Showing posts with label Charles Goodhart. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Charles Goodhart. Show all posts

Sunday, 16 June 2013

Credit - Lucas critique

"Excess generally causes reaction, and produces a change in the opposite direction, whether it be in the seasons, or in individuals, or in governments." - Plato 

While we mused around Goodhart's law, prior to taking a much needed break, unfortunately interrupted by the unavoidable and repetitive French strikes, we thought this week, on the back of a friend's recommendation, we would make a reference to Lucas critique, named after Robert Lucas' work on macroeconomic policymaking. Robet Lucas argued that it is naive to try to predict the effects of a change in economic policy entirely on the basis of relationships observed in historical data, especially highly aggregated historical data. In essence the Lucas critique is a negative result given that it tells economists, primarily how not to do economic analysis:
"One important application of the critique (independent of proposed microfoundations) is its implication that the historical negative correlation between inflation and unemployment, known as the Phillips Curve, could break down if the monetary authorities attempted to exploit it. Permanently raising inflation in hopes that this would permanently lower unemployment would eventually cause firms' inflation forecasts to rise, altering their employment decisions. Said another way, just because high inflation was associated with low unemployment under early-twentieth-century monetary policy does not mean we should expect high inflation to lead to low unemployment under all alternative monetary policy regimes.

For an especially simple example, note that Fort Knox has never been robbed. However, this does not mean the guards can safely be eliminated, since the incentive not to rob Fort Knox depends on the presence of the guards. In other words, with the heavy security that exists at the fort today, criminals are unlikely to attempt a robbery because they know they are unlikely to succeed. But a change in security policy, such as eliminating the guards for example, would lead criminals to reappraise the costs and benefits of robbing the fort. So just because there are no robberies under the current policy does not mean this should be expected to continue under all possible policies." - source Wikipedia

So, as one can infer from the point made above and in continuation to the points made in our conversation "Goodhart's law", Ben Bernanke's policy of driving unemployment rate lower is likely to fail, because monetary authorities have no doubt, attempted to exploit the Phillips Curve.  

In the 1970s, new theories came forward to rebuke Keynesian theories behind the Phillips Curve by monetarists such as Milton Friedman,  such as rational expectations and the NAIRU (non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment) arose to explain how stagflation could occur:
"Since the short-run curve shifts outward due to the attempt to reduce unemployment, the expansionary policy ultimately worsens the exploitable tradeoff between unemployment and inflation. That is, it results in more inflation at each short-run unemployment rate. The name "NAIRU" arises because with actual unemployment below it, inflation accelerates, while with unemployment above it, inflation decelerates. With the actual rate equal to it, inflation is stable, neither accelerating nor decelerating. One practical use of this model was to provide an explanation for stagflation, which confounded the traditional Phillips curve." - source Wikipedia

In similar fashion to what we posited in our conversation "Zemblanity", both Keynesians and Monetarists are wrong, because they have not grasped the importance of the velocity of money. QE is not the issue ZIRP is as we recently discussed.

The issue with NAIRU:
"The NAIRU analysis is especially problematic if the Phillips curve displays hysteresis, that is, if episodes of high unemployment raise the NAIRU. This could happen, for example, if unemployed workers lose skills so that employers prefer to bid up of the wages of existing workers when demand increases, rather than hiring the unemployed." - source Wikipedia

In respect to our chosen title, and looking at the evolution of inflation expectations, via TIPS, we still believe deflation is currently the on-going problem, not inflation as indicated by Bloomberg's chart displaying 10-year TIPS which have turned positive:
"Treasuries have dropped far enough during the past six weeks that investors no longer have to pay for the privilege of guarding against inflation when they buy 10-year notes.
As the CHART OF THE DAY illustrates, 10-year Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities yielded more than zero for the past two days. The last time that happened was in November 2011, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Yields on the notes, known as TIPS, fell as low as minus 0.93 percent last December. Investors who bought the securities and held them to maturity were assured of receiving less than they paid before any adjustments to principal and interest payments, reflecting changes in consumer prices. “The idea that you’re going to have inflation, I think, is coming off,” Ira F. Jersey, director of U.S. rates strategy in New York at Credit Suisse AG, said yesterday in an interview on Bloomberg Radio.
The Federal Reserve’s preferred inflation gauge shows the pace of price increases has slowed even though the central bank is buying bonds and holding its key interest rate near zero to aid the U.S. economy. The indicator, the personal consumption expenditure deflator, rose 0.7 percent in April from a year earlier. The increase was the smallest since 2009.
Lower prices for Treasuries may do more to explain the above-zero yield for 10-year TIPS than the inflation outlook, Jersey said. Ten-year notes that aren’t indexed had a negative return of 4.2 percent from May 1 through yesterday, according to data compiled by Bloomberg."  - source Bloomberg

As a reminder in relation to the Taylor Rule and inflation expectations, as indicated in a Bloomberg article from the 15th of November 2012 by John Detrixhe entitled "Citigroup Seeing FX Signals of Early End to Stimulus: Currencies":
"Traditional measures of monetary policy such as the Taylor Rule that are based on growth and inflation suggest the Fed should end its stimulus efforts. John Taylor, an economist at Stanford University, published the formula in 1993. It signals the Fed’s benchmark should be 0.65 percent, or 40 basis points above the upper range of the current target interest rate for overnight loans between banks, assuming an inflation of 1.7 percent, unemployment of 7.9 percent and a nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment, or NAIRU, of 5 percent. NAIRU is the lowest unemployment rate an economy can sustain without spurring inflation.
About a year ago, the Taylor Rule model indicated policy rates should be minus 0.47 percent. The Fed has a target for price increases of 2 percent. The consumer-price index increased by that much in October 2012 from a year earlier, the Labor Department said on November 14. If “unemployment rate gets below 7 percent, you could have a Taylor Rule that suggests rates should go up and the question becomes do they overturn the Taylor Rule?” Steven Englander, Citigroup’s New York-based global head of G-10 strategy said. “When perceived commitments are at stake, it’s a nightmare.” - source Bloomberg

As far as we are concerned when unemployment becomes a target for the Fed, it ceases to be a good measure. Don't blame it Goodhart's law but on Okun's law which renders NAIRU, the Phillips Curve "naive" in true Lucas critique fashion, but we ramble again

Therefore in this week's conversation, after a quick market overview, we would like to touch again on the deflationary forces at play, given, as Plato's quote rightly said, excess generally causes reaction, and produces a change in the opposite direction .Our "omnipotent" central bankers, and investors alike should pay more attention to this quote...

In our quick market overview, we will not delve too much into the recent surge in rates volatility which has spilled over other asset classes given we have tackle this issue in our post from the 13th of June entitled "The end of the goldilocks period of low rates volatility / stable carry trade environment"

The recent move in the MOVE and CVIX indices are now starting to spillover to the equities sphere. We have added the VIX index to our previous chart - source Bloomberg:
MOVE index = ML Yield curve weighted index of the normalized implied volatility on 1 month Treasury options.
CVIX index = DB currency implied volatility index: 3 month implied volatility of 9 major currency pairs.

The spike in volatility in Japan has been preceding the widening move in CDS Spreads of the Itraxx Japan, a move we saw coming:
"Should the volatility in the Japanese space continue to trend higher, which is currently the case, we would expect credit spreads to continue to widen, particularly for Japanese financials." - Macronomics, Japanese Whispers, 25th of May 2013.
Nikkei Index - 3 Month 100% Moneyness Implied Vol versus Itraxx Japan 5 year CDS since January 2010 until today - source Bloomberg:
Back on the 25th of May the Itraxx Japan CDS, we indicated that a surge in volatility in Japan would lead to a surge of Japanese credit risk. The Itraxx Japan has surged from 82 bps to 111 bps in the continuation of this surge in equity volatility.

More interestingly the surge in bond volatility has led to some serious outflows in the fixed income space. For instance, as indicated by Credit Suisse, the ICI fund flow data which was out for week ended June 5; showed equity mutual fund outflow of -$942m;  the big number was bond outflow of - $10.9bn. It was second-largest bond mutual fund outflow in history of weekly ICI series, which extends back to Jan 2007:
"The Investment Company Institute estimated that bond mutual funds posted a huge net outflow of $10.9bn in the week ended June 5. This was the second largest weekly outflow in the history of this series, which extends back through 2007. The largest outflow recorded was during the darkest days of the financial crisis, in the week ended October 15, 2008 (-$17.6bn). Investors apparently didn’t rotate into equity mutual funds in early June, as equities also saw a net outflow, albeit a much smaller one. In the week ended June 5, investors withdrew a net of $942mn from equity mutual funds.  Hybrid mutual funds posted a small net inflow of $347mn in that week." - source Credit Suisse

So much for the "great rotation" story: 
"Since the beginning of the year we have not bought into the story of the "Great Rotation" from bonds to equities. One of the reason being on one hand demography with the growing numbers of baby boomers retiring, the other one being pension asset allocation trends." - Macronomics, "Goodhart's law".

We will touch more on the deflationary forces at play and the importance of demography after our overview.

When one looks at the relative performance of the S&P 500 versus MSCI Emerging, one can easily see EM equities have been clearly lagging. Emerging markets (MXEF) continue to underperform developed markets  - source Bloomberg:
The absolute spread between the S&P 500 and MSCI Emerging Markets has touched a record low level.

"QE tapering"soon? We do not think so. Markets participants have had much lower inflation expectations in the world, leading to a significantly growing divergence between the S&P 500 and the US 10 year breakeven, indicative of the deflationary forces at play,  graph source Bloomberg (5th of June 2013):

While some central bankers are busy trying to ignite inflationary expectations with various QE programs, the YTD movements in 5year forward breakeven rates which have been falling are indicative of the strength of the deflationary forces at play - source Bloomberg:

We recently commented that Investment Grade is a more volatility sensitive asset to interest rate changes meaning a surge in the MOVE index is leading to increasing volatility in the investment grade bond space where record lows yields on long bonds can lead to some vicious losses on highly interest sensitive long bonds (Apple 30 year bond being a good example of the repricing risk)., High Yield is a more default sensitive asset. The correlation between the US, High Yield and equities (S&P 500) since the beginning of the year has weakened dramatically recently. US investment grade ETF LQD is more sensitive to interest rate risk than its High Yield ETF counterpart HYG  - source Bloomberg:
We recently commented on the latest sell-off in the ETF High Yield credit space with our good cross asset  friend in our conversation "High Yield ETF - The Fast and The Furious":
"If you do not believe in the "tapering QE" scenario, which led to a recent surge in US yields on government bonds and this recent sell-off on credit, then the relative value of High Yield, is starting to be compelling again (6.50% in YTM - yield to maturity versus S&P 500)." - source Bloomberg.

So if you do not believe in the "tapering", like ourselves, and like Mr. Jeff Gundlach, maybe at these levels the ETF HYG is starting to be compelling again. Mr Gundlach's opinion is that the Fed is likely to step in and actually increase QE to try and hold rates down, given mortgage rates have spiked substantially over the last month from a low of around 3.5% to around 4.3% today.

Moving on to the subject of the deflationary forces at play, shipping has always been for us, the best significant example of the reflationary attempts of our "omnipotent" central bankers. For instance, containership lines have announced eight rate increases, totaling $3,650, but have failed to maintain the momentum because of the weak global economy and the excess capacity which has yet to be cleared in similar fashion to the housing shadow inventory plaguing US banks balance sheet, graph source Bloomberg:
"Containership lines have announced eight rate increases, totaling $3,650, on Asia-U.S. routes since the beginning of 2012. The increases have largely failed to hold because of excess capacity and a weak global economy. As such, benchmark Hong Kong-Los Angeles rates have only risen by 36% since the end of 2011 and are down 11.6% ytd. In a Bear Case scenario, operators will continue struggling to sustain rate increases. The Drewry Hong Kong-Los Angeles 40-foot container rate benchmark was broadly unchanged in the week ending June 12, remaining below the $2,000 mark for the third time in 2013. Rates are down 27.5% yoy and 11.6% ytd, even with three rate increases, as slack capacity pressures pricing. Carriers are expected to raise rates by $400 per 40-foot equivalent on containers from Asia to the U.S. West Coast, and by $600 to all other destinations, effective July 1. " - source Bloomberg.

Of course high unemployment which continues to plague developed economies will continue to weight on the economic recovery in general and shipping in particular, graph source Bloomberg:
"Unemployment within the euro zone is expected to increase to 12.2% in 2013 from 11.4% in 2012, and remain broadly unchanged at 12.4% in 2015, according to consensus forecasts. Falling unemployment is crucial for expanding global demand for goods, soaking up excess capacity and firming shipping rates. The recovery in the shipping industry will not be fully realized without improving unemployment trends." - source Bloomberg.

Deflationary forces at play in the shipping space? You bet!
This is what was indicated by Rob Sheridan and Isaac Arnsdorf in their Bloomberg article from the 7th of June - Panamaxes Have Longest Losing Streak as Glut Magnifies Downturn:
"Rates for ships hauling coal and grains posted the longest losing streak on record as the merchant fleet’s largest glut magnified seasonal declines in demand from South America and India.
Earnings for Panamaxes fell 0.1 percent to $6,078 a day, the 32nd drop in a row and the longest stretch in data going back to 1999, according to the Baltic Exchange, the London-based publisher of shipping costs on more than 50 trade routes. Panamaxes can carry about 75,000 metric tons of dry-bulk commodities." - source Bloomberg.

We still are seeing creative destruction at play and deflationary forces in the shipping space as the gradual excesses of too many ships built on ship credit are being dealt with, graph source Bloomberg:
"Excess capacity and depressed charter rates have increased the number of container ships sent to be scrapped by 538% since June 2005. This is creating a more efficient fleet as older ships are replaced by newer models. For instance, Maersk is set to introduce triple-E ships that consume about 35% less fuel per container and are able to carry 16% more boxes. In May, the total number of scrapped container vessels surpassed tankers." - source Bloomberg

Global Economic growth remains weak and vulnerable as indicated by the dry bulk market:
"The dry bulk market continued to show weakness, as time charter rates fell for most carriers in 1Q. Dry bulk rates declined 36% yoy on average and were down 10% sequentially. Torm (down 14.2% yoy) and D/S Norden's (20.2% lower yoy) dry bulk rates decreased the least. D/S Norden noted dry bulk fleet growth has moderated, and scrapping will continue as long as rates remain low. The Baltic Dry Index declined 8.2% yoy in 1Q, and fell 16.5% from 4Q." - source Bloomberg.

In similar fashion to the extend and pretend game being played by banks relating to their real estate exposure and negative equity, some German banks, which total exposure to shipping loans amount to 125 billion USD with a nonperforming ratio of 65%, have resorted to avoid recognizing the losses by acquiring some ships in a bid to salvage their bad loans as reported by Nicholas Brautlecht in Bloomberg on June 13 in his article "Commerzbank Acquires First Ships in Bid to Salvage Bad Loans":
"Commerzbank AG, the German lender whose soured shipping loans prompted a ratings downgrade by Standard & Poor’s last month, is taking the helm as it tries to salvage some of the 4.5 billion euros ($6 billion) it holds in bad debt from the crisis-hit industry.
It plans to take over two feeder ships from debtors this month, holding off on a sale until values recover, said Stefan Otto, 42, the head of the shipping unit. The vessels, which can transport as many as 3,000 standard 20-foot containers, or TEU, are the first the Frankfurt-based bank will actively manage as part of a goal to reduce shipping losses and exit ship financing.
“We focus on ships where we see significantly more upside than downside in the future, and where it seems smarter to hold them for a limited time period and wait with the divestment until the value has increased,” said Otto in an interview, declining to reveal the value or the names of the ships.
The collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. in September 2008 and the ensuing sovereign-debt crisis propelled the shipping industry into a slump from which it has yet to recover, suffocating demand and generating a glut of vessels. Commerzbank decided a year ago to wind down its shipping portfolio to stem the losses.
The company, which had shipping loans of 18 billion euros in the first quarter, became the world’s second-biggest financier of ships with the 2009 acquisition of Dresdner Bank. Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale has a similar-sized loan portfolio, while leader HSH Nordbank AG’s ship loans stood at 27 billion euros in the first quarter." - source Bloomberg

Given that Container ships make up more than one-third of Commerzbank’s 18 billion-euro shipping loan portfolio and looking at the trend in Dry Bulk Cargo described above, and that Commerzbank has had its 5th capital increase in four years, you can expect additional pressure to come for Germany's second largest bank. By 2016, Commerzbank wants to further reduce its portfolio by 4 billion euros to about 14 billion euros, while a date for a complete exit is too difficult to predict according to Stefan Otto. Exit? What exit?

As we have argued in our conversation "Dumb buffers", taking ownership from debtors will not change the fact that Commerzbank's outlook due to its shipping exposure remains deeply concerning:
"Not only have overbuilding occurred due to cheap credit that fuelled an epic bubble in the Baltic Dry Index, but, the on-going decline on vessel prices, will no doubt exert additional pressure on recovery values for Commerzbank's loan book".

Size matters? In shipping it does as indicated by Deutsche Bank in their 7th of June report on the Container Shipping industry, (a point we had made back in August 2012 in our conversation "The link between consumer spending, housing, credit and shipping"):
What are the competitive advantages of the ultra-large vessels?
"Breakeven point is substantially lower in the ultra-large vessels
Container ships have become larger because they can take advantage of economies of scale, diluting the operating costs of the vessel among a larger number of containers. We estimate the freight rates at which a 18k TEU vessels could reach cash breakeven in Asia-Europe trades (USD916) is 21% lower than a 8.5k TEU vessel (USD1,160) and 28% lower than a 6.5k TEU vessel (USD1,268) (calculations made at 18 knot speed, 90% load factor and bunker price USD650/ton)."  - Source Deutsche Bank.

In this deflationary environment, as we repeatedly pointed out, only the strongest will survive. In the shipping space,  Maersk Line, will be the biggest beneficiary we think and agree with Deutsche Bank:
"Given the current order book for new vessels in the sector, the operation of truly ultra large vessels, those larger than 14k TEU, looks almost like a de-facto oligopoly mainly in the hands of Maersk Line, MSC and CSCL, which together will have 78% of the capacity in the segment by 2016, versus a total market share of 33%. This data is based on the global order book as of 11 January 2013 (source Alphaliner) and it does not include the latest order for five 18,000TEU vessels made by CSCL, on which we comment in the specific company pages below in this report." - source Bloomberg

What are "inflationistas" of the world and "tapering believers" fail to take into account in their analysis is the importance of demography we think in true Lucas critique fashion. Therefore we agree with Andrew Cates as reported by Simon Kennedy and Shamin Aman in their Bloomberg article from the 7th of June entitled "Aging Nations Like Low Prices Over High Income":
"The older a country’s population, the lower its inflation rate, posing a challenge for central banks in the world’s industrial nations, according to a UBS AG report.
Singapore-based economist Andrew Cates of the Swiss bank’s global macro team plotted average inflation levels over the last five years against changes in the dependency ratio, which compares the very old and very young to the working-age population.
The resulting chart showed nations that have aged in recent years typically faced very low inflation and, in the case of Japan, deflation. By contrast, those that have been getting younger, such as India, Turkey and Brazil, have relatively strong price pressures.
“Since ageing demographics will now start to feature more prominently in the outlook for many major developed and developing countries this is clearly of some significance for how inflation might evolve,” said Cates in a May 30 report.
The finding clashes with the view of economics textbooks, according to Cates, which tend to say a slowdown in population growth should put upward pressure on wages -- and therefore inflation -- as labor supply shrinks. Still, this ignores how demographics influence demand for durable goods and property, Cates said.
He cited a Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis study that says because the young initially don’t have many assets, wages are their main source of income. The young are therefore comfortable with relatively high wages and the resulting inflation.
By contrast, because older generations work less and prefer higher rates of returns on their savings, they are averse to inflation eating away at their assets.
“Whichever group predominates in any economy will therefore have more ability to control policy and more ability to control economic outcomes,” said Cates." - source Bloomberg

On a final note, dormant inflation in the US is giving plenty of time to the Fed, as indicated as well by the current trajectory of TIPS, graph source Bloomberg:
"The Federal Reserve may be able to take its time in adopting a more restrictive monetary policy because inflation is relatively tame, according to Pavilion Global Markets Ltd.
As the CHART OF THE DAY illustrates, the U.S. core consumer price index’s increase since the latest recession ended in June 2009 is the smallest for any multiyear recovery since the 1970s. The gauge of prices excluding food and energy rose 6.3 percent through April, according to the Labor Department.
“There is no pressure on inflation that could lead the Fed to act more quickly than it would like” in scaling back a bond-buying program and raising interest rates, Pierre Lapointe, the Montreal-based head of global strategy and research at Pavilion, and two colleagues wrote yesterday in a report.
Core consumer prices were 7 percent higher at the same point in the previous recovery, which started in December 2001, as the chart shows. The biggest increase in the inflation gauge was 29 percent, posted in a recovery that began in April 1975.
These and other inflation statistics are at odds with the magnitude of losses in U.S. bonds, according to David R. Kotok, chief investment officer at Cumberland Advisors. The decline in 10-year Treasury notes sent their yield surging 60 basis points from this year’s low, reached on May 2, through yesterday. Each
basis point amounts to 0.01 percentage point. “The bond-market adjustment is too extreme and has created
bargains,” Kotok wrote. He added that Cumberland, a firm that’s based in Sarasota, Florida, is buying tax-free bonds and taking more interest-rate risk with its holdings." - source Bloomberg.

"We are not retreating - we are advancing in another direction." - Douglas MacArthur 

Stay tuned!


Sunday, 2 June 2013

Credit - Goodhart's law

 "When a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure." - Charles Goodhart

"The original formulation by Goodhart, a former advisor to the Bank of England and Emeritus Professor at the London School of Economics, is this: "As soon as the government attempts to regulate any particular set of financial assets, these become unreliable as indicators of economic trends." This is because investors try to anticipate what the effect of the regulation will be, and invest so as to benefit from it. Goodhart first used it in a 1975 paper, and it later became used popularly to criticize the United Kingdom government of Margaret Thatcher for trying to conduct monetary policy on the basis of targets for broad and narrow money" - source Wikipedia.

In anticipation of next week's nonfarm payroll number and the US unemployment rate, we thought this week, following the suggestion of another good credit friend, we would make a reference to Goodhart's law. Conducing monetary policy based on an unemployment target is, no doubt, an application of the aforementioned Goodhart law. Therefore, when unemployment becomes a target for the Fed, we could argue that it ceases to be a good measure.

After a quick market overview where we will be looking at the implications of surging volatilities in the bond space spilling onto other asset classes (a point we touched recently), we would like to focus our attention on the broken credit transmission mechanism. Some punters have been putting the blame on QE recently, we think it has much more to do with global ZIRP. We will also discuss the issues we have with the Keynesian multiplier.

This week, we have continued to watch the moves in the MOVE index, which are going to spill no doubt to the CVIX index and most likely in the equity volatility indices space - source Bloomberg:
MOVE index = ML Yield curve weighted index of the normalized implied volatility on 1 month Treasury options.
CVIX index = DB currency implied volatility index: 3 month implied volatility of 9 major currency pairs.

Like we posited last week, the spike in volatility in Japan has been preceding the widening move in CDS Spreads of the Itraxx Japan, a move we saw coming. Nikkei Index - 3 Month 100% Moneyness Implied Vol versus Itraxx Japan 5 year CDS since January 2010 until today - source Bloomberg:
As per 2011, the spike in volatility in Japan has been preceding the widening move in CDS spreads for the Itraxx Japan.

The volatility jitters in the bond space, have led to a surge in European Government Bonds yields in the process as indicated in the below graph with German 10 year yields rising towards the 1.50% level - source Bloomberg:

As we argued in the last few conversations, Investment Grade is a more volatility sensitive asset to interest rate changes meaning a surge in the MOVE index is leading to increasing volatility in the investment grade bond space where record lows yields on long bonds can lead to some vicious losses on highly interest sensitive long bonds (Apple 30 year bond being a good example of the repricing risk), whereas High Yield is a more default sensitive asset. The correlation between the US, High Yield and equities (S&P 500) since the beginning of the year has weakened significantly recently. US investment grade ETF LQD is more sensitive to interest rate risk than its High Yield ETF counterpart HYG  - source Bloomberg:
With Treasury 10-year note yields, the benchmark for investment grade US bonds rising to 2.23% on May
29, the highest on an intraday basis in 13 months, before falling towards 2.128% on Friday, has led to the biggest losses in the global bond market in 18 months. This month losses on corporate bonds worldwide pare gains for 2013 on the Bank of America Merrill Lynch Global Corporate and High Yield index to 1.3% following a 12% return in 2012. The monthly performance is the worst since a 1.98% loss in November 2011 according to Bloomberg. No wonder investors are piling into shorter duration bonds at a record pace.

Of course in true Goodhart's law fashion so far equity volatility indices have ceased to be a good measure, since the massive liquidity injections courtesy of Central Banks around the world, have led to the volatility measure to be completely anesthetized for now. 

The divergence between VIX and its European equivalent V2X - Source Bloomberg:
The highest point reached by VIX in 2011 was 48 whereas V2X was 51. VIX is around 14.53,  and V2X at 19.14. We haven't seen a similar surge in equity volatility yet, but, rest assured that if the bond repricing continues, we will no doubt have some spillover of risk in the equities space.

Moving on to the subject of the Keynesian multiplier, in 1991, looking across 100 countries, Robert Barro of Harvard presented historical evidence that high government spending actually hurts economies in the long run by crowding out private spending and shifting resources to the uses preferred by politicians rather than consumers. There has also been a study by Valerie Ramey on the same subject.
Robert Barro’s work and research by Valerie Ramey, an economist at the University of California–San Diego, on how military spending influences GDP. Both studies found that government spending crowds out the private sector, at least a little. And both found multipliers close to one: Barro’s estimate is 0.8, while Ramey’s estimate is 1.2. Indicating that every dollar of government spending produces either less than a dollar of economic growth or just a little over a dollar.

Let's agree on one thing, governmnent spending comes from three sources, debt, new money, or taxes.

The Keynesian multiplier is normally supposed to be above 1 in order to justify an increase in government spending, if the multiplier is below 1, there is destruction of value, not creation of value.

Many seasoned economists, such as IMF Olivier Blanchard, have tackled the Keynesian multiplier and they have all come up with different results!

The link to a study of their calculations and different outcomes can be find here unfortunately it is in French but the results are on page 9 of the pdf:http://www.ofce.sciences-po.fr/pdf/revue/2-116.pdf

So you can do all the calculations you want, because if your model is flawed from inception due to wrong hypothesis to start with, so will be the results.


What Keynesian economists tend to forget is that government spending is coming from three sources, you either have to tax more, or to increase debt more, or create new money.

In the short term, if we take France as a base case example of Keynesian policies at play, with the short term increase in taxes, the French government is expecting a boost in growth (financed by taxes) and a boost in growth in the long term (financed by debt). It is working just fine at the moment...

France unemployment rate versus Germany - source Bloomberg:


If a country has 100% debt to GDP, it means that this country has roughly bought growth at a 2% rate for 50 years. Last time France's budget was balanced was in 1974 and debt to GDP was around 20% in 1981.
 
That's why we think Europe is moving towards "japonification", and locked in a vicious deflationary spiral. 

But let's be constructive and talk about debt and credit:
Credit is like cholesterol, there is bad cholesterol that can’t dissolve in the blood (Low-density lipoprotein) and good cholesterol (High-density lipoprotein).
When too much LDL (bad cholesterol) circulates in the blood, it can slowly build up in the inner walls of the arteries that feed the heart and brain. This condition is known as atherosclerosis, and heart attack or stroke can result.

In 2008, we came very close to a global heart failure. The world had a stroke.

But what led to the bad cholesterol in the first place? Bad credit. So betting on a government making the right choice of allocation with "fiscal stimulus" is wishful thinking, we think.

Government policies favoring housing bubbles have led to mis-allocation of credit (bad cholesterol), like in the US, the UK, Hungary, Ireland and Spain.  Bad cholesterol (the "credit stroke) has led to "Balance Sheet Recession".

Government policies favoring infrastructure investment is good cholesterol:
One can posit that President Eisenhower when he signed the 1956 bill that authorized the Interstate Highway System in 1956 was of great benefit to the US. In his parting speech of the White House on the 17th of January 1961, he warned about the risk of bad cholesterol (military complex) but that's another story...

As we have argued in our conversation "Zemblanity", both Keynesians and Monetarists are wrong, because they have not grasped the importance of the velocity of money. QE is not the issue ZIRP is.

The velocity of money is the only real sign that your real economy is alive and well. US Velocity M2 index and US labor participation rate over the years - source Bloomberg:

M2 and the US labor participation rate are indicative of the failure for both theories. Both theories failed in essence because central banks have not kept an eye on asset bubbles and the growth of credit and do not seem to fully grasp the core concept of "stocks" versus "flows".


In similar fashion to the current Japanese plight, the Fed will eventually discover soon that company debt sales will counter its bond buying plan because corporate debt should act to absorb the cash generated by the Fed’s quantitative easing. As more companies take advantage of the relatively cheap funding (thank you ZIRP), they are overwhelming any growth in bond demand that stems from the Fed’s buying and related bond investments.


As we posited at the beginning of the conversation, we have argued that when unemployment becomes a target for the Fed, it ceases to be a good measure.  Don't blame it Goodhart's law but on Okun's law, as reported by Simon Kennedy on the 24th of May in his Bloomberg article - Fed History Shows Punch Bowl Goes as Job Rise:
"U.S. employment is 1 percent weaker than the level suggested by a popular economics’ rule of thumb, meaning about 1.2 million people can’t blame their lack of work on the weak recovery.
That’s the conclusion of a paper published this week by the National Bureau of Economic Research, which looked at Okun’s Law. Created by the late Yale University professor Arthur Okun, it maps a statistical relationship between gross domestic product growth and changes in the jobless rate.
The findings suggest more than 1 million of the jobs lost since the end of the 2008-2009 recession can’t be attributed to cyclical factors. That challenges the view of some Fed officials, including Bernanke, who question the assertion that the economy is suffering from structural shifts that permanently lift unemployment.
“Eliminating this shortfall will depend upon the implementation of measures that improve the workings of the labor market, as well as other government policies that raise the natural rate of unemployment,” said Menzie D. Chinn of the University of Wisconsin, Laurent Ferrara of the Bank of France and the University of Paris Ouest’s Valerie Mignon." - source Bloomberg.

The issue is not the efficiency or inefficiency of QE but, we think the troubling consequences of ZIRP when one looks at Japan as a proxy of the deflationary forces at play, unleashed by the damages caused by a zero interest rate policy for too long.

On that subject we agree with William Pesek views in his Bloomberg column from the 25th of April entitled "Zero Rates Are Harder to Escape Than IMF Thinks":
"Japan’s two lost decades are worth considering. The nation of 127 million people has been living with zero rates for so long that they seem, well, normal. Under the surface, credit spreads mean little, not when the underlying assets on which they are based are drugged up on monetary stimulants. Bank balance sheets get muddied. So do the government’s books, as it becomes hard to discern where a central bank’s holdings begin and end. Corporate shenanigans are easier to disguise.
Oddly, free money has done more to hold Japan back than to revive it. Monetary largesse relieves the pressure on politicians to make industries, from electronics to steel, more competitive and innovative. It concentrates capital in nonproductive sectors such as construction, telecommunications and power, and it starves others -- like startup companies --that could fuel job growth.
Zero rates also sapped the urgency from Japan Inc. at the very worst moment, just as it needed to keep up with a cast of growth stars in Asia, China included. Even when Japan has churned out growth of, say, 3 percent, it has been more artificial than organic. All that liquidity was meant to support so-called zombie companies and industries that employ millions. It has led to a “zombification” of the broader economy, complicating Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s revival efforts.

 Long-term Risks
Ultralow rates, for example, have exacerbated Japan’s fiscal woes because the costs of adding to the world’s largest public debt appear negligible. Someday, bond traders will decide that a debt more than twice the size of a $5.9 trillion economy is too great for a rapidly aging population. For now, 10-year yields of 0.58 percent warp politicians’ sense of long-term risks.
China looks certain to fall into this stimulus trap, too. The yen’s 20 percent drop in the past six months, at a time when the Chinese economy’s prospects are already looking gloomy, has infuriated officials in Beijing. Cutting rates will do little good, as China grapples with its longest streak of sub-8 percent growth rates in at least 20 years. That could mean a yuan devaluation." - source Bloomberg.

We think that QE is not the core issue but ZIRP, which is in effect preventing creative destruction in a Schumpeter fashion and delaying much needed adjustments such as the ones needed from the European banking sector.

On a final note, since the beginning of the year we have not bought into the story of the "Great Rotation" from bonds to equities. One of the reason being on one hand demography with the growing numbers of baby boomers retiring, the other one being pension asset allocation trends. 

The bias towards greater equity allocation versus lower debt allocation is often associated with higher assumption regarding returns. But, as far as allocation data is concerned, there has been a consistent trend since the tightening of pension regulation  and the changes in accounting treatment of defined benefit plans set up in 2006 for lower allocation to equities. In 2006 the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) required that the year-over-year change in the funded status of the plan to be recorded in the company financial statements as part of the Other Comprehensive Income line. 

The "unintended consequences" of such a change as indeed brought volatility in corporate earnings given that the swing in the pension funding level now directly has an impact, pushing companies to increasingly try to reduce the risk and aforementioned volatility as indicated by Bloomberg:
"Companies offering pension plans in the U.S. are increasingly seeking to reduce the risk of failing
to meet their obligations, according to Erin Lyons, a Citigroup Inc. strategist.
As the CHART OF THE DAY illustrates, swings in pension-fund returns may give them an incentive to act. The chart tracks the iBoxx U.S. Pension Index, designed to mirror the performance of a typical plan with defined benefits.
The index had a 6.1 percent loss for the year as of two days ago, when Lyons wrote her report. The decline followed a 0.2 percent gain for all of last year -- and a 31 percent surge the year before.
Volatility in funds’ asset value and relatively low interest rates “have made managing pensions increasingly difficult,” the New York-based strategist wrote. “Corporate managers are evaluating whether or not they want to be in the asset-management business.”
One possibility is switching to defined-contribution programs, especially 401(k) plans, the report said. Another is shifting into bonds and away from stocks. Ford Motor Co. will “walk toward” raising fixed-income investments to 80 percent of pension assets from 55 percent at the end of last year, Treasurer Neil Schloss said in March.
Ford and General Motors Co. offered pension buyouts to retirees last year, and Lyons cited the lump-sum payments as a third option for “de-risking.” GM also used a fourth approach, transferring obligations to an insurance company through the purchase of a group annuity." - source Bloomberg

As indicated by CreditSights in their 29th of May 2013 Asset Allocation Trends - 2012 Pension Review:
"Key among the prevailing market realities in the post-financial crisis environment has been the extended period Quantitative Easing and the continuation of the Fed's prevailing zero interest rate policy and in the latest year's plan asset allocation data there was evidence of the effect this was having. As noted above, historically low interest rates have not only inflated the calculated liabilities of pension plans via the downward pressure on interest rates, they have also deflated assumed plan asset return rates as fixed income has increased as a percentage of plan assets." - source CreditSights.

So much for the great rotation, given, as indicated in the same report from CreditSights:
"One of the notable observations from our data analysis was that there was very little change in the allocation across the plans vs. the prior year. The median allocation to equity fell only marginally (from 50.8% to 50.0%) and the allocation to fixed income, rather than increasing, fell from 37.0% to 36.4%. This suggests that the trend towards Liability Driven Investment has slowed. While this, at least in part, likely reflects that the shifts made over the last seven years have better aligned many plans with their desired allocations, it also is undoubtedly influenced by the interest rate environment. Historically low interest rates across the full maturity spectrum make it an inopportune time to be increasing the allocation to fixed income assets (or to be increasing the duration of those assets in the portfolio!) " - source CreditSights.

Hence the reason, we care more about the distortion created by ZIRP, because if the increasing duration risk which has to be taken by players such as pension funds...

"It is the set of the sails, not the direction of the wind that determines which way we will go." - Jim Rohn 

Stay tuned!

 
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