Macro and Credit - White Tiger

"Earnings don't move the overall market; it's the Federal Reserve Board... focus on the central banks, and focus on the movement of liquidity... most people in the market are looking for earnings and conventional measures. It's liquidity that moves markets." - Stanley Druckenmiller

Watching with interest the trade war between the United States and China ratcheting up with Beijing cancelling its plans to send two delegations to Washington, given the season of fall is upon us, when it came to selecting our title analogy, we decided to go for "White Tiger". The White Tiger is one of the four symbols of the Chines constellations. It is sometimes called the White Tiger of the West and represents the West in terms of direction as well as the autumn season.  It has been said that the white tiger only appeared when the emperor ruled with absolute virtue, or if there was peace throughout the world. Obviously for those who remember our June conversation "Prometheus Unbound", we argued the following:

"It seems more and more probable that the United States and China cannot escape the Thucydides Trap being the theory proposed by Graham Allison former director of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and a former U.S. assistant secretary of defense for policy and plans in 2015 who postulates that war between a rising power and an established power is inevitable:
- source Macronomics June 2016 

"It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable." Thucydides from "The History of the Peloponnesian War" -

In similar fashion, more recently maverick hedge fund manager Ray Dalio came to a similar prognosis in his recent musing entitled "A Path to War" on the 19th of September:

"The economic/geopolitical cycle of economic conflicts leading to military conflicts both within and between emerging powerful countries and established powerful countries is obvious to anyone who studies history.  It’s been well-described by historians, though those historians typically have more of a geopolitical perspective and less of an economic/market perspective than I do.  In either case, it is well-recognized as classic by historians.  The following sentence describes it as I see it in a nutshell:

When 1) within countries there are economic conflicts between the rich/capitalist/political right and the poor/proletariat/political left that lead to conflicts that result in populist, autocratic, nationalistic, and militaristic leaders coming to power, while at the same time, 2) between countries there are conflicts arising among comparably strong economic and military powers, the relationships between economics and politics become especially intertwined—and the probabilities of disruptive conflicts (e.g., wars) become much higher than normal.

In other words economic rivalries within and between countries often lead to fighting in order to establish which entities are most powerful.  In these periods, we have war economies, and after them, markets, economies, and geopolitics all experience the hang-over effects.  What happens during wars and as a result of wars have huge effects on which currencies, which debts, which equities, and which economies are worth what, and more profoundly, on the whole social-political fabric.  At the most big-picture level, the periods of war are followed by periods of peace in which the dominant power/powers get to set the rules because no one can fight them.  That continues until the cycle begins again (because of a rival power emerging).

Appreciating this big economic/geopolitical cycle that drives the ascendancies and declines of empires and their reserve currencies requires taking a much longer (250-year) time frame, which I will touch on briefly here and in more detail in a future report.
Typically, though not always, at times of economic rivalry, emotions run high, firebrand populist leaders who prefer antagonistic paths are elected or come to power, and wars occur.  However, that is not always the case.  History has shown that through time, there are two broad types of relationships, and that what occurs depends on which type of relationship exists.  The two types of relationships are:

a) Cooperative-competitive relationships in which the parties take into consideration what’s really important to the other and try to give it to them in exchange for what they most want.  In this type of win-win relationship, there are often tough negotiations that are done with respect and consideration, like two friendly merchants in a bazaar or two friendly teams on the field.

b) Mutually threatening relationships in which the parties think about how they can harm the other and exchange painful acts in the hope of forcing the other into a position of fear so that they will give in.  In this type of lose-lose relationship, they interact through “war” rather than through “negotiation.”

Either side can force the second path (threatening war, lose-lose) onto the other side, but it takes both sides to go down the cooperative, win-win path.  Both sides will inevitably follow the same approach.

In the back of the minds of all parties, regardless of which path they choose, should be their relative powers.  In the first case, each party should realize what the other could force on them and appreciate the quality of the exchange without getting too pushy, while in the second case, the parties should realize that power will be defined by the relative abilities of the parties to endure pain as much as their relative abilities to inflict it.  When it isn’t clear exactly how much power either side has to reward and punish the other side because there are many untested ways, the first path is the safer way.  On the other hand, the second way will certainly make clear—through the hell of war—which party is dominant and which one will have to be submissive.  That is why, after wars, there are typically extended periods of peace with the dominant country setting the rules and other countries following them for the time it takes for the cycle to happen all over again." - source Ray Dalio

Because the color white of the Wu Xing theory also represents the west, the white tiger became a mythological guardian of the West on the mythological compass. The White Tiger is as well considered in China as the ruler of the Autumn and the governor of the metallic elementals (hint for you gold bugs out there...) but we ramble again. Will the age of reason disappear with the White Tiger? We wonder.

In this week's conversation, we would like to look at the gradual path towards recession in the US and how does the credit cycle will end.

Synopsis:

• Macro and Credit - Credit cycles die of "old age". 
• Final chart - Hey Fed, NAIRU this!

• Macro and Credit - Credit cycles die of "old age". 

While many pundits have been focusing on the continuation of the flattening of the yield curve, as we pointed out in our most recent conversation again, credit cycles die because too much debt has been raised. What the most recent Fed quarterly survey Senior Loan Officers Opinion Survey (SLOOs) tells us is that financial conditions remain very benign still. Yet, no one can ignore the hiking path followed by the Fed and that already some part of the economy such as housing are already feeling the heat and the gradual tightening noose of financial conditions. 

From a "White Tiger" perspective, a full-blown trade war between China and the United States would push US companies to pass on prices increases onto the US consumer. Any acceleration in inflation would lead to the Fed to be more aggressive with its hiking stance. The rhetoric of Fed members in recent week has become decisively more “hawkish”.

First question we are asking ourselves is when does the US consumer gets "maxed out"? We are already seeing credit card usage surging as well as the return of housing equity extraction thanks to the return of HELOC. On this subject we read with interest Wells Fargo Economics Group note from the 18th of September entitled "Consumer outlook in a rising rate environment":

"Executive Summary

Conventional wisdom has it that rising interest rates are bad for consumer spending because swelling financing costs put a squeeze on a household’s capacity for other outlays. What if conventional wisdom is wrong? Our analysis finds that a rising interest rate environment does not immediately snuff out consumer spending growth.

As the current expansion stretches further into its tenth year, the economy is on track to eclipse the expansion of the 1990s as the longest on record. In this report we consider the outlook for consumer spending against this backdrop of a record-setting expansion and consider how long the good times will last. Our base-case scenario, spelled out in this special report, anticipates a modest pick-up in consumer spending, at least in the near term. Eventually, like all good things, the longest economic expansion on record will come to an end and consumer spending will come back down with it. That will likely occur alongside financial conditions that warrant rate cuts by the Fed. The precise timing of these events is tough to get right, but by signaling this drop-off in activity in late 2020, we are essentially saying that while the end of the party is not imminent, no cycle lasts forever.

- Source Bloomberg LP, The Conference Board, University of Michigan and Wells Fargo Securities

As per the below Macrobond chart, the University of Michigan Consumer Confidence turning points tend to coincide with significant S&P 500 12 months return:

- source Macrobond (click to enlarge).

Before we go into more details of Wells Fargo's note, there are a couple of points we would like to make. Despite decreasing significantly from its peak prior to the Great Recession, household debt still remains quite elevated, stabilizing around 77%. Also back in March in our long conversation "Intermezzo", when it comes to consumer credit, as pointed out by famous French economist Frédéric Bastiat, there is always what you see and what you don't see. We pointed out the following from Deutsche Bank's State of the US Consumer report from the 26th of February entitled "Robust Consumer with Pro-cyclical and Seasonal Tailwinds on the Horizon":

"Items to watch

Lower income consumers are more levered than they appear: The aggregate deleveraging post-crisis has largely benefited from mortgage leverage sitting at its lowest level since 2001. However, other consumer leverage (card, student, auto, and personal) continues to grind higher into 2018 and is now at all time highs (~26%). Excluding disposable income for the Top 5% income bracket of US consumers, consumer debt levels are closer to 43% of adjusted disposable income—almost double the reported measure of ~26%. The latest triennial Fed Survey of Consumer Finances highlights this dynamic, with the bottom 40% income households running at ~50% non-mortgage DTI, which is ~10% more than LT averages.

The subprime/low income consumer is stretched: Sluggish wage growth and rising healthcare and rent expenses as a percentage of income (non-debt obligations near 25 year highs) among lower income households have stretched subprime consumers as they look to augment rising expenses with debt. 

Banks have met this increased demand by providing deeper credit access to subprime (increased participation, especially for cards), leading to higher leverage and an increased severity risk of loss as delinquencies start to diverge for lower quality consumers. Like DTI, adjusting debt payment burdens to exclude the top 10% income brackets almost doubles the reported Fed figure (9.6% PTI vs. 5.8% reported PTI by the Fed).

Socio-economic divide driving credit cycle: While aggregate consumer fundamentals remain robust, subprime consumers are seeing rising delinquencies and losses starting to normalize much faster than other credit tiers: +90-day DQs within subprime cards have rose+300bps Y/Y in 3Q17 vs. only~30bps on average for near prime/prime borrowers. ~45% of Americans would have difficulty paying a surprise medical bill of ~$500 (Kaiser Foundation), while ~50% of US consumers live paycheck to paycheck (FITB). Taken all together, a disconnect between the lower credit tier borrowers and the economic cycle is starting to emerge." - source Deutsche Bank

The issue of course for the stretched US consumer would be if Core PCE inflation continues to pick up slightly faster than core CPI if healthcare service price inflation accelerates while rent inflation gradually slows. This upside risk to healthcare prices and expected further labor market tightening, one could expect core PCE inflation to rise further, not to mention the issue with gas prices at the pump should oil prices continue as well to trend up. Remember that the acceleration of inflation is a dangerous match when it comes to lighting up/bursting asset bubbles.

But let's return to Wells Fargo's take:

"A Consumer Spending Framework in the Context of Rates

As we would at any time in the business cycle, we consider the macro drivers of consumer behavior. Consumer sentiment and confidence, by about any measure, are at or near high levels last seen around 2001; which, not coincidentally, was in the late stages of that prior long-lasting expansion (Figures 1 & 2). We also look at the purchasing power in consumers’ wallets, be it in the form of personal income, which is at last picking up (albeit in only a modest way) or in access to capital through borrowing, where measures of revolving consumer credit growth indicate a levelling off more recently. Finally, we tally the actual spending numbers reflected in the personal income and spending report and the monthly retail sales numbers, both of which have been on a roll in recent months.

In an effort to better inform a consumer outlook, it is essential to have a framework for thinking about these fundamentals and how households will manage finances at this late stage of the cycle. The trouble with considering this period in the context of what has happened in prior cycles is that for a long stretch in the current cycle, from December 2008 until December 2015, the Federal Reserve maintained a near zero interest rate policy (ZIRP), and at various points during those years was engaged in a broad expansion of the balance sheet through quantitative easing (QE), (Figures 3 & 4).

- source Federal Reserve System and Wells Fargo Securities

The Fed has historically purchased Treasury securities to expand the monetary base, although the monetary policy “medicine” applied during that era, including the purchases of mortgage-backed securities and other assets, had not been tried before, at least not in the United States.

Central bank actions, no doubt, are a factor in the remarkable duration of the current cycle, and on that basis any informed outlook for consumer spending ought to not only consider these macro drivers (like confidence, access to capital and willingness to spend) but to consider them in the context of Fed policy.

To that end, we went back to just before the 1990s expansion began in 1989 and divided the years since into four broad categories based on what the Federal Reserve was doing with monetary policy at the time: (1) lowering the fed funds rate, (2) a “stable” rate environment, (3) raising the fed funds rate and (4) ZIRP with QE.

The date ranges for each of these periods is spelled out in Table 1 below.

Most of the time periods are straightforward, although the one period that might invite critique is that we have characterized the time period from March of 1995 through January 2001 as “stable” (revisit Figure 3).

One could reasonably observe that the fed funds rate actually moved up and down during that nearly six-year stretch. Our argument for calling it “stable” is that this period was essentially from the “mid-cycle” slowdown until the end of that expansion. Admittedly, there were adjustments up and down throughout the period, but from the start of the period to the end, the funds rate finished just 50 basis points higher. Reasonable minds could disagree, but in our view, the idea of thinking of that period as four unique rate cycles would unnecessarily complicate our analysis.

With our various Fed cycle dates established, we looked at our macro drivers for consumer spending through the lens of the Fed policy that was in place at the time. For each interest rate backdrop, we calculated the average levels for various measures of consumer confidence, the average annualized growth rate of personal income, the average net monthly expansion in consumer credit and finally the average annual growth rates of both real personal consumption expenditures and of nominal retail sales.

A key takeaway from our exercise, depicted in Table 2 below, is that measures of consumer fundamentals tend to do best in periods of stable interest rates. Interestingly though, a rising rate environment is almost as good for these same consumer fundamentals.

Perhaps that is not altogether surprising, considering that the Fed is apt to raise rates when the economy is at full employment and inflation is heating up beyond the Fed’s comfort zone. Those factors tend to exist when the economy is doing particularly well or even overheating.

The inverse of that dynamic may explain why the worst rate theme for consumer spending is during periods when the Fed is lowering rates. Personal income and spending as well as nominal retail sales all performed worst during periods when the Fed was cutting rates. Interestingly, the lowering of interest rates does not compel consumers to increase their appetite for credit, at least not immediately. The average net monthly increase in consumer credit came in a distant last during periods when the Fed was actively lowering rates.

2020 Vision

So what sort of Fed policy theme should we consider looking forward? To judge from the Fed’s dot plot, a visual rendering of policymakers’ own forecasts for the fed funds rate, the FOMC is closing in on its neutral rate for fed funds. With most dots clustered around 3.00 to 3.25% and the current fed funds rate at 2.00%, there are only four or five quarter-point rate hikes left to go in the current cycle, barring some change in forward guidance from the Fed (Figure 5).

Our forecast anticipates two more hikes this year and another three next year. After that it stands to reason we would be in a stable rate environment slightly above the neutral rate until the Fed’s understanding of r* changes (favoring another hike) or until conditions warrant a cut. In a separate special report1, we explained our use of an analytical framework we recently developed to inform our view of Fed policy going forward and why we look for the FOMC to raise rates another 125 bps before it cuts rates at the end of 2020.

In forming our outlook for the consumer, we take the findings of our rate-environment study and overlay them with our expectations for Fed policy over the next couple of years. If things play out the way we anticipate, monetary policy is entering an era of transition unlike anything the economy has seen in more than a decade. For a number of factors including the longevity of the cycle, growing fiscal budget imbalances and a potential fallout from the global economy, we indicated in our initial 2020 forecast that by the end of our forecast horizon the Fed would likely begin cutting the fed funds rate.2 A rate-tightening environment is expected to prevail at least through the first part of 2019, which will be followed by a stable rate for another year or so before the Fed begins to signal eventual rate cuts.

For the consumer, this Fed forecast implies a pick-up in the pace of consumer spending in the near term before an eventual slowing the further out we go in the forecast period. Full year PCE growth was 2.5% in 2017. By the time we close the books on the current year, we expect the comparable number for 2018 to pick up to 2.6%, prior to quickening to 2.7% in 2019 and slowing to just 2.2% in 2020 (Figure 6).

- Source: Bloomberg LP, Federal Reserve Board, U.S. Department of Commerce and Wells Fargo Securities

Outlook

Consumers may be better prepared to endure a slowdown than in the past. The saving rate, currently at 6.7%, is rather elevated given the late stage of expansion, while real median household income surpassed its pre-recession peak in 2017. With the unemployment rate currently matching low levels last seen in the late 1960s, there remains little slack in the economy. The labor market is expected to grow increasingly tight, with the unemployment rate trending to as low as 3.3% by 2020. Similarly, inflationary pressures that continue to gradually build over our forecast horizon will put downward pressure on real income gains.

The length of the current expansion is expected to surpass that of the 1990s, taking the title as the longest expansion on record. While monetary policy changes act as signals to markets about the health of the economy and/or concerns about inflation expectations, we must be sensitive to policy movements and their implication for consumer spending. Our initial 2020 forecast expects the Fed to surpass its neutral rate, prior to beginning to cut policy by the end of 2020. With this signal of a slowdown in activity, we are essentially saying that this expansion will eventually draw to a close. The rate cutting environment will act as a last call announcement – and for the consumer sector it serves as a valuable indication for longevity of this expansion." - source Wells Fargo

Whereas we agree with the timing, we disagree with the perceived health of the US consumer, as per the above points illustrated in a previous Deutsche Bank research note. There is more leverage than what can be seen, not only when it comes to the US consumer but as well when it comes to the distorted balance sheets of many US corporates after years of a buy-back binge and a fall in the quality of the overall rating for the Investment Grade category much closer to "junk" than in the previous cycle.

Overall the timing for the end of the credit cycle could indeed be in the region of 2020. This is as well Ray Dalio's most recent view and also Christopher R. Cole, CFA from Artemis Capital Management as per his July  2018 letter entitled “What is water?”:

“When you are a fish swimming in a pond with less and less water, you had best pay attention to the currents. The last decade we’ve seen central banks supply liquidity, providing an artificial bid underneath markets. Now water is being drained from the pond as the Fed, ECB, and Bank of Japan shrink their balance sheets and raise interest rates.Despite this trend, U.S. equities will very likely escape 2018 without a crisis or volatility regime shift because of the one-time wave of corporate liquidity unleashed by tax reform. Expect a crisis to occur between 2019 and 2021 when a drought caused by dust storms of debt refinancing, quantitative tightening, and poor demographics causes liquidity to evaporate.” – Source Christopher R. Cole, CFA from Artemis Capital Management

The whole note written by Christopher R. Cole is worth a read particularly on the subject of passive management and liquidity. His quote from above resonates as well with our opening quote from maverick investor Stanley Druckenmiller.

 As well in his note, Christopher R. Cole indicates when he thinks we will most likely have another crisis on our hands:

“When does this all end? If or when the collective consciousness stops believing growth can be created by money and debt expansion the entire medium will fall apart, otherwise it is totally real… and will continue to be real.

A crisis-level drought in liquidity is coming between 2019 to 2022 marked by a perfect dust storm of unprecedented debt supply, quantitative tightening, and demographic outflows.

Quantitative easing has caused the natural relationship between corporate debt expansion and default rates to break down. U.S. debt is at an all-time high of $14 trillion (45% of GDP) and high yield default rates are near all-time lows at 3.3% (MarketWatch, 13d). This is not sustainable. Years of cheap money has led scores of investors to buy debt at levels that do not reflect credit risk. The poster child is the 2017 issuance of 100-year Argentina bonds (USD denominated) that were oversubscribed 3.6x with a 7.9% yield. It is hard to find a decade where Argentina has not defaulted, much less a century. That medium of bond market demand has already begun to show signs of cracking.” – Source Christopher R. Cole, CFA from Artemis Capital Management

Fiduciary duty anyone? Credit cycles tend to die of old age and too much debt. We have entered the season of the White Tiger we think. Only a few innings left. 

On the current evolution of the credit cycle we read with interest Bank of America Merrill Lynch's take in their High Yield Strategy note from the 21st of September entitled "The Evolution of the Credit Cycle:

"The Evolution of the Credit Cycle

As we continue to study the state of the current credit cycle, the accumulated evidence sides with the argument that it has more room to develop, as long as few more years. Previous cycles have lasted anywhere between 6-8 years, on average, and this observation would make it an unusual development to see the current cycle extend for much longer. However, we also note that more broadly, this economic cycle has been an unusual one in many respects, including how long it took the US GDP to return to trend growth rates, the unemployment to decline, and the inflation to recover. And if those major macroeconomic variables took an unusually long time to return to normal levels, then why should we expect the credit cycle to be an average one?

Away from this argument, we also continue to believe that the commodity episode in 2015-2016 represented a partial cycle in and of itself. Among the most conclusive pieces of evidence in support of this view, we present the charts in Figure 3 for debt growth and Figure 4 for capex.

In both cases, we highlight cyclical turns, as defined by catalyst events as the starting points and subsequent observed peaks in trailing 12mo HY issuer default rates as ending points.

Both graphs suggest that previous cyclical turns have occurred at similar points on each respective line, had similar impact on each measure, and had left them at similar levels after defaults receded. Both graphs also suggest that a cyclical turn at current levels and given their recent trends would be inconsistent with historical experiences going into previous default cycles.

And yet, inconsistent does not imply impossible, particularly in light of trade tariffs that are being threatened and imposed by the Trump Administration. It remains our view that at the end, these policies are unlikely to survive the test of time, however it is difficult to say how much time it would take to prove them wrong and how much damage they could do in the meantime.

The exact timing of cyclical turns is an inherently uncertain exercise and we do not claim to possess superior skills to do so. Instead, our approach relies on using all available data and analytical tools to help us make a judgment on a relatively short next-12mo time horizon, and continue doing so as time progresses and new data becomes available. As such, we made a call that this cycle was unlikely to turn at this point last year. With all the evidence we accumulated since then, we believe this view still holds today.

Our default model continues to suggest low likelihood of a meaningful spike in defaults over the next year, based on its latest inputs. It currently projects a 3.25% issuer weighted rate during this time period, marginally lower than the actual realized 3.41% rate as calculated by Moody’s (Figure 5). A 3.25% issuer default rate would be consistent with 2.0% par-weighted rate. 

How it ends?

In our last year’s outlook on the prospects of this credit cycle, we listed three key risks to its longevity: (1) inflation spike; (2) trade contraction; and (3) sector distress. We think all three remain valid and potent sources of known risks going forward as well. In our judgment, the spike in inflation remains a lower probability risk, followed by trade contraction, somewhat higher on our scale of likely developments, and still inside of a tail risk zone.

A contraction in one of the key industry sectors is a higher probability outcome, in our opinion, albeit not an imminent one. Previously, we published our thoughts on capital allocation trends across various sectors, and identified healthcare as the most overextended sector in terms of the amount of capital raised in recent years.

A higher capital formation could lead to higher capex, higher production capacity, higher supply, lower prices, and an eventual need to remove excess capacity. The latter stage often goes hand in hand with a need to eliminate excess debt that was used to finance excess capex.

Other sectors that we found to be overextended on this scale include autos, utilities, and food producers, although these three are relatively small compared to healthcare.

And at the end of this conversation on risks, we think it is also important to remind ourselves that previous cycles have ended with a surprise event, a “black swan” of sorts, which, by definition, was unexpected by the consensus and meaningful in its impact. We do not see any particular reasons as to why the next one would break out of this mold." - source Bank of America Merrill Lynch

From our "White Tiger" perspective, an inflation spike is something very much on our radar, hence our close attention to market gyrations in oil prices and geopolitical risk, the famous known unknowns which have been building up recently in world which has decisively moved from cooperation to noncooperation.

As we have stated above, many pundits are focusing on the flattening of the yield curve, from an employment and non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU), Monetary policy conducted typically involves allowing just enough unemployment in the economy to prevent inflation rising above a given target figure, we think the Fed will once again be behind the curve as per our final chart.

• Final chart - Hey Fed, NAIRU this!

In our previous conversation we discussed the great work of American economist Irving Fisher, in relation to NAIRU,  the concept arose in the wake of the popularity of the Phillips curve which summarized the observed negative correlation between the rate of unemployment and the rate of inflation (measured as annual nominal wage growth of employees) for number of industrialised countries with more or less mixed economies. This correlation (previously seen for the U.S. by Irving Fisher) persuaded some analysts that it was impossible for governments simultaneously to target both arbitrarily low unemployment and price stability, and that, therefore, it was government's role to seek a point on the trade-off between unemployment and inflation which matched a domestic social consensus, the famous dual mandate of the Fed. We won't go into more details about our fondness of the Phillips curve, it's a subject we have discussed on this very blog on many occasions. Our final chart comes from Deutsche Bank's US Economic Perspectives note from the 20th of September entitled "How the Powell Fed can make history" and shows that the Fed has never succeeded in returning unemployment to NAIRU from below without a recession ensuing:

"With unemployment now noticeably below standard measures of its natural level of full employment and likely to tighten further and with wage and price inflation returning to desired levels and likely to continue upward, the Fed has a delicate task on its hands. It needs to begin to close the gap between growth of aggregate demand and aggregate supply in the economy — in other words, to slow and eventually reverse the tightening of the labor market before it risks pushing up inflation and inflation expectations excessively. The question is whether it can do so without pushing the economy into recession and causing unemployment to surge upward, overshooting its natural rate.

Many in the market already see the storm clouds of recession gathering in the distance, a narrative that has found an ally in the flattening yield curve. Talk of a downturn by 2020 is increasingly in vogue and for good reason: a soft landing in unemployment from below NAIRU has never been achieved before. In the modern history of US national economic statistics since the late 1940s, every time the unemployment rate has overshot to the downside, policy firming by the Fed has helped drive the economy into recession (Figure 1).

We think the Powell Fed can make history by achieving the unprecedented outcome of a soft landing from below sans recession." - source Deutsche Bank

Contrary to the elements put forward in this very interesting note, we think that once again this time isn't different. On a final note we thought we had run out of arguments against the cult of the Philipps curve as per our conversation "The Dead Parrot Sketch" back in August 2017, we did read additional arguments against the Phillips curve cult in Saad Filali's take on Seeking Alpha in his article "There Is No Inflation: Too Much Supply, Not Enough Unions", which we found of great interest.  It has been said that the white tiger only appeared when the emperor ruled with absolute virtue, it could be said that the white tiger only appeared when the BIS ruled with absolute virtue as per their very interesting most recent quarterly survey, but we digress...

"Liquidity is oxygen for a financial system." -  Ruth Porat

Stay tuned!

Macro and Credit - Gullibility

"Mystical references to society and its programs to help may warm the hearts of the gullible but what it really means is putting more power in the hands of bureaucrats." -  Thomas Sowell

Watching with interest the 10th day of record highs for the Dow Jones and the on-going rally in other asset classes and in continuation to our previous theme of "Barnum statements" and "Woozle effects", we decided to pursue on the path of "tricks of the mind" in our title analogy by selecting "Gullibility".

"Gullibility" is a failure of social intelligence in the sense that a person or an investor gets tricked or manipulated (by central bankers) into ill-advised course of action (insatiable yield chasing). While it is closely related to credulity, many investors in the past have been vulnerable to this form of exploitation. If you would like to make a small experience on the subject you could try this popular test of "gullibility" by telling one of your friends that the word gullible isn't in "the" dictionary (earliest dictionaries did not by the way). If your friend is a gullible person he might respond "really?" and he will go and look it up. 

Some writers on gullibility have focused on the relationship between the negative trait of gullibility and positive trait of trust. The two are related, as gullibility involves an act of "trust", same goes with central banking (remember: "believe me it will be enough"). On this subject we find it amusing that a certain Stephen Greenspan (not Alan) in 2009, in his book "Annals of gullibility: why we get duped and how to avoid it" presented dozen of examples of gullibility in literature and history to name a few: The Adventures of Pinocchio, Little Red Riding Hood, The Emperor's New Clothes, The Adventures of Tom Sawyer, Romeo and Juliet, Macbeth, Othello and even in the classic The Art of War, The Prince or The Trojan Horse story. Greenspan argues that a related process of self-deception and groupthink factored into the planning of the Vietnam War and the Second Iraq War in his book. In science and academia, gullibility has been exposed in the Sokal Hoax which we referenced to in a previous post of ours "The Sokal affair" describing the acceptance of early claims of cold fusion by the media. 

In society, tulip mania and other investment bubbles (Bitcoin comes to mind) involve gullibility driven by greed, while the spread of rumors involves a gullible eagerness to believe (and retell) the worst of other people. You might be wondering where we are going with this but hearing the other Greenspan recently, Alan that is, making yet another claim that there is a bond bubble in the making, although he has done so in recent years made, it interesting to say the least.  Two years ago, when the 10-year US yield was 2.44% the other Greenspan told Bloomberg TV that "we have a pending bond market bubble." In a Bloomberg TV interview in July 2016, he again expressed concerns about stagflation and said "we're seeing the very early signs of inflation beginning to tick up." He also told us at the time with 10-year Treasury yield at 1.50% thanks to Brexit concerns, that he was "nervous" bond prices were too high. In terms of "gullibility", this is the same Greenspan that told us that no one saw the previous crisis coming. Is third time a charm for the "Maestro"? We wonder. Stephen, the other Greenspan, in 2009 wrote that exploiters of the gullible "are people who understand the reluctance of others to appear untrusting and are willing to take advantage of that reluctance." In 1980, Julian Rotter wrote that the two are not equivalent: rather, gullibility is a foolish application of trust despite warning signs that another is untrustworthy. When we see European Junk Bond yields falling to another record low of 2.33% and closing on 10-Year US Treasury Yields at 2.26%, we think that "gullibility" applies for European high yield investors as a foolish application of trust despite warning signs that our central bankers are untrustworthy hence our chosen title. To check your investor gullibility factor you could simply ask yourselves if you would rather hold US Treasuries for the next 3 years or European High Yield but we ramble again...

In this week's conversation, we would like to look again at the potential risk for a convexity event we discussed previously in our conversation "Bond ruck" from a NAIRU ((non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment) perspective. 

Synopsis:

• Macro and Credit - Convexity - A NAIRU headache?
• Final charts - The barrel in the credit revolver is getting empty

• Macro and Credit - Convexity - A NAIRU headache?

Traditional measures of monetary policy such as the Taylor Rule that are based on growth and inflation and a nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment, or NAIRU, of 5 percent. NAIRU is the lowest unemployment rate an economy can sustain without spurring inflation according to the definition. The name "NAIRU" arises because with actual unemployment below it, inflation is expected to accelerate, while with unemployment above it, inflation decelerates. One practical use of this model was to provide an explanation for stagflation, which confounded the traditional Phillips curve, hence the concerns of the "Maestro" and his bond bubble fears. The "NAIRU" analysis is especially problematic if the Phillips curve displays hysteresis, that is, if episodes of high unemployment raise the NAIRU. This could happen, for example, if unemployed workers lose skills so that employers prefer to bid up of the wages of existing workers when demand increases, rather than hiring the unemployed. As we posited in our June 2013 conversation "Lucas critique":

"As far as we are concerned when unemployment becomes a target for the Fed, it ceases to be a good measure. Don't blame it Goodhart's law but on Okun's law which renders NAIRU, the Phillips Curve "naive" in true Lucas critique fashion." - source Macronomics, June 2013

Also as we pointed out in our July conversation "The Rebound effect" in our final chart relating to the death of the Phillips curve, the framework is still adhered to by the Fed, meaning that they should be very slow in removing the credit punchbowl. We also pointed out that subdued job switching is due to a mismatch between jobs and worker skills. To repeat ourselves, what matters is the quality of jobs but we should add that to ensure Americans are great again, they need to get better skills for the jobs being advertised and that goes through training. The Fed's models are built on past relationships. Yet, what seems of key importance to us is that many believe the NAIRU unemployment rate to be around 4.5%, while inflation and wage pressures remain muted because as we pointed out in recent conversation demographics mismatch in the labor market is affecting wage growth. 

You might already being asking yourselves what it has to do with convexity and bond bubble fears for the "Maestro"? It all has to do with "gullibility". On the subject of the non linearity of the Fed's hiking path and therefore convexity risk, we read with interest Bank of America Merrill Lynch's take in their Liquid Insight note from the 4th of August entitled "Who doesn't love 90s rerurns?":

"Key takeaways

• The Fed is facing a similar situation to the 1990s; the unemployment rate is uncomfortably low, but so is core inflation.
• In the '90s, there were data head-fakes and confusion in the Fed's reaction function, resulting in a "fits and starts" cycle.
• This sounds familiar. We think we should prepare for the possibility of further pauses in the hiking cycle, akin to the '90s.

A not-so-distant memory

Nostalgia for the 1990s is tangible: the economy was in a prolonged expansion, the budget deficit was turned into a surplus and, importantly, the quality of television improved with Seinfeld, The Simpsons and Friends. We are now facing a feeble recovery from the Great Recession, a swelling budget deficit and reality television. Don’t fret; there are some things in common. The Phillips Curve faced similar challenges in the late 1990s as it does today (Table 1). Today’s Fed should keep in mind the lessons of the 1990s:

1. Relying on the Phillips Curve relationship can prove dangerous
2. It is essential to maintain credibility as a defender of price stability
3. Hiking cycles can have fits and starts

We think the 1990s episode puts the spotlight on a risk to our forecast. Although we have been arguing that the risks are skewed toward a slower cycle, our baseline expectation is still for the Fed to follow their dots (a hike in December and three more hikes next year). Given the lessons learned from the experience of the 1990s, we should prepare for the potential of a pause in the tightening cycle early next year.

Measured pace is the exception, not the rule

Many investors tend to look back at the 2004-6 “measured pace” episode as the norm for Fed tightening cycles. In reality, the 1990s offers a much better comparison. In the 1990s, there were many head-fakes in the data and changes in the Fed's reaction function, which led to a “fits and starts” hiking cycle. As Chart 1 shows, the Fed delayed hiking rates until three years into the recovery; did a relatively normal tightening cycle, but then did two mini-cycles of cuts followed by another hiking cycle.

On paper, this seems like a Federal Reserve that was quite confused. Why start the hiking cycle in 1994 with inflation still low? Why the abrupt reversal and then the delayed resumption of hikes? It helps to think about Fed hikes back then as a complicated interactive process rather than a pre-ordained plan.

Stage 1 (1994-1995): preemptive tightening of monetary policy against the "inflation scare" in bond markets. The unemployment rate at the onset of the hiking cycle was only 6.5% while wage and price inflation was subdued. But the 30-year Treasury rate soared to 8.1% in November 1994 from 5.9% in October 1993. Fed officials became concerned about losing their inflation-fighting credibility. In the February 1994 minutes, Fed officials noted that “a relatively small move would readily accomplish the purposes of signaling the Committee’s anti-inflation resolve” and in the March 1994 minutes argued that “a stronger policy action …would serve to underscore the Committee’s commitment to its price stability.”

Even within this apparent steady tightening cycle there were plenty of head-fakes. Three times the Fed signaled that it might be done and skipped a meeting. Each time they came back with a “catch up” hike of 50bp, 50bp and 75bp, respectively. This stopand- start occurred for two reasons. First, they expected hikes to slow the economy, but the labor market continued to motor ahead. Second, most Fed officials came into the period thinking NAIRU was around 6.5% but as inflation failed to respond, they revised their estimates lower.

Stage 2: Recalibrating an overshoot: By July 1995, the Fed seemed to regret those hikes, noting in the minutes that “some modest easing was desirable now that the growth of the economy had slowed considerably more than anticipated and potential inflationary pressures seemed to be in the process of receding.” This led to 75bp of cuts over the next several months.

Stage 3: Watchful waiting: The Fed went on hold for roughly two years. While dissents were minimal (because of Greenspan’s domination of the Committee at that time), there was growing pressure from the Committee to resume hiking. Skimming through the transcripts, we find that Janet Yellen was one of the voices advocating for the Fed to hike rates. Her arguments echo those that she is making today.

In the September 1996 transcripts Yellen gave two arguments for hiking:
"First, an unemployment rate of 5.1% lies near the lower end of almost anyone's estimated NAIRU range. Second, whatever the NAIRU, the unemployment rate does have predictive power for changes in the inflation rate...for that reason, I would conclude that the risk of inflation has definitely risen, and I would characterize the economy as operating in an inflationary danger zone."

"My concern is that a failure to shift policy just modestly in response to shifting inflationary risks could undermine the assumptions on which markets' own stabilizing responses are based."

Stage 4: Crisis mode: The FOMC did eventually hike by 25bp in March 1997, but it proved to be a one-off as the economy faced a variety of exogenous shocks thereafter, including the Asian currency crisis in 1997, the Russian default and failure of LTCM. Through it all, the unemployment rate continued to glide lower, but yet the "inflationary danger zone" proved benign. As such, if the Fed actually engaged in a hiking cycle, the economy might have suffered, as would have the Fed's credibility. It turned out that Greenspan was right to hold off as he correctly saw that stronger economic growth was generated by strong productivity gains, which were disinflationary.

Stage 5: The real deal: Heading into 1999, the Fed was facing a tight labor market with the unemployment rate hovering just above 4%, wage growth of about 3%, but core PCE growth of only 1.4%. Asset prices were elevated with signs of "irrational exuberance" in the markets: by the time the Fed hiked, the cyclically adjusted P/E had climbed to historical highs. This sounds quite familiar to the situation we are in today with a tight labor market, but muted price pressures with the exception of assets.

A big theme then and now: shifting views of the Phillips curve

Janet Yellen was not the only one who believed that inflation would accelerate as the unemployment rate fell further. In fact, it was very much the consensus view. According to the Blue Chip consensus survey, economists in 1996 were looking for CPI inflation of 3.0% for 1998 while it ended up coming in at 1.6%. Core CPI similarly came in below 3%, averaging 2.3% for the year. Economists reacted to the data and within a year were bringing forecasts lower, coming in close for 1999 (Chart 2).

The challenge is that models are imperfect. If you were sitting in September 1996 with an unemployment rate just above 5%, a standard Phillips Curve would estimate 3.5% for core CPI over the next 12 months, which was about 1.3pp too high relative to the actual data. At the time, the weakness in inflation was explained by external factors such as globalization and technological improvements that could not be captured properly by the Phillips Curve. There was quite a lot of awareness at the time that the Phillips Curve was failing. In September 1999, John Williams and others at the Board authored a piece called “What’s Happened to the Phillips Curve,” which looks at various specifications of the Phillips Curve to attempt to improve the fit in the 1990s.

Finding the right re-runs

It is important to focus on the experience of the 1990s, rather than the 2000s, when considering risks to monetary policy. Fed officials struggled with the same questions two decades ago as they are today. How tight is policy? Does the Phillips Curve work? Have we maintained credibility as defenders of price stability? How should we handicap market risks?

The result in the 1990s was a hiking cycle that was not linear. It may end up being the same story today. The Fed had a 12-month pause between the first and second hikes before slowly delivering another 75bp of hikes. We could be reaching a crossroads once again as wage and price inflation remain subdued. After another hike, the Fed will be a hair away from neutral (Chart 3), which means the next hike would no longer be considered a removal of accommodation, but rather a true tightening of policy. 

We think a considerable risk to our forecast is that the Fed pauses the hiking cycle early next year, slowing the pace of rate hikes." - source Bank of America Merrill Lynch

The consensus view it seems is that inflation will accelerate as the unemployment rate falls further, in similar fashion to the 90s. We discussed convexity in our conversation "Bond ruck" recently, given that as well, some have been arguing that in a rising rates environment you would be better off with RMBS thanks to negative convexity features. We indicated there was a catch because of the significant need in "delta hedging". Maybe the Maestro's fear comes from the potential for a "Convexity event" fueled by MBS hedging, particularly in the light of the balance sheet exercise soon to be taken by the Fed. As we pointed out in the final point of this particular conversation, the unemployment rate is currently far below NAIRU. The risk again, is therefore a policy mistake in similar fashion to what was avoided by the Maestro in 1997, but, eventually burst the bubble in stage 5 as pointed in Bank of America Merrill Lynch above. If indeed Janet Yellen still believes in an acceleration of inflation as per the September 1996 transcripts, there is indeed a cause for concern from a "convexity perspective". Yet, when it comes to central banks' "Barnum statements" we are not rest assured that "gullible" and like any good behavioral psychologist we tend to focus on the process rather than on the content of their narrative.

What we think is very similar to the 90s so far is indeed the non linear hiking path chosen by the Fed. On that note we agree with HSBC's Steven Major take on disinflation sinking further Treasury Yields as reported by Bloomberg in their article from the 7th of August entitled "HSBC's Steven Major Sounds a Bearish Alarm on European Credit":

"Major, HSBC Holdings Plc’s head of fixed-income research, is a key proponent of the view that global interest rates can stay low for longer, he says investors aren’t being paid for the risks they are taking in corporate debt markets in the euro area, with yields a whisker away from post-crisis lows.

"Low volatility across asset classes may give a false sense of security and bond markets may be caught napping," HSBC strategists led by Major wrote in a note published Monday. "The risk is that with increasingly interconnected capital markets, driven by years of international spillover from quantitative easing, local triggers can have a more global impact than before.

Major’s bearish case: The European Central Bank’s asset-purchase program won’t be as large over the next year as the 12 months prior, while there’s a natural cap on credit demand as yields sit "materially below" typical expense ratios for retail funds, and to a lesser-extent insurance funds. "Gross yields leave very little left for income-seeking savers," he adds. "Spreads could widen with a volatility shock."

The strategist also takes exception with the argument that the euro-area economy is ensnared by Japanese-style stagnation, which would keep spreads in check for decades to come, amid low interest rates and a lifeless corporate sector." - source Bloomberg

We also agree with his forecast for 10 year UST yield of 1.9%, that still make us part of the bond bulls after all. As we pointed out at the beginning of the conversation, at this stage we would rather hold US Treasury notes than European High Yield no offense to the gullible investing crowd busy picking the remaining basis points in front of the credit steam roller. We also agree that the US treasury market and the US dollar are reflecting a weaker economy. If there is a market which is less gullible to the "Barnum statements" from the Fed, it is the US bond market.

The big "Gullibility" question is one of returning duration risk through a sudden rise in bond volatility and we are not even taking into account exogenous geopolitical risk at this stage (which would be bond and gold bullish and oil bullish). On this subject we read with interest Nomura's take in their Inflation Insights note from the 7th of August entitled "Returning real duration risk to the market":

"A central banker’s headache

There are still many scenarios in which the gradual normalisation in the real monetary stance pursued by central banks might not have a gradual impact on financial markets. Uncertainty still looms large on key variables conditioning a balanced path to “normal.” Separately and/or collectively, the lack of term premium in inflation valuations, the level of the natural real rate of interest, the anchoring of inflation expectations, and flow dynamics from the unwinding of large-scale asset purchases can often have outsized impacts on global bond markets. Of course, central banks might find a perfectly balanced path, yet risks remain that real rates could overshoot. We suggest short real rate trades as a hedge against an environment of fast-rising nominal rates and slow-rising inflation.

“Taper tantrum” vs. “gradualism”

In Inflation Insights - Mini “taper tantrum” vs. “dear Prudence”, we argued that risk of a large, unexpected upswing in real yields remained. Despite normalisation in the real stance of policies being widely expected and advertised by central bankers, some mechanisms might facilitate unusually large yield changes.

Several factors potentially generating unexpectedly large yield moves

These mechanisms originate in both cyclical and structural features of economies. At a conceptual level, they stem from the possibility of a sharp rebuilding in term premia accompanying higher interest rates. The inflation premium – the price of a risk of inflation overshooting – remains low on most metrics. The term premium on the inflation component of yield remains also very subdued, as we have shown in Inflation Insights - A short trip to the long end . Therefore it is from the real component of yields that the risk of fast-rising rates comes from.

At a practical level, factors potentially resulting in an unexpected and uncontrolled rise in real yields are:

• The non-linear dynamics between the level of real rates and the real term premium, as short-term nominal rates retrieve some margin away from the effective lower bound.
• The re-pricing of the natural real rate of interest (NRRI) until recently, financial markets have rather followed central banks in their downside revision of the natural real rate and accepted the consequences on fixed income valuations. Even though there is an active debate among Fed members about NRRI, most still believe it will be heading higher as they continue with their normalization. A repricing could happen if surprises on activity remain to the upside, e.g., as they have been in the euro area.
• The complex interplay between segmentation across market participants and largescale asset purchase programmes conducted by central banks. For example, the transfer back to private investors of MBS paper would probably be accompanied by reintroduction of interest rate hedges. Another example is the behaviour of insurance companies and pension funds in the euro area increasing their purchases of fixed income assets with the ECB purchase programme – against the intuition of the balance portfolio channel pushing such investors to invest more in riskier securities.
• The discontinuity of asset purchases and the “signalling channel” – an abrupt stop to bond buying or re-investment would result in the pricing in of a much denser sequence of “taper” and then rate hikes. In our opinion, the long lead time of preparing markets for the Fed’s eventual balance-sheet unwind could mean that it is rather unlikely in the US (that said, there is a risk to some US rate vol if the Fed gets new leadership). However, it is made possible in the euro area by the perception of technical constraints on the PSPP.

Low inflation duration risk, high real duration risk

All these factors would allow for potentially large and sudden nominal yield changes, translating into large and sudden real yield changes through the elasticity (“beta”) of real yields to nominal yields. However, we think there are reasons to expect real yield changes to be larger than nominal yield changes.

One feature of the environment of low inflation has been that inflation valuations are unusually highly sensitive to current realized inflation trends (both markets and consumer prices). It is not only the expectation component of inflation valuations that has remained subdued, it is also the inflation premium embedded in valuations that has only marginally corrected from its negative levels. The lack of any increase in inflation premia and also inflation term premia would push real yields upwards, even faster than nominal yields.

As Figure 1 shows, it was the case in the early stages of the “taper tantrum” in 2013. The 5y5y real rate increased by about 150bp initially - the 5y5y inflation rate lost about 40bp over the same period. With markets remaining sceptical about the sustainability of higher inflation, it is very possible that the next big bond market sell-off will be a real-rate story.

 Away from the Effective Lower Bound (ELB): a distributional change

The risk of non-linear dynamics on rates stems above all from the proximity of the ELB. The effectiveness of monetary policy is conditional on the ability of the central bank to change the real rate – in other words, to increase the nominal rate faster or slower than the expected change in inflation. At the ELB, the short-term real rate is fully determined by the (negative of the) level of expected inflation. Central banks must resort to other instruments to lower real yields further on the curve – a methodology much advertised in Japan for instance for QQE.

Credible alternatives to the use of the nominal short-term rate might lower real rates further along the yield curve. Their credibility rests to a large extent on the notion that long-term inflation expectations do not fall too much – otherwise the objective of lower long-dated real yields is difficult to achieve. This is why the focus on inflation valuations by central bankers increases – and not only the focus on realised inflation and inflation scenarios.

Figure 2 shows that 5y5y inflation rates remain above half a standard deviation below their 2014-17 average. 

The 1-year inflation rate in 9 years is 30bp below the 2% target in the euro area. In the US, it is 2.60% - which is only just consistent with the Fed’s long-term PCE target and the CPI/PCE basis. In the UK, the 1y in 9 years is 3.45% - the only inflation rate above the central bank’s target of about 3% in RPI-equivalent terms ( the target is set in terms of CPI inflation, UK markets quote RPI inflation). Yet the spread to the target has been contracting since the beginning of the year. In our view, inflation markets have not priced in risk of inflation overshoots that these numbers suggest, consequently as a result the right-side of the inflation distribution remains thin.

A particular risk arises in case of a “spurious” surge in inflation expectations – for example acceleration in prices stemming from rising energy prices. In this case, central banks could increase the pace of nominal rate normalisation on the back of a temporary increase in inflation and despite a low probability of protracted and self-sustained inflation backdrop. Although central banks in general try to “look through” temporary factors, the distinction between “temporary” and “persistent” is not always easy to make in the heat of the moment. In addition, one consequence of the effective lower bound is to skew the distribution of inflation expectations – the normalisation of the distribution to the right can easily be triggered by a temporary factor such as large oil price increases.

Re-pricing the natural real rate of interest

The consequences of a lower natural real rate of interest for monetary policy are very far-reaching, in our opinion, and the uncertainty around the potential evolution of these rates would suggest in and of itself, an increased cautionary outlook for central banks in the pursuit of “normalisation”. An important aspect of this issue is that financial markets have priced in much lower levels of the “equilibrium” real rate. We focus on a simple statistical result – the mean-reversion level of the 5-year real rate, 5 years forward.

Figure 3 shows the contraction in this market’s estimate of the natural real rate. The magnitude is 150bp between our two samples across markets – the common magnitude of the contraction suggests a global issue rather than a country-specific problem.

The 5y5y real rate using swaps is currently about 0.40% in the US, 0% in the euro area and -1.40% in the UK. These levels are very close to the “mean-reverting” level that has prevailed since 2012 – but still very far from the levels before 2008. They are also not too far in the US and the euro area from estimates of the natural real rate provided by Laubach and Williams – respectively 0.45% for the US, -0.30% for the euro area and 1.50% for the UK. A very large discrepancy remains for the UK. In addition, these numbers suggest that “real normalisation” towards the natural real rate has already occurred for some version of the natural real rate – especially in the US.

When looking at the real rate curve in the US, given where 30-year TIPS have been trading, it seems as if the markets have taken to heart the idea that the long-run real rate is somewhere around 1% (2% inflation minus 3% median long-run dots). Down the curve is where the debate over how high the natural real rate could go, in our view. Further increase in real yields would therefore potentially put policy at or above the neutral level – a result that currency markets have not missed in the case of the euro area, with the consequence of a sharp euro appreciation. A sudden and sharp revision in the neutral level advertised by central banks could result in much higher real rates, with the risk to push policy into restrictive levels, which in turn would add to the negative pressure on inflation and activity. This would happen at a time when short-term rates are only some basis points away from the ELB, with limited restored potential for accommodation.

Rushing to the exit: the segmentation of investors

Another factor creating potential non-linear dynamics in real rates stems at a technical level from the segmentation of investors – a feature that accounted for the unusually large changes in US real yields in 2013 referred to as “taper tantrum.” We have explained this consequence of segmentation in Inflation Insights - Mini “taper tantrum” vs. “dear Prudence”.

In the US, a structural and potential destabilising feature for rates market dynamics is the process of MBS holdings of the Federal Reserve System slowly returning to private investors. For years, the Fed has basically warehoused US rate vol (see link) by holding so many MBS securities out of the private sector. MBS hedging in the past was an issue for global markets during quick rises in US rates (where MBS hedgers can push nominal US rates up even faster – known as “convexity hedging”). However, rates/spreads can also rise over time as private investors begin to hedge their MBS for interest rate risk.

In the euro area, the ECB provided evidence that the implementation of the PSPP resulted mostly in the selling of euro fixed income assets by non-residents to the eurosystem, while insurance companies and pension funds did not change their investment pattern. Such investors given their high fixed-income exposure would typically react to a change in the direction of monetary policy towards faster normalisation and create “rush-to-the exit” dynamics." - source Nomura

As we pointed out, a "Convexity event" would be possible depending solely on the "velocity" in the rise in US rates. Given the Fed's recent "Barnum statements" and dovish tone, we think that the Fed's first priority will be to go ahead with the initiation of its balance sheet reduction in September, before following up on additional rate hikes we think. There is a possibility though that, given the current NAIRU discrepancy, Janet Yellen travels "back to the future" so to speak, to the 90s and this, would of course generate significant instability and the aforementioned "bond" volatility which is so feared by the beta crowd and carry players alike. "Velocity" will induce "volatility" and therefore weigh on fund bond flows. Obviously, the risk is a significant rise in real rates, which would be simultaneously bond and gold bearish. We might have been gullible in some instances, but it isn't our core scenario for the time being. Not until we see the facts change, namely less muted wages growth, that we will change our mind to paraphrase Keynes.

For our final charts, back in our conversation "Orchidelirium" we asked ourselves if the US consumer was "maxed out". We noticed at the time that consumer loan demand, a finding consistent with the weaker spending in Q1 had been cooling. We mentioned it was a significant indicator to monitor in the coming months.

• Final charts - The barrel in the credit revolver is getting empty

In our book, consumer credit year-over-year change needs to be monitored very closely. Our final charts comes from Wells Fargo Economics Group note from the 7th of August and shows that Consumer Credit Growth has been slowing to end Q2. We are getting worried as well that total consumer credit momentum is decelerating:

"Consumer Credit Growth Slows to End Q2

Consumer credit rose $12.4 billion in June. Nonrevolving credit growth has been slowing for the past couple years, and with the recent halt in revolving credit’s momentum, total consumer credit is decelerating.

 Nonrevolving, Revolving Credit Both Slowing

• Steady growth in nonrevolving credit earlier in the economic expansion helped spur total consumer credit higher despite anemic growth in the revolving space.
• More recently, however, revolving credit growth has stalled. Net-charge offs have risen and delinquencies are up slightly, although both of these series have risen from historically low levels.

- source Wells Fargo

In June this year we mentioned our concern relating to the US consumer getting close to being maxed out in our conversation "Potemkin village":

"While it might be premature to pull the curtain on the Potemkin village, if indeed we break the 5% level for nonrevolving credit and continue to see a deteriorating trend in the coming months, then it will be a cause for concern. For credit markets at the moment, it's pretty much "carry on", though we are clearly tactically more cautious with High Yield and high beta in general." - source Macronomics, June 2017

If "Gullibility" is a failure of social intelligence in the sense that an investor gets tricked or manipulated by central bankers in buying European High Yield for example, then again, the US yield curve has been immune to the old tricks played by the Jedis at the Fed. As the economic cycle matures, so do credit standards and credit demand that simple. Most recent evidence indicates us that both consumer credit and business lending demand is slowing regardless of low unemployment and NAIRU readings. On top of that nonfinancial domestic corporate profit margins peaked in early 2014 and have declined in the last two years. This means, dear credit friends, that you need to have a more cautious stance going forward. Some investors might still be gullible enough to believe in "Barnum statements" and "Woozle effect", to paraphrase Jabba the Hutt in the Return of the Jedi, dear central banker your old Jedi mind tricks don't work on us.

"Most people are sceptical about the wrong things and gullible about the wrong things." - Nassim Nicholas Taleb

Stay tuned!