Macro and Credit - Last of the Romans

 "Bad money drives out good" - Gresham’s Law

Looking at the massive capitulation and fall of oil prices, feeling somewhat liquidation from a wounded player in the market, as well as looking at the escalation in the war of words between the Trump administration and Europe, not paying enough their "fair" share for "defense", when it came to selecting our title analogy, we reminded ourselves the term "Last of the Romans". The term "Last of the Romans" (Ultimus Romanorum) has historically been used to describe an individual or individuals thought to embody the values of Ancient Roman civilization - values which, by implication, became extinct on his or their death. In the United States, "Last of the Romans" was used on numerous occasions during the early 19th century as an epithet for the political leaders and statesmen who participated in the American Revolution by signing the United States Declaration of Independence, taking part in the American Revolutionary War, or established the United States Constitution. Looking at the trajectory of the United States, with its swelling budget deficit and rapidly growing interest payments share of the budget and political polarization, when it comes to the fall of an Empire, the fall of the Roman Empire comes to mind. We read with great interest Ben Hunt's latest missive on Linkedin entitled "Foudation and Empire":

"The other way to be richer than your economy grows is to take wealth from the rest of the world. The other way is to turn alliance into empire. And then suck it dry. Or as we'd say in bloodless economic-speak, "extract rents".

The Athenians did it. The Romans did it. The British did it. And history remembers each of these imperial nations rather fondly. They were the Foundations of their day, at least as the victors write the history books.

I submit to you that the "economic nationalist" trade policies of Trump and Lighthizer and Navarro and Bannon and the rest of that crew understand this other way. I submit to you that when Trump expresses excitement over collecting some billions of dollars in Chinese tariffs, he genuinely believes that he is adding to the "wealth" of the United States. I submit to you that when Trump demands that Europe pay more for defense, his goal is to turn NATO into a profit center. I submit to you that applying a simple mercantilist lens explains 99% of our foreign policy towards Korea, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Russia.

Does this sort of rent-seeking empire-sucking foreign policy "work"? Sure, particularly if you run it like a mob protection racket. Cough, cough. I mean, of course it ultimately ends in tears and constant warfare, but hey, we've got an election to win. What's a little inertia, despotism and maldistribution among friends? " - source Ben Hunt  on Linkedin.com

Of course as the saying goes, any resemblance to actual persons, living or dead, or actual events is purely coincidental. To make yet another parallel between Ben's must read paper and the Fall of the Roman Empire, we read with interest Cato Institute note entitled "How excessive government killed ancient Rome":

"At first, the government could raise additional revenue from the sale of state property. Later, more unscrupulous emperors like Domitian (81—96 AD.) would use trumped-up charges to confiscate the assets of the wealthy. They would also invent excuses to demand tribute from the provinces and the wealthy. Such tribute, called the aurum corinarium, was nominally voluntary and paid in gold to commemorate special occasions, such as the accession of a new emperor or a great military victory. Caracalla (198—217 AD.) often reported such dubious “victories” as a way of raising revenue. Rostovtzeff (1957: 417) calls these levies “pure robbery.”" - source Cato Institute.

While obviously the United States comes to mind when it comes to the recent spat with Europe relating to "defense" cost and extracting "rent" from their "allies", also in relation to excessive taxation and wealth confiscation, taxation levels in France have become so rapacious that the French government is facing public discontent which will come in full display on the 17th of November. Again, watch this space, because whereas everyone is focusing on the on-going Mexican standoff between Italy and  the European Commission in relation to the Italian budget, we think that France's trajectory is worth monitoring: public spending represents 56.4 % of GDP whereas the average in other countries in the European Union amounts to 47 %. We live in interesting times. Just saying...

In this week's conversation, we would like to look at what the latest fall in oil prices entails in conjunction with the rise of the US dollar, as well as the growing stress in credit and the deceleration in global growth.

Synopsis:

• Macro and Credit - When the Credit facts change, I change my Credit mind. What do you do, Sir ...
• Final charts -  US Investment Grade credit, retail is finally dragging their feet...

• Macro and Credit - When the Credit facts change, I change my Credit mind. What do you do, Sir ...

In our previous conversation, following the US midterm elections we were wondering whether we would see a period of "Goldigridlock" namely a potential end to the bear steepening experienced during the jittery month of October and some restrain on the US dollar. Obviously, the markets have seen more jitters in recent days and oil prices, as expected in our previous musing has started to put some pressure on the high beta CCC bracket in US High Yield. As we indicated in our previous conversation, in our book credit leads equity and we are closely watching credit drifting wider.

We have not been the only one watching credit drifting wider, following rising dispersion in recent months. We read recently with interest Morgan Stanley's US Economics note entitled "Cracks in Credit":

"Widening credit spreads are in focus as a recent development with potential implications for financial conditions and the economic outlook. Recent moves in credit have not had a material impact on our economic outlook to date, but the risk bears watching as a sustained tightening in corporate credit conditions can create strong headwinds for economic activity.

Policymakers at the Fed are paying close attention as well. In a recent speech, Governor Brainard judged the easy state of corporate credit conditions and narrow credit spreads as upside risk factors with respect to the economic outlook that "could push the short-run neutral [fed funds] rate above its longer-run value." But Governor Brainard was more cautious on the medium term implications, noting that "financial vulnerabilities are building" and pointed to particularly notable risks in the corporate sector, "where low spreads and loosening credit terms are mirrored by rising indebtedness among corporations that could be vulnerable to downgrades in the event of unexpected adverse developments." We interpret this to mean that policymakers believe that easy corporate credit conditions are supportive for activity today, but the unwind could generate even larger downside risks over the medium-term.

This perspective reminds us of a 2014 speech from former Fed Governor Jeremy Stein, where he warned about the risks from compressed risk and term premia resulting from the Fed's quantitative easing and forward guidance policies, and with particular focus on the economic impacts of the inevitable reversal in those risk spreads—“there is a cost associated with pushing risk premiums too low, because doing so increases the likelihood that they may revert back in a way that hinders the Federal Reserve's ability to achieve its mandated objectives.” Stein noted a "striking asymmetry" in the impact of corporate credit spreads—widening spreads were more informative and more negative for the future economic outlook, but narrowing spreads had virtually "no discernible effect at all on economic activity."

Motivated by Stein's observations, below we show a summary perspective on how credit spreads impact GDP growth and the labor market. The asymmetry of the simple relationships shown here is stark. A widening in corporate credit spreads is associated with more material and significant deterioration in GDP growth two quarters ahead (Exhibit 2), while the relationship between narrowing corporate credit spreads and two quarter ahead GDP growth is flat and insignificant (Exhibit 3).

A simple regression here finds that every 10bp sustained widening of BBB/Baa corporate credit spreads is associated with 0.3pp lower GDP growth after two quarters, all else equal. For the same narrowing in credit spreads, the effect on GDP growth is roughly zero.

The same relationship is true for labor market activity. The effect of widening credit spreads on the unemployment rate is significant and positive (Exhibit 4).

A simple regression here finds that every 10bp sustained widening of BBB/Baa corporate credit spreads is associated with a 0.15pp rise in the unemployment rate after two quarters, all else equal. For the same narrowing in credit spreads, the effect on the unemployment rate is roughly zero (Exhibit 5).

Of course we recognize that the magnitude of these simple estimates may be larger than if we incorporated these scenarios into a larger-scale dynamic macro model, so the emphasis of the analysis above is to show the asymmetric impacts on economic activity from corporate credit developments. This effect is consistent in other models as well, for example in our payrolls model where the corporate credit spread predicts employment when it widens, and the variable "turns on" in downturns, but has no impact in expansions.

Looking at credit in a broader financial conditions perspective, our modeling finds that a 100bp sustained widening in BBB credit spreads over four quarters would be the equivalent of a 62bp increase in the fed funds rate. We will be watching how credit markets evolve over the coming weeks and months to see how sustained recent moves are, and how spreads evolve in conjunction with broad financial conditions. As of the September FOMC, policymakers saw financial conditions as an upside risk to the outlook, and so the recent tightening may simply reduce that upside risk in their view. Further tightening in financial conditions may be warranted before these developments have material implications for Fed policymakers." - source Morgan Stanley

In similar fashion we will be closely watching how credit markets evolve in the coming weeks, given that as the GE story has been widely commented, we are seeing increasing rising dispersion leading to some credit spreads blowing out in spectacular fashion in some instances. This we think, is typical of a late credit cycle. We have reached a stage where credit picking skill matters. We also think that cash levels need to be raised and that the front end of the US yield curve offers again some protection in a more volatile environment.

As we indicated in our previous conversation we are watching oil prices and credit:

"Watch closely the energy sector in general and oil prices in particular because any additional weakness in oil prices would cause even more credit spread widening given the exposure to the sector of the CCC High Yield ratings bucket." - source Macronomics, November 2018

Of course we have seen this move before back in 2015 when oil prices came crashing down. DataGrapple on their blog on the 14th of November entitled "Déjà Vu":

"It is not 2015 all over again, when oil went from $100 per barrel to $42, but the roughly 25% fall in oil price from $86 per barrel to $67 since the beginning of October has eventually caught credit investors’ attention. Worries over rising oil production around the world and weakening demand from developing countries has just driven a 12-day uninterrupted fall which just ended today. Stockpiles are building, and producers are struggling to agree on production cuts. According to experts, supply will likely outstrip demand by early next year due to a potential cooling of the global economy and slower growth in China, which is in the middle of a trade war with the United States. On both sides of the Atlantic, the risk premia of oil companies have been remarked wider. The weakest American credits like Weatherford International or Transocean Inc have been impacted the most (+ 700bps at 2,457bps and +127bps at 535bps respectively over the last week), but even European names which are traditionally much more stable have seen their credit risk re-assessed. During the past week, Repsol is 19bps wider at 80bps, BP is 17bps wider at 62bps, while Equinor ASA and Total are 11bps wider at 35bps and 39bps respectively." - source DataGrapple

As economic growth decelerates as seen in Germany, Japan and Italy, China and other places, of course the fall in oil prices is biting again credit markets. This is not really surprising.

Given the pain inflicted to credit markets in particular and equities market in general falling the fall in oil prices in a recent past with a low point touched in March 2016, many pundits seems to be concerned by the recent crash in oil prices and the spillover effect it could have again. On that subject we read with interest Bank of America Merrill Lynch Situation Room note from the 14th of November entitled "Still Stormy":

"Today, not surprisingly, we received a number of questions on whether we are concerned about the recent rapid decline in oil prices. We are not (yet). As far as the high grade Energy sector is concerned, we went through a major stress-test four years ago when oil prices last plunged. That forced companies to deleverage, be conservative about capex and work to aggressively lower break-even oil prices (See: Annual Breakeven Analysis: Breakevens fall for the fifth straight year and make $45 the new $50 30 April 2018, Figure 1).

While in 2014 break-even oil prices (WTI) were $70.81/bbl they have by now nearly halved to $38.30/bbl. That leaves plenty of cushion for most companies right now – unlike in 2014.

This is a general point we have been making, by the way, that the credit quality of high grade companies is the best it has been in decades, as companies and industries have been tested and forced to improve. For example, during the commodities downturn that started four years ago, as discussed above, but also the financial crisis and Dodd-Frank greatly improved the credit quality of banks and before that the early 2000s fraud cases led to Sarbanes-Oxley. This is one key reason that in the next downturn the rate of downgrades to high yield is likely to be the lowest ever.

The other aspect of declining oil prices relevant to investors is what they signal about demand – and OPEC mentioned this. Same thing for this week’s concerns about iPhone sales. There is plenty of foreign economic weakness even though the US economy is strong. The antidote to these concerns is hard data on the US economy starting with Retail Sales and producer surveys tomorrow. The idiosyncratic stories GE, PCG and BATSLN are – well idiosyncratic. For the various macro stories such as Brexit, trade war, etc. there appears to be marginal improvement. High grade supply volumes should be on the heavy side during the remaining eight days this month where the market is open (and potentially into the first week of December). From what we are hearing this includes deals coming earlier than what we expected – such as Takeda, of which it appears the USD part will be much smaller than we thought." - source Bank of America Merrill Lynch

Sure, for Bank of America Merrill Lynch, the US economy is "plain sailing" yet, we do not adhere to their optimism. We pointed out concerns relating to US housing in our October conversation "Ballyhoo". Falling US savings rate, in conjunction with housing affordability issues on top of increasing usage of credit cards from the US consumers to maintain their level of consumption with rising PPI and surging healthcare costs for Baby Boomers, do not paint such a "rosy" picture in our book. Maybe we have been used to being too "cynical" from our "credit" perspective or simply put, maybe we are part of the Last of the Romans. There is no doubt in our mind that we are coming closer to the end of an extended credit cycle thanks to cheap credit and multiples expansion with massive buybacks.

The continuation of the rise in US interest rates is a well creating higher dispersion and more repricing of risk given the surge in "real rates" (a headwind for gold prices in true Gibson Paradox fashion one might opine). We made  the following comment on the 10th of November on another platform the following:

"Life of PI: Real rates spiked to 3.14% in late October 2008. Currently real rates have touched 1.15%. Could 2% real rates be the new pain threshold to watch for?

With real rates rising on the back of the Fed’s rate-hiking stance, no wonder we pointed out recently the divergence  between gold prices ($1,208.6) and US 5 year TIPS. With the surge of the US dollar in conjunction with the rise in real rates, this marks the return of the “Gibson paradox”:

- source Macrobond - Macronomics

Of course it might be seen as too early for the gold prices to shine again in the light of the Fed's continued hiking path, but at some point deflationary forces could reassert themselves and both gold prices and the long end of the US yield curve could benefit (yet for the latter it is hard to be enthusiastic given the aggravation of the US budget deficit).

At least there is some solace coming for the bond bulls, given that oil prices falling means that inflation is clearly moving from being a tailwind during most of the course of 2018 to a headwind for the remainder of 2018.

Also, more and more pundits are pointing towards the rising risk in corporate credit, in terms of valuations, liquidity and other metrics. It is a subject we have tackled on many occasions on this very blog. The latest ruction on GE is indicative of rising dispersion, not the start yet of the turn of the credit cycle for the worse. On that point we read with interest Bank of America Merrill Lynch's take from their Situation Room note from the 13th of November entitled "Perfect storm for credit":

"Today’s most important developments included at least the following five: 1) Monday was a bond market holiday so today fixed income investors had to catch up to yesterday’s 2% decline in equities. 2) Yesterday’s sell-off included the reaction to more negative headlines over the weekend for GE and GS. 3) We know foreign economic activity is relatively weak and investors are seeing a number of potential signs of weak demand including possibly disappointing iPhone sales and plunging oil prices (including - 7.83% today). 4) Significant new issuance volumes are looming this week and through the end of the month. 5) Meaningful decline in interest rates. That proved a perfect storm for credit and recipe for wider spreads.

Over the past month, as GE was gradually downgraded to BBB1, its outstanding bonds have now repriced not only to BBB levels, but to BB-rated levels in HY (Figure 1).

At the turn of the month, when the company’s index ratings are reduced to BBB1 GE will become the 6th largest BBB rated issuer with just shy of $50bn of outstanding index eligible debt (Figure 2). That represents 0.8% of the IG market, 1.5% of BBBs and 3.9% of HY. When General Motors and Ford were downgraded to HY in 2005 they measured 6.5% and 6.3% of the HY market, respectively. Our view is that GE is small enough, and the story sufficiently idiosyncratic, to leave other large BBB capital structures relatively little affected as this story plays out." - source Bank of America Merrill Lynch

Obviously, this has all to do with "repricing". The rise in dispersion is increasing as real rates are moving up, meaning that investors are becoming acutely more discerning to issuer profiles and trajectory. It's not only a case for credit markets, it is as well the story so far in equities with the rotation from growth stocks to value stocks and also the significant headwinds and underperformance in cyclicals in autos and housing stocks with global trade and global growth cooling down as of late. At this stage of the cycle, active stock/credit picking skills are becoming essential. Gone are the days when everything was moving up in synch as the Fed gradually tightens up the liquidity spigot through its QT policy. In that context, we continue to believe that active management should be in a better position to come back into favor. Though, for many Hedge Fund managers, the month of October has not been validating this trend so far.

When it comes to financial conditions, as we discussed recently and above, when the velocity in declining asset prices is important, this "reflexivity" feature can add up to the tightening. In terms of credit cycle and forward default rates, we look on a quarterly basis at the Fed's Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey (SLOOs). This is what Bank of America Merrill Lynch had to say in relation to the latest survey in their Situation Room note from the 13th of November entitled "Perfect storm for credit":

"Competing harder for less business

The Fed’s fresh October senior loan officer survey released today showed weaker demand across the board for C&I, CRE, residential mortgage, auto and credit card loans. The survey cited increases in customers’ internally generated funds, reduced customer investment in plant or equipment, and customers’ borrowing having shifted to other lenders as important reasons for weaker C&I loan demand. In terms of lending standards, banks reported easing standards for C&I, mortgage, and credit card loans, while tightening standards for CRE and auto loans.

In addition, the October survey added special questions on the effect of the slope of the Treasury yield curve on lending policies. Banks responded that the change in the slope of the yield curve year-to-date “had not affected lending standards or price terms across the major loan categories.” However, “when asked their potential response to a prolonged hypothetical moderate inversion of the yield curve over the next year, banks responded that they would tighten standards or price terms across every major loan category if the yield curve were to invert, a scenario that they interpreted as a signal of a deterioration in economic conditions, likely being followed by a deterioration in the quality of their existing loan portfolio. In addition, major shares of banks reported lending would become less profitable and their bank’s risk tolerance would decrease in this scenario.”

C&I and CRE loans

In the latest October survey a net 15.9% and 3.1% of banks reported easing lending standards over the previous three months for loans to large/medium C&I firms and small C&I firms, respectively, compared to 15.9% and 7.6% in the prior July survey. For CRE loans the net share reporting tightening standards increased again to 3.9% in October from 1.9% in July. Please note that the CRE value reported here is the average for the three separate questions on loans for construction and land development, loans secured by nonfarm nonresidential structures, and loans secured by multifamily residential structures (Figure 17).

C&I loan demand weakened according to a net 14.5% of banks for large/medium firms and 10.8% for small firms, respectively, compared to a net 2.9% and 9.1% reporting stronger demand in July. For CRE loans the net share reporting weaker demand also increased to 10.9% in October from 7.2% in July (Figure 18).

Mortgages

Banks continued to ease lending standards for residential mortgage loans. A net 11.3% and 10.0% of banks reported loosening lending standards for GSE-Eligible and QMJumbo mortgages, respectively, compared to a net 15.3% and 4.8% in July, respectively (Figure 19).

Meanwhile, the net share reporting weaker demand for GSE-Eligible and QM-Jumbo mortgages jumped to 21.3% and 15.0% in October, respectively, from a net 5.1% and 6.6% in July (Figure 20).

Consumer loans

A net 2.2% of banks tightened lending standards for auto loans and a net 3.6% of banks loosened lending standards for credit card loans according to the fresh October survey. This is a reversal from a net 12.0% of banks loosening lending standards for auto loans and a net 3.5% of banks tightening lending standards for credit card loans in the prior (July) survey (Figure 21).

At the same time a net 1.8% and 4.3% of banks reported weaker demand for auto and credit card loans, compared to a net 3.5% of banks reporting stronger demand for auto loans and a net 2.1% of banks reporting weaker demand for credit card loans in July, respectively (Figure 22).

 - source Bank of America Merrill Lynch.

Yes, financial conditions remain very "accommodative" and it is probably the reason why the Fed will continue on its hiking path. We continue to think that investors' expectations of the Fed's number of hikes in 2019 are "undershooting".

Our readers know by now that when it comes to credit and macro, we tend to act like any behavioral psychologist, namely that we would rather focus on the "flows" than on the "stock". Our final charts below look at additional headwinds building up for US credit fund flows.

• Final charts -  US Investment Grade credit, retail is finally dragging their feet...

When it comes to "monitoring" the evolution of the credit cycle in general and credit markets in particular, we like to look at fund flows. This is a subject we discussed in our January 2018 conversation "The Lindemann criterion":

"Fund flows have a tendency to follow total returns

Fund flows have a tendency to follow total returns, both on the way up and on the way down. When risk assets are performing well, investors do most of their saving in risky assets, and keep relatively little in cash. As the cycle matures, risk assets become more expensive and deposit rates rise, they do steadily more of their saving in safe assets. Finally as risk assets start to wobble they try and withdraw some money and do all of their saving in cash, precipitating a sell-off." - source Macronomics, January 2018

More recently in September in our conversation "The Korsakoff syndrome", we pointed out towards a Wharton paper written by Azi Ben-Rephael, Jaewon Choi and Itay Goldstein published in September and entitled "Mutual Fund Flows and Fluctuations in Credit and Business Cycles" (h/t Tracy Alloway for pointing this very interesting research paper on Twitter).

This paper points to using flows into junk bond mutual funds as a gauge of an overheated credit market to tell where we are in the credit cycle. In their paper they pointed out that investor portfolio choice towards high-yield corporate bond mutual funds is a strong predictor of all previously identified indicators of credit booms.

Our final charts come from CITI US High Grade Focus note from the 14th of November entitled "Hot topics in IG credit" and shows that inflows are vanishing, particularly from the retail side in US Investment Grade Credit and also that foreign demand is not as strong as it used to be:

"Retail has become a net drag on IG credit…

Mutual funds and ETFs that invest in IG bonds beyond 3 years to maturity are seeing inflows vanish…

– Between 2015 and 2017, mutual funds focused on the IG asset class absorbed slightly more than their share of net issuance of three-year and longer IG paper, providing a solid foundation for credit spreads during periods of turbulence. Fund inflows into all IG categories excluding funds with a short-maturity focus grew at an annual rate of 10%-15% of fund assets at a time when the market for IG corporate bonds with greater than 3 years to maturity grew between 7%-9%. As the (3yr) IG market growth rate has slowed to 3%, fund inflows are turning south. On a 3m annualized basis, the mutual fund and ETF community is seeing outflows at an annualized rate of roughly 5%. (Figure 1).

We prefer to exclude developments in short duration IG funds because their lower rate sensitivity; indeed, short-duration funds continue to receive healthy inflows with 1-4 year duration single-A IG yields at 3.51%. That's only 55 bps lower than the yield of single-A 4-9 year duration bonds. The post-crisis average yield difference is 133 bps.

 … as Treasury yields weigh on investor sentiment

– We contrast the rate of inflows into US IG mutual funds focused on maturities greater than three years against the year-over-year change in 10-year Treasury yields in Figure 2.

The momentum in yields provides a strong signal about changes the direction of fund flows, perhaps because households base expectations for rate changes on current trends. In the 2013 "Taper Tantrum" year-over-year changes in Treasury yields moved from -150 to +100 as fund inflows dropped from +20% to -10%. On a 3m basis, outflows maxed out at an annualized rate of 25%. Citi's  10Y rate view of 2.85% portends a slight positive for the fund outlook. Retail outflows become a greater concern if the IG market returns to a 5-10% market growth rate.

…while the international demand picture is growing more complex

To start on a bright spot, Taiwanese investors are pumping cash into US IG through local ETFs…

– Taiwanese financial institutions have introduced locally listed foreign bond ETFs at a rate of one new ETF per two weeks in 2018, and the pace has increased to one per week since the beginning of August. (Figure 1).

In the past two months alone, these ETFs have seen inflows of $2.8 billion, of which $1 billion was directed toward DM IG paper. The fastest-growing ETFs focus on tech, bank, telecom, BBB and 4.5% coupon or higher paper; all are focused on bonds with at least 15 years to maturity. Taiwan lifers are awaiting a rule change expected to provide new avenues around a 45% cap on foreign corporate bonds (e.g. underwriting more USD-denominated policies). Until then, buying ETFs (and classifying them as local equities) could provide an alternative means to gain access to long-duration, higher-yielding paper. Demand from ETFs is more dispersed than traditional Taiwan flows, which may eliminate some technical pressure on the 10s30s curves of particular issuers and securities.

 … although the broader picture for currency-hedged foreign inflows into US IG corporate bonds is somewhat bleak

– The trailing 12m rate of purchases remained steady at $82bn, the slowest pace since early 2013. And the forward indications of foreign demand for US corporate bonds are mixed at best, and will almost certainly be levered to investors' willingness to take open (unhedged) positions in US-dollars.

At some stage, global investors may be freed from the knotty challenge of balancing foreign credit risk with foreign currency risk, should global yields continue to rise, opening up domestic alternatives. (See: North America Multi-Asset Focus – Foreign Flows in US Fixed Income). Buying USD without costly FX hedges is an alternative but less likely with DXY at 18 month highs." - source CITI

So while everyone and their dog are focusing on what is happening in equities with the "great rotation" from growth to value and the "repricing" it entails, us, being part of the "Last of the Romans" when it comes to assessing "credit risks", we'd rather focus on what is happening in credit flows.

"I think the history of the world suggests if one studies the Romans, and one studies the early Greeks, and one studies the history of the world, they all eventually falter if they don't come back to the basic aspect of integrity and honor and feelings of love one for another." -  Jon Huntsman, Sr.

Stay tuned !