Showing posts with label PIMCO. Show all posts
Showing posts with label PIMCO. Show all posts

Thursday, 17 March 2011

Fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me...

My thoughts are with all the Japanese people following the ongoing tragedy.
"神さまが守るように"
"kami sama ga mamoru youni"
"May God protect you."

"Japan is a very rich country and has a high savings rate and has the capacity to deal not just with the humanitarian challenge but also the reconstruction challenge they face ahead."

US Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner
Tuesday 15th of March 2011.

Geithner does not believe that there is a risk Japan could sell their US Treasuries to raise cash in order to respond to the damages caused by both the earthquake and the tsunami.

And the reason why according to US Treasury Secretary is that "Japan has a high savings rate":




Japanese getting older = Bad for savings Tim...

Yeah right Tim! Spot on!
This is purely and simply incorrect to stay polite. Get your facts right...I am not surprised to hear this from the man who was in charged of regulating the US banks while at the New-York Federal Reserve Bank from 2003 until 2009.

Are we witnessing at this very moment the demise of the US dollar?

Japan might be finally calling another bluff from the US by dumping in size their US Treasuries to rebuild their economy.

I previously wrote about the Bluff Call of 1971 - the Nixon shock and the collapse of the Gold Standard.

Is it payback time for Japan following the disaster of the 1985 Plaza agreements? (please refer to the post: Analyze this!).
As a reminder from my previous post, another former quote from Tim Geithner:

"On June 1, 2009, during a question-and-answer session following a speech at Peking University, Geithner was asked by a student whether Chinese investments in U.S. Treasury debt were safe. His reply that they were "very safe" drew laughter from the audience."

China is not stupid. I wrote specifically on the fact that China is well aware of what happened to Japan with the Plaza Agreements of 1985: The end of the American Dream, the call for trade barriers and the rise in populism....

Please find enclosed the link to the Chinese view on what happened to Japan following Plaza in 1985:

Revaluation of Japanese Yen, a historical lesson to draw: analysis

Maybe Japan has no choice but to cash in on its holdings to rebuild its country and repatriate Japanese Yens. At least this is what the FX market is betting on, given this evening huge price action and surge in JPY versus the USD from around 80 to an amazing 76 JPY for one USD to now back to 79...Crazy...


Japan selling their US Treasuries would be driving up interest rates.

Prior to the dramatic events happening in Japan, Bill Gross, from PIMCO, the authority on bonds, announced to the world he had dumped all his US Treasuries from his flagship fund: “Yields may have to go higher, maybe even much higher to attract buying interest,”
Yes, Bill Gross expects a sharp increase in interest rates within the next few months. If Japan starts dumping some of its US Treasuries holdings (around 885.9 billions USD as of January 2011), you can be assured Bill's expectations could materialise. China cut its holdings of US treasury bonds by 5.4 billion USD to 1.15 trillion USD in January, reported sina.com.cn, citing the U.S. Department of Treasury.

During the 1995 Kobe earthquake, the Japanese repatriated 30 billion USD worth of U.S. government bonds, equivalent to about 13 per cent of its Treasury holdings at the time.

This time is different?

Monday, 13 September 2010

The Hurt Locker

Definition: noun. a period of immense, inescapable physical or emotional pain.



The Hurt Locker and the problem of the liquidity trap.

Paul Krugman's definition of the liquidity trap, the Keynesian view:

[a] liquidity trap may be defined as a situation in which conventional monetary policies have become impotent, because nominal interest rates are at or near zero: injecting monetary base into the economy has no effect, because base and bonds are viewed by the private sector as perfect substitutes. By this definition, a liquidity trap could occur in a flexible price, full-employment economy; and although any reasonable model of the United States in the 1930s or Japan in the 1990s must invoke some form of price stickiness, one can think of the unemployment and output slump that occurs under such circumstances as what happens when an economy is trying to have deflation — a deflationary tendency that monetary expansion is powerless to prevent.[29]


Excellent comment this week by R. Glenn Hubbard, dean of the Columbia Business School and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under President George W. Bush, and Peter Navarro, a professor of economics at the Merage School of Business at the University of California-Irvine:

http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2010/09/10/desperate-times-do-not-always-call-for-desperate-measures/

"The fundamental flaw in Washington’s stimulus logic is the incorrect assumption that America’s current economic woes began with the 2007 recession. In fact, the roots of our slow-growth problem date back at least a full decade.

From 1946 to 1999, GDP grew annually at 3.2 percent, but since then, we’ve only averaged about 2.5%. On a cumulative basis, this seemingly small difference adds up to about 10 million jobs we failed to create.

What these statistics add up to is not a short term cyclical downturn, but rather longer-term trouble driven by four major structural imbalances in America’s GDP “growth driver equation.”


Overconsumption:

From 1946 to 1999, consumption averaged 64 percent of GDP but over the last decade, that share jumped to 70 percent. This increase was fueled not by rising wages, but rather by a housing bubble and a mortgage refinancing wave that turned American homes into ATM machines. This overconsumption has been mirrored in a low saving rate and a second major structural imbalance – underinvestment.

Underinvestment:

Business investment in research and development, technological innovation, and the new productive capacity required for the job creation process has been the single most important missing ingredient in our economic recovery – and for renewed long-term prosperity. Yet the current administration seeks only to raise the regulatory and tax burdens of business.

Chronic trade deficits:

These have been equally destructive. During the 2000s, our current account deficit more than doubled and likely reduced our annual GDP growth rate by a half a percent or more.

Excessive government spending:

This spending has provided some short-term stimulus. However, an overfed Uncle Sam represents the ultimate seed of destruction through upward pressure on taxes and interest rates and a stark future of sharp cuts in defense, education, and infrastructure spending."

"Over the long — and short — term, in implementing any stimulus, we should favor tax cuts to stimulate business investment as the best way to stimulate job creation. Reducing the fiscal burden of entitlement programs is also essential to restoring prosperity."

Federal Government Debt: Total Public Debt



In relation to the raging inflation/deflation debate, Bill Gross at PIMCO has decided to put a wager on it. A 8.1 billion USD wager...quite meaningful (notional value of derivatives position tied to the Consumer Price Index).
They bought inflation floors in size...

"Inflation floors, structured as options on the consumer price index for all urban consumers, are similar to insurance. The buyer of the contract pays a premium at the outset in return for the right to receive a payment after 10 years should the CPI decline during this period."

The bet is that the USA will not be like Japan and are not on a verge of entering a similar lost decade as Japan did.

As I previously discussed in relation to the heated deflation/inflation debate, we are going through a deleveraging period, which meant deflation in some asset prices (real estate, etc.) but inflation in other items, such as food items (up 16% since 2009). In a previous post I argued you could have both deflation and inflation at the same time as currency values are being debased. The latest new record of Gold is of no suprise and the trend is up and up, given we can expect a second round of QE in November in the US.

The rise in food prices are strong inflationary forces at play which is probably creating a lot of headaches for the Bank of England given its inflation target of 2%. You can therefore expect the UK to rise interest rates sooner than expected which will coud increase the risk for a double-dip recession due to the current constraints in household balance sheets. I hope Mervyn King still has plenty of ink in his pen, as he will definitely have more letters to write to the chancellor in the coming months...


http://noir.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aqqEDrWMDO3w&pos=3

“We think the possibility that the U.S. goes 10 years with stagnant or falling prices is remote,” Mihir Worah, the head of Pimco’s real return portfolio management team, said in an e- mailed response to questions. “The options were priced at rich levels to the underlying” risk, added Worah, whose funds invest in Treasury inflation protected securities."

"Pimco Chief Executive Officer Mohamed El-Erian said last month the chance of deflation in the U.S. is around 25 percent."

Deflation then inflation is still the ongoing theme, which might lead us to Stagflation 70s style.

The latest inflation figure in the UK is of no surprise: August's consumer price inflation came in at 3.1 %. QE is working just fine...I kept saying the results of QE would be more inflation down the line, in April, in March...



http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/8003750/UK-inflation-is-uncomfortably-high-says-Bank-of-England-rate-setter-David-Miles.html

"Inflation has been above the central bank's 2pc target since December 2009 although policymakers have argued that it is largely down to one-off factors and should subside over time."

Can the policymakers please specify the time frame? They won't...

High UK inflation no conspiracy:
By James Mackintosh

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/81dacaae-c038-11df-b77d-00144feab49a.html?ftcamp=rss



Jacques Rueff, a great French economist clearly saw the strategy behind Keynes General Theory of Employment which is currently being used in the UK with QE:

http://www.moneyweek.com/news-and-charts/economics/homage-to-jacques-rueff-88380.aspx

"Keynes came up with a subterfuge. The central bank should cause price inflation during a slump, he proposed. Rising prices for 'things' meant that salaries - in real terms - would go down. That was the greasy scam behind Keynes' General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money: inflation robbed the working class of their wages without them realizing it. The poor schmucks even thank the politicians for picking their pockets: "salary cuts without tears," Rueff called them."

Bill Bonner also adds in his hommage to Jacques Rueff the following:

"Rueff died in 1978. Had he lived, he probably would have been as surprised as we have been by the stamina of the monetary horses. Except for a brief rest while Paul Volcker was managing the stables, they have run from bubble to bubble... delivering more liquidity wherever it would do the most damage. All the while, inflation continued to cut the price of labour. Between 1974 and 1984, real wages fell as much as 30%. Then, more moderate levels of inflation held them down for the next 24 years.

But Rueff’s insight comes with a warning. The faith-based, dollar-dependent monetary system is like a loaded pistol in front of a depressed man. It is too easy for the US to end its financial troubles, Rueff pointed out, just by printing more dollars. Eventually, this “exorbitant privilege” will be “suicidal” for Western economies, he predicted."

Bill Bonner concludes:
"Paul Volcker put the pistol in the drawer. Ben Bernanke has found it. And Jacques Rueff must look on in amusement to see what happens next."

http://www.thedailybell.com/1114/Britain-to-See-Inflation-Risk.html

"Until the 1970s, classic Keynesian economists seem to have believed that it was impossible to have a stagnant economy along with an aggressive monetary stimulus program. In slumps, central banks should print money, and more money, to stimulate via government spending and bank lending. Of course, while such Keynesian solutions may not stimulate the economy much (not with real jobs anyway), they do lead to inflation, and then price inflation, especially in severe slumps. Hence, stagflation..."

http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article21501.html

"Krugman's monetary solution to a liquidity trap is sustained inflation, where the central bank reverses fears of future deflation by instead causing an increase in the price level through massive monetary pumping (Krugman estimates this to be in the area of $10 trillion, borrowing the figure from a prior study conducted by Goldman Sachs)."

Housing in the US is still in the hurt locker:

More pain to come unfortunately. There is a huge shadow inventory that needs to be worked through. Banks reposession runs unabated. Housing starts at rock bottom still.

http://www.cnbc.com/id/39175282

"RealtyTrac, an online foreclosure sale site, will release its monthly numbers on Thursday, but sources there confirm the number of repossessions will come in just shy of 100,000 for the month.
That is the highest since the site began tracking in 2005. July's repossession number was the second highest on record. The last highest was 93,777 in May of 2010."

U.S. Home Prices Face Three-Year Drop as Supply Gains:

http://noir.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=aPjDFWbLAdd8&pos=10

“Whether it’s the sidelined, shadow or current inventory, the issue is there’s more supply than demand,” said Oliver Chang, a U.S. housing strategist with Morgan Stanley in San Francisco. “Once you reach a bottom, it will take three or four years for prices to begin to rise 1 or 2 percent a year.”

Gains Versus Inflation

"If the market doesn’t fall to its natural bottom, price gains in the next five to 10 years won’t keep pace with inflation as the difference is made up “on the backend,” said Barry Ritholtz, chief executive officer of FusionIQ, a New York research company. Price increases that fail to at least match inflation are the same as reductions in value, Ritholtz said."

"The Obama administration’s effort to help mortgage holders, the Home Affordable Modification Program, or HAMP, is another source of future inventory as owners with new loan terms re- default, Ritholtz said. About half of the modifications done in 2009 were behind in payments by the first quarter of 2010, according to the Treasury Department."

‘Day of Reckoning’

“The belief has been: if we stimulate sales with a tax credit and delay foreclosures with modifications, the market would stabilize,” said Ritholtz, author of “Bailout Nation.” “We’re just putting off the day of reckoning and drawing out the pain by not letting the housing market hit its bottom.”

Insanity: doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. Albert Einstein.

Just the facts on housing in the US:

"Owners of about 11 million homes, or 23 percent of households with a mortgage, owed more than their property was worth as of June 30, according to CoreLogic. Another 2.4 million borrowers had less than 5 percent equity in their houses and probably would lose money on a sale after paying broker fees and closing costs, CoreLogic said Aug 25."

Deep sea fishing: Housing starts still at rock bottom



From the excellent Calculated Risk blog:

http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2010/09/two-key-housing-problems.html

"The excess supply is keeping pressure on residential investment, and therefore on employment and economic growth. As new households are formed, the excess supply will be absorbed - but this is happening very slowly."

"It takes jobs to create households, and usually housing is the key driver for employment growth in the early stages of a recovery. So this is a trap: the excess supply means weak employment growth, leading to few new households, so the excess supply is absorbed slowly - putting off more robust employment growth.







The excess supply is also pushing down house prices (prices are just starting to fall again). Lower prices will eventually help clear the market, however lower prices will push more homeowners into negative equity."

"Negative equity frequently leads to distressed sales (short sales or foreclosures), and losses for lenders."

It will take a long time to clear the mess in US housing. A long, painful process to clear the excesses of the housing bubble.

Saturday, 5 June 2010

AAA, the most endangered rating, regulating the rating agencies and Basel III

This title sounds like a warning issued from the WWF, relating to endangered species. Truth is the coveted AAA rating ranks have been seriously depleted by the past and current credit crisis we have been through. We will look at what happened in the corporate sector and as well in the sovereign space as well as the role of the rating agencies given the recent turmoils and scandals, regulations and Basel III implications.

Given the latest downgrade of Spain from AAA to AA+ is the latest in an increasing list given the current deflationary environment and credit situation in Europe, we can expect many more downgrades to come.

First we will look at the decline of AAA ratings in the corporate world:

The link below refers to an article which was published in 2002.

1969: 61 American Companies were AAA
1982: 21 American Companies were AAA
2002: 9 American Companies were AAA
2009: 4 American Companies were AAA

As of October 2009 only 4 remains rated AAA by S&P:

Automatic Data Processing (NYSE:ADP)
Johnson & Johnson (NYSE:JNJ)
Microsoft (NASDAQ:MSFT)
ExxonMobil (NYSE:XOM)


http://articles.sfgate.com/2002-03-03/business/17537097_1_credit-ratings-major-rating-agencies-moody-cash-flows

In 1979, there were 61 American companies that earned a top-level Aaa credit rating from Moody's. Ten years ago, there were 21. Today, there are only nine.

The decline in triple-A-rated companies is one of the most obvious -- though hardly the most worrisome -- sign of a widespread decline in credit quality.

"Corporate America has become more risky," says James Van Horne, a finance professor at Stanford's Graduate School of Business. "The triple-A decline is a manifestation of the decay of credit ratings in general."

In the same article, Kathleen Pender also review the list of AAA corporate entities in 2002:

The bankruptcies of Enron, Kmart and Global Crossing are refocusing attention on credit ratings and balance sheets.

"We've always focused on the balance sheet. In this environment, we've been even more focused," says Scott Glasser, co-manager of the Smith Barney Appreciation fund.

Glasser's top 10 holdings include five Aaa-rated companies: Berkshire Hathaway, ExxonMobil, General Electric, Pfizer and American International Group.

The other four Aaa-rated companies (excluding government-backed companies such as Fannie Mae) are Bristol-Myers Squibb, Johnson & Johnson, Merck and United Parcel Service.

In 1979, Moody's list of Aaa companies included 12 banks and insurance companies, such as Bank of America, Chase Manhattan, Chemical Bank and Citicorp.

It also included 25 industrial and consumer-oriented companies, such as Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing, General Motors, Ford, IBM, DuPont, Kellogg, Procter & Gamble, Sears Roebuck, Federated Department Stores and the major oil companies.

The remaining 24 companies were telephone and electric and gas utilities.

"The '80s really gutted the list," says Moody's economist Kamalesh Rao.

We all know what happened to the AAA for banks as well as for GM, Ford and we all know the dire situation of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and SLM.

From the same article:

"The major reasons cited for the decline in triple-A companies are deregulation, global competition, debt-financed mergers, bad management decisions and a growing tolerance for risk among investors.

Many banks also got hurt by the collapse of real estate in the early 1990s."

You would think the banks would have learnt from the real estate collapse in the early 1990s following the Savings and Loans debacle.

Does that sound familiar? We are talking about the economic environment of 2002...

The article goes on:

"Money managers are not too worried about the long-term decline in Aaa companies, mainly because the difference between a triple-A and a double-A company is slight.

They're far more concerned about a recent, widespread decline in ratings across the credit spectrum.

"You could do a story on the demise of double-A and single-A companies as well," says Putterman."

http://stocks.investopedia.com/stock-analysis/2009/the-aaa-rated-bond-club-gets-smaller-gexommsft0305.aspx

It is true the reputation of the ratings agencies have been seriously tarnished in the last two years given the evident conflict of interest which came with the business of providing AAA rating to dubious structured credit products.

This is what Bill Gross from PIMCO had to say about the rating agencies and discussion around reforms of their model:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/jun/02/european-union-credit-agency-watchdog

"Credit rating agencies have fallen out of favour with top investors. Bill Gross, founder of Pimco, the world's biggest bond investor, recently said: "Their quantitative models appeared to have a Mensa-like IQ of at least 160, but their common sense rating was closer to 60, resembling an idiot savant with a full command of the mathematics, but no idea of how to apply it."

He added: "I come not to bury the rating services, but to dismiss them. To tell the truth, they can't really die – they serve a necessary and even productive purpose when properly managed and more tightly regulated.""

Truth is all the concerns regarding regulating the ratings agencies were previously discussed and not applied by many authors and Scholars. Below is an example of previous discussions surrounding regulation of rating agencies.


Claire Hill in a paper published in 2004 called Regulating the Rating Agencies

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=452022

"Less promising are suggestions to begin substantive oversight of rating agency business operations, and to increase the ability of investors and others to sue rating agencies. Finally, conflicts of interest may become a significant problem, especially if the market becomes much less concentrated - an annual certification by rating agencies that they are operating in accordance with procedures to guard against conflicts may be desirable."

The only way to restore trust in ratings, is to remove conflicts of interest which means not an annual certification as suggested above but a review in the way rating agencies operate.
There was a similar issue with Equity Research Analysts during the run up to the Technology bust in 2000. Henry Blodget was barred from the securities industry because of fraudulent activity.

The only way to regulate is to impose accountability to the Rating Agencies, ensuring the risks twart the rewards. If ratings agencies face losing the license of conducting business due to high conflict of interests similar to what we have seen during the build up to the credit crisis, they might do a better job and serve their necessary purpose of independent assessment of credit risk.

Although credit ratings can be a good indicator in measuring the risk of a corporate or country, they always lag the market. Credit spreads and Credit Default Swap (CDS)spreads are better at indicating increased perceived credit risk in issuers.

The implication of ratings downgrade are very important in relation to assessing the risk for financial institutions, when taking into account Basel II regulation. This was particularly the case for structured credit positions in Banks.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credit_rating_agency

"Basel II agreements meant that CDOs capital requirement rose 'exponentially'. This made CDO portfolios vulnerable to multiple downgrades, essentially precipitating a large margin call. For example under Basel II, a AAA rated securitization requires capital allocation of only 0.6%, a BBB requires 4.8%, a BB requires 34%, whilst a BB(-) securitization requires a 52% allocation."

Because of the need for independent assessment of credit risk, Rating Agencies must be regulated in a way that the ratings which are issued enable investors to trust these ratings and use them as a guidance in their investment.

As well as reviewing the role played by the rating agencies in the financial crisis, it is essential that bank regulation takes place.

Basel III proposed reforms are going in the right direction:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basel_III

The introduction of a leverage ratio is essential to avoid the same mistakes which were done. The Canadian banking system had the leverage capped to around 20 times which meant that the Canadian Banks were in a much better situation than their American neighbours when the financial crisis occurred.

The idea of also promoting the build up of capital buffers in good times, is also a very good one.

There is great resistance from the bank to fully implement Basel III as indicated in this article from The Economist:

http://www.economist.com/business-finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=16231434

If the same idea of capital buffer could be implemented for goverments in relation to public finances, it would be great but given the propensity of our politicians to overspend in good times as well as in bad times, there is a very low probability of seeing it happen effectively.

Monday, 1 March 2010

The importance of branding in economy in general and what it really means in particular

Branding Definition: "Entire process involved in creating a unique name and image for a product (good or service) in the consumers' mind, through advertising campaigns with a consistent theme. Branding aims to establish a significant and differentiated presence in the market that attracts and retains loyal customers."

Branding Definition in Economy as per this blog: "Entire process in creating a unique term for an economic policy or financial product in the consumers' mind, through consistent communication in the news." The best example to mind comes when you think about High Yield bonds, which should really be called Junk bonds, or more recently "Quantitative Easing" which should really be called printing money out of thin air...

Here is the link to Wikipedia about QE (Quantitative Easing):

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantitative_easing

"Risks"
"Quantitative easing is seen as a risky strategy that could trigger higher inflation than desired or even hyperinflation if it is improperly used and too much money is created.

Some economists argue that there is less risk of such an outcome when a central bank employs quantitative easing strictly to ease credit markets (e.g. by buying commercial paper), whereas hyperinflation is more likely to be triggered when money is created for the purpose of buying up government debts (i.e. treasury securities) which in turn can create a political temptation for governments and legislatures to habitually spend more than their revenues without either raising taxes or risking default on financial obligations."

MV=PT as per Irving Fisher's equation. The Bank of England bought 200 Billions worth of long dated Gilts with QE. The BOE by pumping M (M4) is expecting T to rise and it is not really happening...
As a reminder: MV = PT. M is the stock of money in the economy,V is the velocity of circulation or the speed at which money flows around the economy. P is the price level and T the value of transactions, or gross domestic product (GDP). Hence by
increasing ‘M’, QE aims to increase ‘T’.

The main risk of QE was that the money pumped into the system would not result in higher
spending and economic activity. Banks are currently using all these additional funds to help repair balance sheets. Increased availability of credit is not resulting in more lending. Many companies and individuals do not want to increase borrowing during a period of economic uncertainty and this is the reason why savings are going up and people are trying to repay their debt.

Therefore the initial MV = PT equation means that a rise in ‘M’ leads in reality to a fall in ‘V’ leaving no net benefit.

As per my previous blog post in February, first we are seeing deflation then comes the big risk of hyperinflation which explains why so many famous hedge fund managers like Tudor, Soros, Paulson and others have fallen to the gold bug and have as well increased recently their holdings in Gold in size...

The results of QE will be an increase in inflation down the line.

This also bring us to the recent violent currency movements we have seen in the markets and particularly on GBP. The United Kingdom faces massive headwinds and with the risk of a hung parliament with the upcoming election, the prospect for GBP currency could not be bleaker. GBP will probably come under significant pressure and I can easily see GBP at parity with the Euro, not to mention that the coveted AAA of the UK is threatened.

Bill Gross from PIMCO in his latest market comment talks as well of the sovereign risks ahead of us:

http://europe.pimco.com/LeftNav/Featured+Market+Commentary/IO/2010/Investment+Outlook+March+2010+Bill+Gross+Dont+Care.htm

The importance of looking at the Macro picture has never been more important than today.

You should look at safe harbors such as Australia, Canada, and developing countries like China, India, etc.

I also agree with Bill Gross comments:

"An investor’s motto should be, “Don’t trust any government and verify before you invest”."
 
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