roughly 0.1pp drag in year 1 and 0.1-0.2pp in year. This is consistent with Fed research which shows that the primary transmission of tighter financial conditions works through weaker business fixed investment.2
• The cumulative tightening we’ve see over the past year is roughly equivalent to 33bp of Fed tightening. Another way to interpret these results is tighter financial conditions would prescribe the Fed to ease up on the pace of rate hikes by roughly one fewer hike, consistent with the latest median dots.

What about weaker global growth? The direct impact should be fairly muted given that the external macro linkages are only a small share of the US economy. However, weaker global conditions will filter through tighter financial markets, primarily through higher borrowing rates for businesses and to a lesser extent a decline in household equity wealth that will act as a headwind for the economy." - source Bank of America Merrill Lynch

While global trade has been decelerating thanks to the trade war narrative, the spike in "real rates" in early October triggered the repricing of US equities. Our timing using another "aeronautics" on the first of October in our post "The Amstrong limit" was probably lucky:

"Watching with interest the Japanese Nikkei index touching its highest level in 27 years at 24,245.76 points, with US stock indices having rallied strongly against the rest of the world during this year, and closing towards new highs, when it came to selecting our title analogy we decided to go for another aeronautic analogy "The Armstrong limit". The Armstrong limit also called the Armstrong's line is a measure of altitude above which atmospheric pressure is sufficiently low that water boils at the normal temperature of the human body. Humans cannot survive above the Armstrong limit in an unpressurized environment." - source Macronomics, October 2018.

We wondered at the time if we had reached the "boiling point". In retrospect we did.

The big question many pundits are asking is should the bold pilots at the Fed continue with QT on autopilot. Back in February 2013 in our conversation "Bold Banking" we used another aeronautics reference:

"While 1994, was the year of a big sell-off in many risky assets courtesy of a surprise rate hike, 1994 was as well the year of the demise of "Czar 52" on the 24th of June 1994 which saw the tragic crash of a Boeing B-52H "Stratofortress" assigned to 325th Bomb Squadron at Fairchild Air Force Base during practice maneuvers for an upcoming airshow. The demise of the BUFF (the nickname among pilots for the B-52 meaning Big Ugly Fat Fellow) was due to Colonel Bud Holland's decision to push the aircraft to its absolute limits. He had an established reputation for being a "hot stick".

So what is the link, you might rightly ask, between "bold banking" and "bold piloting"?

A subsequent Air Force investigation found that Colonel Bud Holland had a history of unsafe piloting behavior and that Air Force leaders had repeatedly failed to correct Holland's behavior when it was brought to their attention (not  French president Hollande in that instance but we digress...).

When it comes to "reckless banking" and "reckless piloting", we found it amusing that current leaders have repeatedly failed to correct central bankers' policies, like the ones pursued by former Fed president Alan Greenspan and current Fed president Ben Bernanke, or, the ones pursued by Japan. These policies are instigating, bubbles after bubbles at an inspiring rate." - Macronomics, February 2013

For now the pilots once again at the Fed seem pretty confident in the strength of the US economy, on our side we do not think their optimism is warranted as per our final charts.

• Final charts  - What the Fed see and what they don't...  

With Philadelphia Fed manufacturing index undershooting in similar fashion to the New York Fed released this week as well, one might indeed be wondering if "Fuel dumping" is warranted given the heavy load of the US airplane in terms of corporate debt binge. Our final charts comes from Wells Fargo Economics Group note from the 19th of December entitled "Where the Fed May Be wrong" and in their note they are pondering whether or not the Fed is making a "policy mistake":

"Caught Between A Rate Hike and A Hard Place

Recessions are typically triggered by policy mistakes and the Federal Reserve may very well be on the road to making one. The policy statement that accompanied the Fed’s latest rate hike attempted to allay fears the Fed would tighten too much by acknowledging the economic outlook has diminished and that the balance of risks was now roughly even. FOMC participants also slightly lowered their expectations for the federal funds rate and now call for just two rate hikes in 2019 and one more after that, while the drawdown of the Fed’s balance sheet is expected to remain on auto-pilot at $50 billion a month in 2019.

The financial markets provided some powerful real-time feedback to the Fed. Stocks had rallied just before the Fed’s decision was released, gave back their gains after digesting the policy statement and then sold off heavily during Chairman Powell’s testimony. The yield curve also flattened further and remains inverted between the two- and five-year notes. The markets shot down the Fed’s dovish tightening because they feel economic growth may not be as strong as the Fed believes and is certainly not strong enough to hold to the notion that monetary policy, in its entirety, remains short of neutral.

Economic growth may not be as ‘strong’ as the Fed believes. The strength in the U.S. economy has been narrowly focused, with the energy and technology booms accounting for a disproportionate share of economic growth. Both sectors now appear to be slowing, with the former struggling under the weight of sluggish global economic growth and lower oil prices, while the latter is facing an onslaught of government oversight concerning privacy concerns and anti-trust matters. Growth in the more cyclical parts of the economy is also slowing, with demand for home sales and capital goods flagging for the past few months.

The Fed’s confidence about the strength of the economy may be grounded in the satisfaction that the unemployment rate remains so low at just 3.7%. The unemployment rate is a lagging indicator, however, and monetary policy works with a long and variable lag. Moreover, the IT revolution and growth in online job search platforms have likely changed the way job seekers interact with the labor force. This may help explain why the surge in job openings has not led to a resurgence in wage increases.

The Fed may also be underestimating the impact the drawdown of the Fed’s balance sheet and continuation of enhanced forward guidance are having on global liquidity. Both policies were projected to have strong positive effects when they were implemented. Why wouldn’t they have an equally strong impact now that they are headed in the other direction? Moreover, the high degree of certainty the Fed has displayed that these policies will continue, effectively on auto-pilot at a time that growth is decelerating, has sent a foggy message to the financial markets, which has likely increased uncertainty— hence the rush out of stocks and into bonds and the dollar." - source Wells Fargo

It might be the case that the pilots at the Fed are slightly over-relying on "auto piloting" QT aka "Fuel dumping" while interpreting incorrectly the readings from their pilot cabin's instruments, but we ramble again...

We wish you all a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year. Don't hesitate to reach out to us in 2019, a year in which we hope to celebrate the 10 year anniversary of this very blog. Thank you for your praise and support.

as the old pilot saying goes:

"There are old pilots and there are bold pilots; there are no old, bold pilots!" 

Stay tuned !

Macro and Credit - Stalemate

"In life, as in chess, forethought wins." - Charles Buxton, English public servant

Watching with interest the outcome of the US midterm elections in conjunction with a divided congress leading somewhat to a gridlock, as well as the tentative rebound in Emerging Market equities, when it came to selecting our title analogy, we decided to go again for a chess analogy on this very post (see previous chess analogies: "Zugzwang", "The Game of The Century"). "Stalemate" is a situation in the game of chess where a player whose turn it is to move is not in check but has no legal move. The rules of chess provide that when stalemate occurs, the game ends as a draw. During the endgame, stalemate is a resource that can enable the player with the inferior position to draw the game rather than lose. In more complex positions, stalemate is much rarer, usually taking the form of a swindle, a ruse by which a player in a losing position tricks his opponent, and thereby achieves a win or draw instead of the expected loss. A swindle in chess only succeeds if the superior side is inattentive. Stalemate is also a common theme in endgame studies and other chess problems. The outcome of the US midterm elections gridlock could create short term what we would call "Goldigridlock", namely a potential end to the bear steepening experienced during the jittery month of October and some restrain on the US dollar. In conjunction with the return of buybacks following the blackout period of earnings, then, this obviously could be bullish equities wise we think, with high beta pulling ahead until the end of the year. For credit, we are not too sure, given a fall in oil prices with definitely put pressure on the high beta CCC bracket of US High Yield and its well documented exposure to the energy sector but, we ramble again...

In this week's conversation, we would like to look at what the US midterm election stalemate entails of asset prices in general following a very much "red October".

Synopsis:

• Macro and Credit - Goldigridlock for asset prices? 
• Final charts -  The invisible hand is fading...

• Macro and Credit - Goldigridlock for asset prices? 

The month of October was clearly a bloodbath for many asset classes and diversification didn't offer protection. While the velocity in real rates as we pointed out in our previous conversation forced a serious repricing of the Fed "put" at a much lower strike, the fact that it was a blackout period thanks to earnings reporting season and lack of buybacks, being another strong pillar in US equities rally seen in recent years was enough to wreak havoc on global markets on the back of weaker US equities. Looking at the below performance chart from Bank of America Merrill Lynch for the month of October can clearly see that, indeed, “misery loves company”:

- source Bank of America Merrill Lynch

As we pointed out in our final chart in our mid-October conversation "Under the Volcano", 2018 has marked the return of large standard deviations move, typical of late cycle behavior in conjunction with rising dispersion. 

What we also find interesting (H/T Driehaus on Twitter) is that 89% of asset classes tracked by Deutsche Bank have a negative total return YTD in USD terms. This is the highest percentage on record since 1901. Last year just 1% finished without negative total return:

- source Deutsche Bank - Driehaus Twitter feed

2018 is indeed a year where volatility and large standard deviations move have staged a comeback as the US Federal Reserve is trying to exit the stage with its Quantitative Tightening policy (QT) and its continuing hiking process. US Employment and wage growth likely to trigger another hike in December from the Fed. That’s a given. Total nonfarm payroll employment increased by 250,000 in October vs. 190,000 expected. Over the year, average hourly earnings have increased by 83 cents, or 3.1 %. Fed will remain hawkish.

With the "Stalemate" with the latest US midterm elections, what are the implications for asset prices, one might rightly ask?

First thing we would like to look at given the recent bounce from Emerging Market equities with Brazil leading ahead the bounce thanks to the hope brought by the presidential elections is the trajectory for the US dollar and what it means for "high beta". On that subject we read with interest Bank of America Merrill Lynch's take from their Liquid Insight note from the 7th of November entitled "Midterm outcome":

"FX: a split Congress is bearish USD, but downside could prove limited

As we have argued, tonight’s split Congress outcome should result in dollar weakening. We think this could continue for a while yet as the first order effects of US growth deceleration and increasingly-limited monetary policy support cause a reevaluation of long USD exposure. Ultimately, second order effects could limit USD downside; however, we think that markets are likely to focus on first order effects for now.

Initially, we expect a weaker USD predicated on a further softening in US growth leading to reduced monetary policy support. US growth deceleration from the 2Q high water mark should continue as intense political gridlock precludes new stimulus measures, putting the prospect of a Fed move beyond neutral in doubt for now absent convincing evidence of inflationary pressure. Indeed, our US economics team is forecasting a gradual US growth deceleration toward 2% (around potential) by the end of next year, alongside a largely-benign inflation profile. While a Fed move beyond neutral was never in the market (the Fed is still priced to end the cycle at around the long-term median dot of 3%), a move above neutral looks increasingly less likely given the new information set. Thus, interest rate support for USD looks asymmetrically skewed to the downside, and the market’s expectation for Fed hikes next year (currently about +50bp) is at risk of compression, in our view. Positioning is net long USD – particularly in the riskier parts of the FX spectrum (Exhibit 1).

Diminished rationale for USD longs and a potential relief rally in markets post-midterm resolution suggests liquidation flow driving USD lower. Finally, we would expect modestly higher USD risk premium – reflecting a state of political acrimony in DC – to provide an additional headwind to the dollar. That said, because the Senate has remained Republican-controlled, we do not expect a material spike higher in USD risk premium arising from the expectation that House leadership could successfully remove the President through impeachment.

Looking beyond the initial reaction, however, we think that potential second round effects could serve to limit USD downside. Successful resolution of the present state of global trade policy uncertainty has become more challenging, particularly if President Trump’s negotiating position has been weakened as we suspect may well be the case. To be sure, the evolution of global trade policy uncertainty is critical to the global economic cycle. Reduced prospects for a speedy end to this uncertainty, and indeed increased risks of further deterioration, add to downside global growth risk in our view. Although hardly a recession story, US deceleration represents a potential negative impulse to the already-sagging global economy. An increase in risk aversion as markets anticipate a global downturn could thus broadly support the dollar. Finally, on a brighter note, compromise on US economic stimulus later next year is possible due to potentially overlapping interests. Democrats seem to be advocating an increase in infrastructure spending, and the President may well seek to prime the economy in advance of his 2020 reelection bid. If ultimately successful, this should support USD as it could lead to a renewed bout of US cyclical and monetary policy divergence.

Historical parallels suggest gridlock is not always so benign

The consensus among investors is that a gridlock is a benign outcome for markets. We think this may be overly optimistic. In our view, the most relevant historical precedent for the next half year may be the months following the mid-term elections of 2010 that resulted in the same configuration in Washington as the latest elections (with the President’s party controlling the Senate but the other party controlling the House). In 2011, the Republicans, upon regaining control of the House, used the debt ceiling as a lever to demand budget reduction by the Obama administration. The brinksmanship that ensued raised concerns in the market of a possible default by the US government which led to a sharp sell-off in risky assets as well as a major rally in rates (10y Trsy yields falling from 3.7% in March 2011 to 1.8% by September). The USD came under considerable selling pressure during the same period as foreign investors avoided US assets (EUR/USD rose from 1.30 in January to 1.48 by July that year). The market turmoil around the US debt ceiling crisis probably exacerbated the Eurozone sovereign crisis that occurred later that year (which saw the euro surrendering all of its earlier gains).

With the House Democrats having stated their intention to open new investigations against President Trump and with the 2020 presidential election campaign kicking off very soon, we see greater chances of brinksmanship than cooperation. History suggests that brinksmanship could mean lower rates and lower USD." - source Bank of America Merrill Lynch

With growing downside risk for growth with a notable deceleration in Europe and in global trade, there is indeed potential scope for the US yield curve to start flattening again. A conjunction of a flatter yield curve would be positive for the long end of the US yield curve and a falling US dollar would enable Emerging Market equities to continue to rally in the near term we think.

Second point, the recent fall in oil prices is as well putting some pressure on US breakevens as of late, meaning that for now a scary inflation spike has been avoided but, nonetheless, healthcare inflation, namely acyclical inflation is something to monitor closely as indicated by Bank of America Merrill Lynch in their US Economic Viewpoint note from the 5th of November entitled "Inflation in pictures":

"No scary inflation monsters

• Procyclical inflation has moved sideways over the past year, despite the unemployment rate improving by half a percent to 3.7%. The muted inflation response highlights the flattening in the Phillips curve.
• In No fear of an inflation curveball, we evaluated whether there was a kink in the Phillips curve at full employment. We find some, but not strong evidence, and therefore believe a strong cyclically-driven breakout in inflation is unlikely.
• While procyclical inflation has been flat, acyclical inflation has picked up, healthcare in particular. We expect healthcare inflation to continue to accelerate, driven by hospital services.

• In No inflation monsters under the bed, we looked at the disaggregated PCE components and found that there was an increasing share of PCE that has moved into a “low inflation” (0-2%) bucket, and a dwindling share in the “high inflation” (5-10% bucket).
• This shift in inflation dispersion is illustrative of a structural move lower in inflation. A lower trend decreases the probability of an inflation breakout.
• Digging into the components, we found that healthcare services accounts for much of the shift. As healthcare inflation picks up going forward, we may see some reversal of the shift, albeit into the more moderate 2-5% inflation range.

• Another reason to expect only a gradual pickup in inflation is because of inflation expectations, which have drifted lower over the cycle and serve as an anchoring point.
• In particular, University of Michigan 5-10yr inflation expectations have descended to a trend of 2.5%. The central tendency has also consolidated closer to the median, mostly from the 75th percentile. This indicates a greater decline in those expecting high inflation.
• Given core inflation is likely to run above target by next year, inflation expectations could improve, presenting upside to the outlook. But even with some improvement in expectations, inflation upside would likely remain contained." - source Bank of America Merrill Lynch

In our recent conversation we hinted that housing was in earnest starting to turn "South" in the US and that housing affordability was becoming a headwind on top of US consumers using their savings and increasing their use of the credit card to maintain their consumption level. Both auto and housing, which are very cyclical in nature are clearly showing the late stage of the credit cycle in our book.  

One segment where spending rises with age is healthcare (out-of-pocket and government). Healthcare will account for a greater share of spending among Boomers than previous generations. Rising insurance premiums have more than offset out-of-pocket savings on prescription drugs due to Medicare Part D. Housing is also taking up a higher share of senior spending as more households reach age 65 without having paid off their home or are renting, leaving them exposed to future price increases.  This upside risk to healthcare prices and expected further labor market tightening, one could expect core PCE inflation to rise further:

- graph source Macrobond

Sure falling oil prices bring some relief to the US consumers but rising healthcare costs as well as housing costs will not be sufficient to offset the risk of "stagflation". We could see lower growth ahead and even looming recession risk.

As we pointed out in our recent conversation "Ballyhoo", Main Street has had a much better record when it comes to calling a housing market top in the US than Wall Street. If you want a good indicator of the deterioration of the credit cycle, we encourage you to track the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index given the proportion of consumers stating that now is a good time to sell a house has been steadily rising:

- graph source Macrobond

Maybe after all, they are spot on and now is a good time to sell houses in the US? Just a thought. Main Street was 2 years ahead of the 2008 Great Financial Crisis (GFC) as a reminder.

As pointed out by Lisa Abramowicz on her Twitter feed, you need going forward to monitor closely in the months ahead the rise in inventory of new unsold homes:

"The inventory of new unsold homes in the U.S. has reached the highest level since 2011, as measured in months of supply. https://blogs.wsj.com/dailyshot/2018/11/07/the-daily-shot-the-inventory-of-unsold" - source Lisa Abramowicz, Twitter

In a response to Lisa's Tweet, M&G Bond Vigilantes made the following important point on Twitter:

"If you saw the Lisa Abramowicz tweet about inventory of new unsold homes reaching 7 months, you should worry. Historically that level is consistent with GDP growth of zero. This chart is from our 2007 blog."

- graph source M&G Bond Vigilantes - Twitter

Housing has always been a leading indicator in the United States when it comes to forecasting GDP growth.

To illustrate further the rift between Main Street's much more sanguine view of housing than Wall Street we would like to point towards Wells Fargo's take on the weakness in home sales from their Economics Group note from the 7th of November entitled "Home Sales Remain Soft":

"The Softening For-Sale Market Has Been Good for Apartment Owners

The magnitude and speed at which home sales have weakened is surprising, following just a three-quarter of a percentage point rise in mortgage rates. We suspect the problem is a lack of affordable product in the markets where potential home buyers would like to live. This helps explain why sales turned down well ahead of this fall’s rise in mortgage rates. The lack of inventory in desirable markets is a function of how highly concentrated economic growth has been in this cycle. Two industries, technology and energy, have accounted for a disproportionate share of job growth. While job gains have broadened more recently, a larger proportion of the high-paying, creative industry jobs are being added in submarkets closer to the central business district. By contrast, job growth in suburban markets has been slower to recover and wage gains have lagged for many occupations that are at greater risk of automation and outsourcing.

The rapid growth in higher value-added positions closer in to many major cities has fueled a housing crunch that has sent home values and rents soaring in many rapidly growing markets. The lack of developable lots closer in to the city has fueled growth of in-fill developments and teardowns, which have often removed more affordable homes from the market. The resulting battles over gentrification have also led to some political blowback, which has stymied development in some areas. Growth is also creeping back out toward the suburbs, particularly those that are developing their own urban cores. What has largely been missing, however, has been the push to develop exurban areas, where land has historically been less expensive. Such development has remained elusive, as higher development costs have largely offset any savings in raw land costs.

The same trends impacting home sales are evident in the rental market. Demand remains strong for amenity-rich apartments located near the city center or in the metro area’s second or third largest employment centers. Demand for apartments further out in the suburbs has taken longer to recover but has been doing better more recently, reflecting stronger job growth and an acceleration in wage gains. The suburbs have generally seen less development, so the improvement in demand has pulled vacancy rates lower and pushed rents higher. New suburban development remains elusive, however, and most new projects continue to cluster around pricier submarkets closer to the central business district.

We have further reduced our forecasts for home sales and new home construction following the recent string of weaker housing reports and downward revisions to previous data. We still see new home sales increasing over the forecast period but now look for just 5.6% growth in 2019 and 5.3% growth in 2020.

Much of that increase will come from more affordable homes in the South and West, which will restrain new home price appreciation. With little inventory, new home construction will continue to gradually edge higher. Apartment development is now expected to remain stronger for a little longer. There are a great deal of projects in the pipeline and a large number of proposed projects that have not yet moved forward. Demand for well located projects should remain strong, but vacancy rates will likely rise as job growth moderates in 2019 and 2020."  - source Wells Fargo

We do not share the optimism above relating to new home construction due to affordability issues coming from rising mortgage rates due to the Fed continuing its hiking path, their views being supported by the most recent employment report. Housing affordability has become a headwind, no wonder in some parts of the US prices are starting to cool down as indicated by Bloomberg on the 30th of October in their article entitled "Mortgage Rates Are Pushing U.S. Homes Out of Reach":

"While U.S. home prices have gained almost 60 percent since March 31, 2012, according to the S&P Corelogic Case-Shiller 20-City Composite Index, household income is up a little less than 30 percent in the same period, Bureau of Economic Analysis data shows. The average rate for a 30-year fixed mortgage rose from about 3.85 percent at the start of 2018 to about 4.74 percent now, Bankrate.com reports. Next year, it’s expected to rise further.

A buyer with a $2,500 monthly housing budget has lost almost $30,000 in purchasing power this year, according to Redfin Inc., a national brokerage.

In Orange County, California, more than 30 percent of homes for sale in the metro area would become unaffordable to buyers with a $3,500 monthly budget, Redfin estimates. In San Jose, that number would be almost 40 percent." - source Bloomberg

Housing markets turn slowly then suddenly...Just a thought.

While the US elections stalemate and the return of buybacks should be supportive, US markets for many years have been levitating and defying gravitation provided by the central bank support. This support has been obviously fading during the course of 2018 with QT as per our final charts below.

• Final charts -  The invisible hand is fading...

If October has been murderous for various asset classes thanks to the conjunction of several factors such as the velocity in the rise of real rates, blackout period leading to smaller buybacks, escalating tensions in the trade war narrative between the United States and China as well as Italian worries, our final charts from Bank of America Merrill Lynch coming from their European Credit Strategist note entitled "The hunt for red October" from the 2nd of November clearly shows that the "invisible hand" coming from the central bank is fading:

"The end of the “invisible hand”…

Last month wasn’t unique, though. We think it reflects a bigger picture theme…namely that assets are now struggling to produce meaningfully positive returns in an era of less central bank liquidity. The “invisible hand” that once propped-up market prices is now significantly smaller.

Chart 1 shows that there are precious few assets that remain above water this year. In fixed-income land, US leveraged loans have produced total returns of around 4%.

In Europe, many government debt markets – with the exception of Italy – are up for the year, albeit only by a modicum. But note that the biggest loser of all during the QE era, namely cash, has turned into one of the best performing assets of 2018 (1.5% total returns).

…the start of abnormal markets?

This spectrum of returns, however, is also far from normal. Chart 2 shows the historical percentage of assets with positive vs. negative returns on a yearly basis (our sample contains over 300 equity, fixed-income, commodity and FX indices). 

This year, we find that only 23% of assets have produced positive total returns. As can be seen, historically this is a very low number. In fact, such a number is usually only observed in periods of financial crises (2008), debt crises (2011), or just plain old recessions. And yet despite the shocks and bumps lately, the global economy is still humming along fairly nicely in 2018.

In our view, after such a big drawdown last month, markets are likely prepped for a rebound in November. Yet, we caution that bounces in risk sentiment could still be shallow ones. After all, with so many assets trending lower this year, long-only investors are finding that there are much fewer ways to help them diversify and protect their portfolios." - source Bank of America Merrill Lynch

One could argue that, no matter what "stalemate" we have reached in the United States midterm elections, the "fall" in the fall is surely indicative that at some point winter is coming. Could housing woes be seen as leaves already falling? We wonder...

“How did you go bankrupt?" 

Two ways. Gradually, then suddenly.” - Ernest Hemingway, The Sun Also Rises

Stay tuned!