Showing posts with label rogue waves. Show all posts
Showing posts with label rogue waves. Show all posts

Sunday, 11 February 2018

Macro and Credit - Harmonic tremor

"Stupidity is an elemental force for which no earthquake is a match." -  Karl Kraus, Austrian Writer


Watching with interest the tragedy unfold on the short gamma crowd through the demise of the short volatility ETN and ETF complex, sending markets into some tailspin and causing additional havocs in bond yields, when it came to choosing our title analogy for our post we reminded ourselves of the meaning of "Harmonic tremor". A "Harmonic tremor is a sustained release of seismic and infrasonic energy typically associated with the underground movement of magma (rising term premiums), the venting of volcanic gases from magma, or both. It's a long-duration release of seismic energy (volatility), with distinct spectral lines, that often precedes or accompanies a volcanic eruption (the demise of some short vol ETNs). More generally, a volcanic tremor is a sustained signal that may or may not possess these harmonic spectral features. Being a long-duration continuous signal from a temporally extended source, a volcanic tremor contrasts distinctly with transient sources of seismic radiation, such as tremors that are typically associated with earthquakes and explosions. Harmonic tremor is part of the four major types of seismograms, the three others being tectonic like earthquakes, shallow volcanic earthquakes and surface events. 

In this week's conversation, we would like to look at the recent sell-off which in effect was triggered by the harmonic tremor coming from the uninterrupted rise of term premiums. This regime change in volatility and the effect of "Who's Afraid of the Big Bad Wolf?" aka "inflation expectations" thanks to rising wage inflation expectations have already claimed the small fishes such as some players in the short volatility leveraged and crowded complex. Like a new grain of sand U.S. Average Hourly Earnings triggered an avalanche as seen in complex systems such as financial markets.


Synopsis:
  • Macro and Credit - Rising term premium have already claimed small fishes, when are the whales going to show up?
  • Final chart - Increased inflation presents a potential threat to the purchasing power of consumers.


  • Macro and Credit - Rising term premium have already claimed small fishes, when are the whales going to show up?
We had hardly pressed the "publish" button for our previous post, that the events taking place in the volatility complex led to the already well publicized demise of some short volatility ETNs. This was bound to happen given the non-linearity aspect one can find in financial markets. 

The events that took place were fascinating as it was indeed yet another confirmation of our musing from February 2016 conversation "The disappearance of MS München" when we were discussing the fascinating destructive effect of "Rogue waves" on man-made "structures". Those waves have a high amplitude and may appear from nowhere and disappear without a trace, or investors in some instances. Generally rogues waves require longer time to form (like "harmonic tremors" led explosions), as their growth rate has a power law rather than an exponential one. While a 12-meter wave in the usual "linear" model has a breaking force of 6 metric tons per square meter (MT/m2), modern ships are designed to tolerate a breaking wave of 15 MT/m2, a rogue wave can dwarf both of these figures with a breaking force of 100 MT/m2. Remember this. 

Once again we would like to come back to our February post of 2016 and quote the book "Credit Crisis" authored by Dr Jochen Felsenheimer (which we quoted on numerous occasions on this very blog for good reasons) and Philip Gisdakis and steer you towards chapter 5 entitled "The Anatomy of a Credit Crisis" page 215 entitled "LTCM: The arbitrage saga" and the issue we have discussing extensively which is our great discomfort with rising positive correlations and large standard deviations move. This amounts to us as increasing rising instability and the potential for "Rogue Waves" to show up in earnest like the one experienced last Monday:
"LTCM's trading strategies generally showed no or almost very little correlation. In normal times or even in crises that are limited to a specific segment, LTCM benefited from this high degree of diversification. Nevertheless, the general flight to liquidity in 1998 caused a jump in global risk premiums, hitting the same direction. All (in normal times less-correlated) positions moved in the same direction. Finally, it is all about correlation! Rising correlations reduces the benefit from diversification, in the end hitting the fund's equity directly. This is similar with CDO investments (ie, mezzanine pieces in CDOs), which also suffer from a high (default) correlation between the underlying assets. Consequently, a major lesson of the LTCM crisis was that the underlying Covariance matrix used in Value-at-Risk (VaR) analysis is not static but changes over time." - source Credit Crises, published in 2008, authored by Dr Jochen Felsenheimer and Philip Gisdakis
You might probably understand by now from our previous sailing analogy (The Vasa ship) and wave analogy (The Ninth Wave) where it will eventually end: Another financial crisis. 

Moving back to the LTCM VaR reference, the Variance-Covariance Method assumes that returns are normally distributed. In other words, it requires that we estimate only two factors - an expected (or average) return and a standard deviation. Value-at-Risk (VaR) calculates the maximum loss expected (or worst case scenario) on an investment, over a given time period and given a specified degree of confidence. This what we had to say about VaR in our May 2015 conversation "Cushing's syndrome" and ties up nicely to our world of rising positive correlations. Your VaR measure doesn't measure today your maximum loss, but could be only measuring your minimum loss on any given day.

Check the recent large standard deviation moves dear readers such as the one experienced on the VIX last Monday and ask yourself if we are anymore in a VaR assumed "normal market" conditions:
"On a side note while enjoying a lunch with a quant fund manager friend of ours, we mused around the ineptness of VaR as a risk model. When interviewing fellow quants for a position within his fund, he has always asked the same question: What does VaR measures? He always get the same answer, namely that VaR measures the maximum loss at any point during the period. VaR is like liquidity, it is a backward-looking yardstick. It does not measure your maximum loss at any point during the period but, in today "positively correlated markets" we think it measures your "minimum loss" at any point during the period as it assumes "normal" markets. We are not in "normal" markets anymore rest assured." - source Macronomics, May 2015
But, last Monday's move while surprising by its velocity, has not been as significant as the move seen in the VIX back in 1987. We are yet to see a spike to 173 seen on the VIX during the October 1987 crash and that was something, really something.

This is also what we argued in February 2016:
If you think diversification is a "solid defense" in a world of "positive correlations", think again, because here what the authors of "Credit Crisis" had to say about LTCM and tail events (Rogue Waves):
"Even if there are arbitrage opportunities in the sense that two positions that trade at different prices right now will definitely converge at a point in the future, there is a risk that the anomaly will become even bigger. However typically a high leverage is used for positions that have a skewed risk-return profile, or a high likelihood of a small profit but a very low risk of a large loss. This equals the risk-and-return profile of credit investments but also the risk that selling far-out-of-the-money puts on equities. In case of a tail event occurs, all risk parameters to manage the overall portfolio are probably worthless, as correlation patterns change dramatically during a crisis. That said, arbitrage trades are not under fire because the crisis has an impact on the long-term-risk-and-return profile of the position. However, a crisis might cause a short-term distortion of capital market leading to immense mark-to-market losses. If the capital adequacy is not strong enough to offset the mark-to-market losses, forced unwinding triggers significant losses in arbitrage portfolios. The same was true for many asset classes during the summer of 2007, when high-quality structures came under pressure, causing significant mark-to-market losses. Many of these structures did not bear default risk but a huge liquidity risk, and therefore many investors were forced to sell." source Credit Crises, published in 2008, authored by Dr Jochen Felsenheimer and Philip Gisdakis
You probably understand by now why we have raised the "red flag" so many times on our fear in the rise of "positive correlations". They do scare us, because they entail, larger and larger standard deviation moves and potentially trigger "Rogue Waves" which can wipe out even the biggest and most reputable "Investment ships" à la MS München." - source Macronomics, February 2016
Obviously, for us rising term premiums have been like a "harmonic tremor" leading to the buildup that ended with the explosion that occurred in the short volatility space. The catalyst has been rising inflation expectations coming from the latest U.S. Average Hourly Earnings rising 2.9% Y/Y, the most since 2009. This was the little grain of sand that triggered, we think Monday's avalanche. 

If Short Vol ETNs could be compared to a piece of a CDO like structure for the financial markets complex, they could be seen as the "Equity tranche", or the first loss piece of this "capital structure" (The tranche that absorbs the first loss (and thus is the most risky tranche) is often called an equity tranche). Obviously the next question one would like to have answered when looking at his portfolio, is am I "senior" enough in the capital structure and is my attachment point high enough to avoid the pain? 

In relation to the issue of rising term premiums and additional potential pain and "de-risking" coming we read with interest Nomura's Global Markets Navigator note from the 7th of February entitled "Rising term premium claims its first victim":


"According to the NY Fed, the 10yr UST term premium troughed in early December at -0.62bps. As of 5 February, the NY Fed estimates that it has risen 33bps to -0.29bps.

Over the same period, the MOVE Index of implied treasury volatility rose in sympathy from an all-time index low of 48 to today’s 66. In previous reports we have linked low term premia to low implied interest volatility and in turn low implied volatilities in risk assets, e.g., equities.

Front-end VIX started to rise from the first day of 2018 trading, lagging behind the increase in the term premium. It was toward the end of January that both measures began to move faster. The recent few days of trading needs little rehashing.
And yet other risk assets and measures of risk aversion have not gone through similarly violent changes. Equity volatility in the euro area and Japan rose in tandem with the US but didn’t reach the same intraday highs. High yield spreads widened too, but not in a disorderly manner. Investment grade spreads didn't move much. Indeed a simple model of daily VIX changes vs daily S&P changes would have implied that US equities should have been down nearer 11% on 5 February rather than 4%. In other words, implied has move significantly higher than realised.
There are two interpretations of these facts. First, the VIX is sending us a serious message about the outlook for short-term US equity returns that the market needs to pay attention too. Second, US equity volatility products are an asset class in their own right. The existence of levered short-vol carry positions in those markets makes them more exposed to relatively small changes in other asset classes, e.g., rates vol.
To the extent interpretation one is correct, we should see a large increase in long rates hedges and selling pressure in credit and EM. To the extent the second interpretation is correct we should expect, when the affected positions are removed, a return to the status quo ex ante. Feedback from discussions with market participants suggests most people are putting faith in the second interpretation; this was an isolated incident in an important derivatives market.
The evidence supports that case. But there’s a problem. And it's the term premium.
As we wrote last time, the cyclical growth outlook points to higher policy rates and flatter curves, tight spreads and strong equity performance. The secular improvement scenario calls for higher rates too but is ambiguous about the shape of the nominal and real curve. The ambiguity stems from uncertainty about the natural rate and inflation. This makes it hard to anchor long-end rates (without even taking into account net net issuance) – ergo higher realised rates volatilities. This uncertainty is unlikely to go away for some time if we remain in an above-trend positive output gap world.
Thus normalisation – whether cyclical or structural – means a higher term premium and higher rates volatility. Even while the absolute level of yields remains low the past few days tells us two important things: investment strategies habituated to low term premia are likely to struggle in this environment; and higher beta assets can rally as government yields rise so long as their risk premia fall faster than rates increase. If rates rise too quickly, all bets are off.

The speed and breadth of the recent recovery has left central banks with a communication problem – it is tough to forward guide a nervous bond market if inflation is rising and growth is well above trend. If a rising term premia has claimed its first victim, will there be others?

Given the low absolute level of yields there’s little case for a growth driven risk sell off. But it is the speed of the adjustment to normal that will now be critical. Perversely, the best thing for markets now would be more modest growth and comforting downside inflation miss. - source Nomura
There lie the crux of the situation, too much good news could lead to more bad news for risky assets such as the dreaded CPI number coming out soon in the US. This is a very important number for bond yields in particular and asset prices in general. 

As we stated in our previous conversation prior to the VIX bloodbath that ensued, positive correlations matter and matter a lot. On this subject we read with interest Deutsche Bank' Special Report from the 7th of February entitled "The bond risk premium and the equity/yield correlation":
"A few months ago, we noted that the combination of low yields and high equities raised concerns that a sudden rise in bond yields could lead to a material repricing of equities. A week ago, we had a glimpse of a potential shift in the equity/yield correlation (higher yields/lower equities) that has been mainly positive since the late 90s. The risk-off environment of the last couple of days has reasserted the positive correlation between bond yields and equities. How can we explain such shift in correlation?
Our analysis suggests that the equity/yield correlation is related to the bond risk premium. A high bond risk premium coincides with a negative correlation between yields and equities. In the post Volker period, 10Y UST ~3% above r* corresponds to a yield/equity correlation close to zero (on a 12m backward looking basis). Current estimates of r* are between 0 and 50bp, but are expected to rise to 50-75bp in the quarters ahead.
On this basis, assuming that inflation expectations remain broadly anchored, a persistent shift in correlation is likely to occur when 10Y UST is somewhere between 3 and 3.5%. Clearly, the market will notice a shift in correlation on a much shorter time frame: a few days of negative correlation between yields and equities have been enough to generate significant attention. Thus, one would expect the shift in correlation to be felt at lower level of rates.
The relative perception of the risk of high vs low inflation regimes – i.e. 70s stagflation vs. Japanese deflation – is likely to be the underlying driver of the equity/yield correlation. When higher inflation is negative for growth (e.g. the 70s), one would expect bond yields and equities to be negatively correlated. A positive shock to inflation would coincide with a negative shock to growth, leading to higher bond yields and lower equities. Moreover, as higher inflation will coincide with lower growth, bonds will not be a good hedge for an equity portfolio. As a result, they should command a higher risk premium. We would therefore observe a higher risk premium in bond markets and a negative correlation between bond yields and equities.
Conversely, if low inflation is negative for growth (e.g. Japan), then one would expect bond yields and equities to be positively correlated. A negative shock to inflation would coincide with a negative shock to growth. It would lead to lower bond yields and lower equities. Moreover, as lower inflation will coincide with lower growth, bonds will be a good hedge for an equity portfolio, commanding a lower risk premium. We would therefore observe a lower risk premium in bond markets and a positive correlation between bond yields and equities.
From a historical perspective, higher productivity coupled with cheap supply of labour reduced the risk of high inflation since the late 1990s. Technological advances and globalization have therefore likely been instrumental in establishing the low bond risk premium regime in place since the late 1990s.
This enabled central banks to establish their inflation targeting credentials and to be more predictable, thereby reducing interest rate volatility and the bond risk premium. Moreover, the FX regime in place in key EM economies led to  a significant increase in excess savings, which in turn depressed the bond risk premium (the bond market conundrum).
Looking ahead, the focus on inequalities in DM economies coupled with the desire of China in particular to shift towards a more consumption based economy suggest the current political economy trend is conducive to some reversal of the regime in place since the 90s, pointing towards the potential for a higher bond risk premium.
Indeed, these trends should result in (a) greater risk of trade barriers, (b) greater fiscal deficits in DM and (c) reduced current account surpluses in EM. Taken together, this should reduce the savings/investment imbalance and the disinflationary pressures from globalization. The resulting rise in the bond risk premium would put downward pressure on the yield/equity correlation.
The bond risk premium and the equities/yields correlation: the evidence
The bond risk premium (defined as the 10Y yield minus long-term growth and inflation expectations) has proven to be a good indicator of the correlation between equities and yields (defined as the rolling 12m correlation of weekly changes in the S&P and weekly changes in the 10Y yield). In the early 1990s, the bond risk premium was high and the correlation between yields and equities was negative.
Since the late 1990s, the correlation has been mostly positive with temporary exceptions around the end of tightening cycles (early 2000s and 2006) and the taper tantrum (see graphs below, note that the correlation scale is inverted on the left graph).

The focus on the post 1990s period is driven by the data availability: there are no long term growth and inflation surveys prior to this date. This period has been one of relatively stable inflation (especially relative to the 1970s), and as a result a significant portion of the move in yields can be associated to changes in the bond risk premium or a decline in the neutral real rate rather than changes in inflation. Thus, over this period, using the gap between UST10Y and the neutral real rate (as estimated by Holston, Laubach and Williams) is also a good indicator of the correlation between bond yields and equities (see graphs).
By focusing on 10Y UST – r* we can extend the sample to the early 60s. The correlation observed since the 1990s, extends over the whole lower inflation era (1986-2017). During the post Bretton Woods/high inflation/Volker periods, the correlation is weaker which could be ascribe to the fact that the 10Y rates are more impacted by inflation. Also the yield/equity correlation is always negative, which is consistent with the intuition discussed above.
In the 60s, the correlation is somewhat stronger again (see graph below).
In short, the bond risk premium is a decent indicator of the correlation between equities and bond yields. When it is high, the correlation becomes negative, pointing to high bond risk premium weighing on equities.
Assuming that inflation does not vary significantly, the gap between 10Y UST and r* can be used as a reference. Looking at the most recent samples (charts below), a spread between 10Y UST and r* of 3% would be consistent with the bond equity correlation persistently changing sign.

As well as representing a gauge of bond risk premium, the equity/yields correlation can be also used to confirm the evolution of credit risk in the euro area. Indeed, the correlation between the various European bond yields and equity markets was the same pre-crisis. In 2009, Italy switched to a persistently negative correlation which increased back towards zero following the “whatever it takes” statement from Draghi. The correlation between the CAC40 and OAT briefly turned negative when French spreads where widening substantially in 2011/2012. The shift in correlation can be interpreted as the result of a tightening of credit conditions due to a widening of credit spreads." - source Deutsche Bank
If indeed the shift in correlation from positive to negative marks a regime change in the narrative, given how loose financial conditions have been, it also indicates as per Deutsche Bank a tightening of credit conditions. To illustrate further the impact changes in cross-asset volatility thanks to change in correlations we think the below chart from Bank of America Merrill Lynch Cross-Asset Hedging note from the 7th of February entitled "Few signs of X-asset contagion as equity vol bubble finally pops" illustrate even further the "harmonic tremor":
- source Bank of America Merrill Lynch

For us, the most important piece of the puzzle for additional pain would be from the "Big Bad Wolf" aka inflation. This would generate additional pressure on risk premiums and bond yields. What matters as Nomura puts it in their note, is the speed of the adjustment and also from the Fed should it fells it is behind the curve thanks to faster than expected rise in inflation expectations. The risk obviously is on the upside particularly when it comes to rising concerns with inflation expectations. Some see the current situation with the latest US fiscal profligacy as similar to what the US experienced in the 1960s. This is the case for Deutsche Bank which sees similarities as per their Global Fixed Income note from the 9th of February entitled "A structural repricing of bond markets":
"There are some striking similarities between the new policy mix discussed above and the conditions that led to a shift upward in inflation expectations in 1966. In the first half of the 1960s, unemployment was declining rapidly but core inflation remained low and the Phillips Curve was “dead” (right graph below).

In 1966, the US administration significantly increased its fiscal spending on the back of (a) the Vietnam war and (b) the introduction of Medicare and Medicaid. This denoted a turning point in core inflation, which began to rise markedly (graph above). There are competing interpretations as to what drove the pickup in inflation: (a) fiscal stimulus, (b) non-linearities in the Phillips curve as the unemployment rate dipped below 4%, (c) rising healthcare inflation and (d) a Fed that was (ex-post) behind the curve.
Irrespective of the precise drivers, there are some similarities with current conditions. As the US economy is approaching full employment, the US government is implementing a significant fiscal stimulus. The potential introduction of trade barriers creates upside risks to inflation. Finally, the Fed may not intend to be behind the curve today, but if r* rises, as the Fed and our economists expect, current market pricing of the Fed policy will be overly accommodative." - source Deutsche Bank
There are many upside risks we commented in recent conversation, one being the start of a trade war through the implementation of trade barriers (that 30s feeling) which would put indeed some pressure on prices no doubt. This set up of both US profligacy and trade war would obviously reinforce further the bullish case for gold that led, at the end of the Vietnam to the Nixon shock in August 1971 and  the direct international convertibility of the United States dollar to gold. Could the sudden rise in positive correlations be yet another sign of the buildup in "harmonic tremor" that would led to a regime shift in inflation? We wonder.

Given as we pointed out again recently in our conversation "Bracket creep" that bear markets for US equities generally coincide with a significant tick up in core inflation, this the biggest near term concern of markets right now we think. When it comes to the relation between inflation and stock markets we read with interest Nomura's take from their Inflation Insights note from the 6th of February:
"A lesson for the near future
We think the correction in stock prices is connected to the likelihood of a return of wage inflation. We look at the traditional Gordon growth model to find that a scenario of higher wage inflation, higher inflation, higher inflation valuations, higher nominal rates and higher equity prices are very unlikely unless expectations of trend real growth substantially increase from current levels. We note that the US corporate tax cut did not manage to lift these expectations. We also note that the correction in stock prices may be a signal that US monetary policy is maybe being tightened in real terms more rapidly than what profit growth can actually sustain.
A simple framework and a reminder
According to James Bullard, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis, “inflation scare triggered some of the (equity) market sell-off”. There is indeed a very strong theoretical linkage between inflation and equity markets, which is best illustrated in the simple framework provided by the Gordon growth model, also referred to as the Dividend Discount Model. In this very simple model of stock prices, stock prices are discounted dividend expectations so that:

Where P is the stock price, D is future dividends and y is the nominal discount factor. Assuming a constant rate of growth for dividend g, this equation can be re-written so
that:

Yet beyond this simple formula there are various assumptions that connect stock prices to the inflation market. First, y is the discount factor for stock prices, so it is the nominal risk-free rate plus the equity premium (y=r+ep). G is the growth rate for dividends, so it is in fact the nominal growth rate of the economy multiplied by the share of economic growth that goes to profits rather than wages (g=k*gdp, with gdp the growth rate of nominal GDP). Economists call it the sharing of national income.

A key factor affecting the sharing of national income is wage inflation. Average hourly earnings increased to 2.9% year-on-year in the US nonfarm payrolls report for January – their highest growth rate since 2009. This high number was perceived as heralding the return of wage inflation in the US and therefore altering the sharing of national income towards a larger share for wages and a lower share for profits.
Clearly, this framework from 1962 does not capture some other key financial aspects of the determination of stock prices. For example, it is likely that there is some linkage between the sharing of national income and the level of the risk-free rate (k and r). If wage inflation returns, the path of nominal interest rates is likely to be higher: that was also the case recently, resulting in a higher discount factor for dividends negatively affecting stock prices. With the equity premium term already minimal (implied volatility is low), there were few reasons for investors to expect higher risk-free rates to be offset by a lower equity premium.
We view this framework as a good reminder that a scenario of higher wage inflation, higher inflation, higher inflation valuations, higher nominal rates and higher equity prices are very unlikely unless expectations of trend real growth substantially increase from current levels. It is also intriguing that the US corporate tax cut was so promptly followed by the stock price correction – which suggests at least some skepticism about its effectiveness.
A minor caveat
And there is of course a minor caveat to this framework: the risk of an inflation overshoot remains noticeably absent from inflation valuations despite the increase in wages in January. Figure 1 shows that despite an increase in the 5yr inflation swap rate, the price of a hedge against inflation much higher than 2% is not historically high. We are only cautiously long 5yr breakeven rates in the US, it is worth recalling.
Too high, too fast?
Maybe the correction in stock prices – despite the tax cut – is a sign that real rates are getting close to “neutral” levels, for example the level of the natural real rate estimated by Williams and all, is likely to exert a negative effect on growth that may go beyond what inflation conditions currently imply. In other words, absent the risk of an inflation overshoot, real rates may normalise too fast, too soon – which would have an adverse impact on the real risk-free rate, but also on real dividend growth.
- source Nomura

When it comes to inflation "expectations", the above reminds us it is all about "implied" and "realized". In similar fashion implied volatility is more simply what the market is expecting (VIX) whereas realized volatility is sometimes deemed more tangible because it reflects the actual daily movement of the S&P 500 Index. The true outlying year in history was 2008 (before 2018's sucker punch), when realized volatility was actually higher than implied volatility - the only such instance over recent years. Even in 2017 the relationship between implied volatility and realized volatility was pretty much "normal". The issue of course is that when central banks are meddling with interest rates and financial repression leads to volatility being subdued for too long, then like a coiled spring, profiting, primarily, from the "volatility premium" (the difference between implied volatility (investors’ forecast of market volatility reflected in options pricing) and realized (actual) market volatility) seems like a "sure bet" for the likes of LJM Fund Management that got beaten up big time with the VIX blowing out à la 2008 (that infamous rogue waves we talk about with a breaking force of 100 MT/m2) . Believing that the spread between implied and realized volatility would persist has indeed been a dangerous proposal with rising positive correlations. In similar fashion believing that "implied inflation" could persist remaining below "realized inflation" could become hazardous in the coming months, particularly with growing geopolitical exogenous risks around. Whereas QE was deflationary, QT could prove to be inflationary but we ramble again...

Make no mistake, inflation is the "Boogeyman" for financial markets.  A sharp pickup in inflation is likely to entail a significant re-pricing and as per our final chart below it represents a serious headwind for the US consumers (Bracket creep aside).


  • Final chart - Increased inflation presents a potential threat to the purchasing power of consumers.
 The "Big Bad Wolf" aka inflation would force the hand of central banks and lead to a more rapid pace in rate hikes leading to some significant additional repricing on the way. Inflation is our concern numero uno. Our final chart comes from Wells Fargo Economics Group note from the 8th of February entitled "Is the US Consumer Running on Fumes?" and highlights the relationship between PCE Deflator and Disposable Income:
"The Threat of Higher Inflation and Higher Interest Rates
In general, higher inflation reduces the growth rate of real disposable personal income and vice versa, which is clearly demonstrated in Figure 8.

As income and wealth are affected by fluctuations in inflation, one of the biggest threats over the next several years has to do with the rate of inflation. Markets recently seem to have been spooked by the relatively, and surprisingly, strong report on average hourly earnings, which could be indicating some pressure on prices for the U.S. economy. Higher inflation means higher interest rates, and both factors are clearly negative for the U.S. consumer. Higher inflation reduces the purchasing power of income, while higher interest rates makes purchases of durable goods, which are typically financed, more expensive over time. While for those that have fixed-rate mortgages, it is music to their ears, it is bad news for those that have adjustable rate mortgages.

Although inflation has remained low in this cycle compared to its historical trend, if prices were to accelerate, Americans’ real DPI growth will, once again, slow down and could also lead to a slowing of growth in real PCE, all else equal. Therefore, if we were to see an uptick in inflation, real DPI growth will slow and consumers’ purchasing power, or the amount they could consume based on their current income, would be negatively affected. Although this effect is clearly demonstrated in Figure 8, it is also evident that DPI experiences fluctuations with rather lackluster inflation growth. That is, although higher inflation can directly decrease disposable income growth, it is not the only factor that causes reductions in the rate of growth of income.
Furthermore, increases in interest rates could contribute to a slowdown in real PCE, as consumer purchases might diminish based on increased expense, such as what we have previously mentioned associated with durable goods financing. Another sector of risk for the consumer as well as for the credit market is the tax reform’s change in second mortgages or equity lines of credit. Americans, in some circumstances, can no longer take a credit on their taxes for interest on equity lines of credit and this together with the still-high, relative to the past, delinquency rate for these lines of credit could be signaling problems ahead for the U.S. consumer, as well as for the overall credit market." - source Wells Fargo
One could argue that the only "easing" day was yesterday. Have we seen "peak consumer confidence" in the US? It certainly looks like it so beware of the Big Bad Wolf aka "inflation" because he has already blown apart the "short vol" pig's house made of straw...


"Worry is the interest paid by those who borrow trouble." -  George Washington

Stay tuned ! 

Sunday, 14 February 2016

Macro and Credit - The disappearance of MS München

"Hope, the best comfort of our imperfect condition." - Edward Gibbon, English historian

While thinking about correlations in particular and risk in general, we reminded ourselves of one of our pet subject we have touched in different musings, namely the fascinating destructive effect of "Rogue waves". It is a subject we discussed in details, particularly in our post "Spain surpasses 90's perfect storm":
"We already touched on the subject of "Rogue Waves" in our conversation "the Italian Peregrine soliton", being an analytical solution to the nonlinear Schrödinger equation (which was proposed by Howell Peregrine in 1983), and being as well "an attractive hypothesis" to explain the formation of those waves which have a high amplitude and may appear from nowhere and disappear without a trace, the latest surge in Spanish Nonperforming loans to a record 10.51% and the unfortunate Sandy Hurricane have drawn us towards the analogy of the 1991 "Perfect Storm".
Generally rogues waves require longer time to form, as their growth rate has a power law rather than an exponential one. They also need special conditions to be created such as powerful hurricanes or in the case of Spain, tremendous deflationary forces at play when it comes to the very significant surge in nonperforming loans.", source Macronomics, October 2012
You might already asking yourselves why our title and where we are going with all this?

The MS München was a massive 261.4 m German LASH carrier of the Hapag-Lloyd line that sank with all hands for unknown reasons in a severe storm in December 1978. The most accepted theory is that one or more rogue waves hit the München and damaged her, so that she drifted for 33 hours with a list of 50 degrees without electricity or propulsion.  The München departed the port of Bremerhaven on December 7, 1978, bound for Savannah, Georgia. This was her usual route, and she carried a cargo of steel products stored in 83 lighters and a crew of 28. She also carried a replacement nuclear reactor-vessel head for Combustion Engineering, Inc. This was her 62nd voyage, and took her across the North Atlantic, where a fierce storm had been raging since November. The München had been designed to cope with such conditions, and carried on with her voyage. The exceptional flotation capabilities of the LASH carriers meant that she was widely regarded as being practically unsinkable (like the Titanic...). That was of course until she encountered "non-linear phenomena such as solitons.

While a 12-meter wave in the usual "linear" model would have a breaking force of 6 metric tons per square metre (MT/m2), although modern ships are designed to tolerate a breaking wave of 15 MT/m2, a rogue wave can dwarf both of these figures with a breaking force of 100 MT/m2. Of course for such "freak" phenomenon to occur, you need no doubt special conditions, such as the conjunction of fast rising CDS spreads (high winds), global tightening financial conditions and NIRP (falling pressure towards 940 MB), as well as rising nonperforming loans and defaults (swell). So if you think having a 99% interval of confidence in the calibration of you VaR model will protect you againtst multiple "Rogue Waves", think again...

Of course the astute readers would have already fathomed between the lines that our reference to the giant ship MS München could be somewhat a veiled analogy to banking giant Deutsche Bank. It could well be...

But given our recent commentaries on the state of affairs in the credit space, we thought it would be the right time to reach again for a book collecting dust since 2008 entitled Credit Crisis authored by Dr Jochen Felsenheimer (which we quoted on numerous occasions on this very blog for good reasons) and Philip Gisdakis.

Before we go into the nitty gritty of our usual ramblings, it is important we think at this juncture to steer you towards chapter 5 entitled "The Anatomy of a Credit Crisis" and take a little detour worth our title analogy to "Rogue Waves" which sealed the fate of MS München. What is of particular interest to us, in similar fashion to the demise of the MS München is page 215 entitled "LTCM: The arbitrage saga" and the issue we have discussing extensively which is our great discomfort with rising positive correlations and large standard deviations move. This amounts to us as increasing rising instability and the potential for "Rogue Waves" to show up in earnest:
"LTCM's trading strategies generally showed no or almost very little correlation. In normal times or even in crises that are limited to a specific segment, LTCM benefited from this high degree of diversification. Nevertheless, the general flight to liquidity in 1998 caused a jump in global risk premiums, hitting the same direction. All (in normal times less-correlated) positions moved in the same direction. Finally, it is all about correlation! Rising correlations reduces the benefit from diversification, in the end hitting the fund's equity directly. This is similar with CDO investments (ie, mezzanine pieces in CDOs), which also suffer from a high (default) correlation between the underlying assets. Consequently, a major lesson of the LTCM crisis was that the underlying Covariance matrix used in Value-at-Risk (VaR) analysis is not static but changes over time." - source Credit Crises, published in 2008, authored by Dr Jochen Felsenheimer and Philip Gisdakis
You might probably understand by now from our recent sailing analogy (The Vasa ship) and wave analogy (The Ninth Wave) where we are heading: A financial crisis is more than brewing. 

It is still time for you to play "defense", although we did warn you well advance of the direction markets would be taking at the end of 2015 and why we bought our "put-call parity" protection (long US long bonds / long gold-gold miners), given that if there is huge volatility in the policy responses of central banks, the option-value of both gold and bonds position would go up (it did...). Although some like it "beta" or more appropriately being "short gamma" such as the "value" proposal embedded in Contingent Convertibles aka CoCos (now making the headlines), we prefer to be "long gamma" but we ramble again...

Moving back to the LTCM VaR reference, the Variance-Covariance Method assumes that returns are normally distributed. In other words, it requires that we estimate only two factors - an expected (or average) return and a standard deviation. Value-at-Risk (VaR) calculates the maximum loss expected (or worst case scenario) on an investment, over a given time period and given a specified degree of confidence. 

LTCM and the VaR issue reminds us of a regular quote we have used, particularly in May 2015 in our conversation "Cushing's syndrome":
"The issue with so many pundits following "similar strategies" and chasing the "same assets" in a growing "illiquid" fixed income world is a Cushing's syndrome impact. Excess stimulants have compressed yield spreads too fast leading to "unhealthy" rapid bond prices gain.
The growing issue with VaR (Value at risk) and bond volatility is that it has risen sharply from a risk management perspective. This could lead to a sell-fulfilling "sell-off" prophecy of having too many pundits looking for the exit as the same time, namely "de-risking".
To that effect and in continuation to Martin Hutchinson's LTCM reference, we would like to repeat the quote used in the conversation "The Unbearable Lightness of Credit":
Today investors face the same "optimism bias" namely that they overstate their ability to exit.
“Liquidity is a backward-looking yardstick. If anything, it’s an indicator of potential risk, because in “liquid” markets traders forego trying to determine an asset’s underlying worth – - they trust, instead, on their supposed ability to exit.” - Roger Lowenstein, author of “When Genius Failed: The Rise and Fall of Long-Term Capital Management.” – “Corzine Forgot Lessons of Long-Term Capital
So what is VaR really measuring these days?

This what we had to say about VaR in our May 2015 conversation "Cushing's syndrome" and ties up nicely to our world of rising positive correlations. Your VaR measure doesn't measure today your maximum loss, but could be only measuring your minimum loss on any given day. Check the recent large standard deviation moves dear readers such as the one on the Japanese yen and ask yourself if we are anymore in a VaR assumed "normal market" conditions:
"On a side note while enjoying a lunch with a quant fund manager friend of ours, we mused around the ineptness of VaR as a risk model. When interviewing fellow quants for a position within his fund, he has always asked the same question: What does VaR measures? He always get the same answer, namely that VaR measures the maximum loss at any point during the period. VaR is like liquidity, it is a backward-looking yardstick. It does not measure your maximum loss at any point during the period but, in today "positively correlated markets" we think it measures your "minimum loss" at any point during the period as it assumes "normal" markets. We are not in "normal" markets anymore rest assured." - source Macronomics, May 2015
Therefore this week's conversation we will look at what positive correlations entails for risk and diversification and also we will look at the difference cause of financial crisis and additional signs we are seriously heading into one like the MS München did back in 1978, like we did in 2008 and like we are most likely heading in 2016 with plenty of menacing "Rogue Waves" on the horizon. So fasten your seat belt for this long conversation, this one is to be left for posterity.

Synopsis:
  • Credit - The different types of credit crises and where do we stand
  • A couple of illustrations of on-going nonlinear "Rogue Waves" in the financial world of today
  • The overshooting phenomenon
  • The Yuan Hedge Fund attack through the lense of the Nash Equilibrium Concept
  • Credit - The different types of credit crises and where do we stand
Rising positive correlations, are rendering "balanced funds" unbalanced and as a consequence models such as VaR are becoming threatened by this sudden rise in non-linearity as it assumes normal markets. The rise in correlations is a direct threat to diversification, particularly as we move towards a NIRP world:
"When it comes to a macro-driven market as "central banks' put" are losing their "magic", correlations unfortunately are still moving higher, which, we think is a sign of great instability brewing.The correlation between macro variables such as bund yields, FX and oil and equity market factors (Momentum, Value, Growth, Risk) is now higher than the correlation between macro variables and the market. There lies the crux of central banks interventions. There is now deeper inter-linkages in the macro economy as well as financial markets globally post crisis." - source Macronomics, January 2016
When it comes to the classification of credit crises and their potential area of origins both the authors  for the book "Credit Crisis" shed a light on the subject:
  • "Currency crisis: A speculative attack on the exchange rate of a currency which results in a sharp devaluation of the currency; or it forces monetary authorities to intervene in currency markets to defend the currency (eg. by sharply hiking interest rates).
  • Foreign Debt Crisis: a situation where a country is not able to service its foreign debt.
  • Banking crisis: Actual or potential bank runs. Banks start to suspend the internal convertibility of their liabilities or the government has to bail out the banks.
  • Systemic Financial crisis: Severe disruptions of the financial system, including a malfunctioning of financial markets, with large adverse effect on the real economy. It may involves a currency crisis and also a banking crisis, although this is not necessarily true the other way around.
In many cases, a crisis is characterized by more than one type, meaning we often see a combination of at least two crises. These involve strong declines in asset values, accompanied by defaults, in the non-financials but also in the financials universe. The effectiveness of government support or even bailout measures combined with the robustness of the economy are the most important determinants of the economy's vulneability, and they therefore have a significant impact on the severity of the crisis. In addition, a crucial factor is obviously the amplitude of asset price inflation that preceded the crisis.
Depending on the type of crisis, there are different warning signals, such as significant current account imbalances (foreign debt crisis), inefficient currency pegs (currency crisis), excessive lending behavior (banking crisis), and a combination of excessive risk taking and asset price inflation (systemic financial crisis). A financial crisis is costly, as they are fiscal costs to restructure the financial system. There is also a tremendous loss from asset devaluation, and there can be a misallocation of resources, which in the end, depresses growth. A banking crisis is considered to be very costly compared with, for example, a currency crisis.
We classify a credit crisis as something between a banking crisis and a systematic financial crisis. A credit crisis affects the banking system or arises in the financial system; the huge importance of credit risk for the functioning of the financial system as a whole bears also a systematic component. The trigger event is often an exogenous shock, while the pre-credit crisis situation is characterized by excessive lending, excessive leverage, excessive risk taking, and lax lending standards. Such crises emerge in periods of very high expectations on economic development, which in turns boosts loan demand and leverage in the system. When an exogenous shock hits the market, it triggers an immediate repricing of the whole spectrum of credit-risky assets, increasing the funding costs of borrowers while causing an immense drop in the asset value of credit portfolios.
A so-called credit crunch scenario is the ugliest outcome of a credit crisis. It is characterized by a sharp reduction of lending activities by the banking sector. A credit crunch has a severe impact on the real economy, as the basic transmission mechanism of liquidity (from central banks over the banking sector to non-financial corporations) is distorted by the fact that banks do a liquidity squeeze, finally resulting in rising default rates. A credit crunch is a full-fledged credit crisis, which includes all major ingredients for a banking and a systemic crisis spilling over onto several parts of the financial market and onto the real economy. A credit crunch is probably the most costly type of financial crisis, also depending on the efficiency of regulatory bodies, the shape of the economy as a whole, and the health of the banking sector itself." - source Credit Crises, published in 2008, authored by Dr Jochen Felsenheimer and Philip Gisdakis
The exogenous shock started in earnest in mid-2014 which saw a conjunction of factors, a significant rise in the US dollar that triggered the fall in oil prices, the unabated rise in the cost of capital.

If we were to build another schematic of the current market environment, here what we think it should look like to name a few of the issues worth looking at:
- source Macronomics

So if you think diversification is a "solid defense" in a world of "positive correlations", think again, because here what the authors of "Credit Crisis" had to say about LTCM and tail events (Rogue Waves):
"Even if there are arbitrage opportunities in the sense that two positions that trade at different prices right now will definitely converge at a point in the future, there is a risk that the anomaly will become even bigger. However typically a high leverage is used for positions that have a skewed risk-return profile, or a high likelihood of a small profit but a very low risk of a large loss. This equals the risk-and-return profile of credit investments but also the risk that selling far-out-of-the-money puts on equities. In case of a tail event occurs, all risk parameters to manage the overall portfolio are probably worthless, as correlation patterns change dramatically during a crisis. That said, arbitrage trades are not under fire because the crisis has an impact on the long-term-risk-and-return profile of the position. However, a crisis might cause a short-term distortion of capital market leading to immense mark-to-market losses. If the capital adequacy is not strong enough to offset the mark-to-market losses, forced unwinding triggers significant losses in arbitrage portfolios. The same was true for many asset classes during the summer of 2007, when high-quality structures came under pressure, causing significant mark-to-market losses. Many of these structures did not bear default risk but a huge liquidity risk, and therefore many investors were forced to sell." source Credit Crises, published in 2008, authored by Dr Jochen Felsenheimer and Philip Gisdakis
You probably understand by now why we have raised the "red flag" so many times on our fear in the rise of "positive correlations". They do scare us, because they entail, larger and larger standard deviation moves and potentially trigger "Rogue Waves" which can wipe out even the biggest and most reputable "Investment ships" à la MS München. 

The big question is not if we are in a bubble again but if this "time it's different". It is not. It's worse, because you have all the four types of crisis evolving at the same time.
Here is what Chapter 5 of "Credit Crisis" is telling us about the causes of the bubble:
"A mainstream argument is that the cause of the bubbles is excessive monetary liquidity in the financial system. Central banks flood the market with liquidity to support economic growth, also triggering rising demand for risky assets, causing both good assets and bad assets to appreciate excessively beyond their fundamentally fair valuation. In the long run, this level is not sustainable, while the trigger of the burst of the bubble is again policy shifts of central banks. The bubble will burst when central banks enter a more restrictive monetary policy, removing excess liquidity and consequently causing investors to get rid of risky assets given the rise in borrowing costs on the back of higher interest rates.
This is the theory, but what about the practice? The resurfacing discussion about rate cuts in the United States and in the Euroland in mid-2005 was accompanied by expectations that inflation will remain subdued. Following this discussion, the impact of inflation on credit spreads returned to the spotlight. An additional topic regarding inflation worth mentioning is that if excess liquidity flows into assets rather than into consumer goods, this argues for low consumer price inflation but rising asset price inflation. In late 2000, the Fed and the European Central Banks (ECB) started down a monetary easing path, which was boosted by external shocks (9/11 and the Enron scandal), when central banks flooded the market with additional liquidity to avoid a credit crunch. Financial markets benefited in general from this excess liquidity, as reflected in the positive performance of almost all asset classes in 2004, 2005, and 2006, which argued for overall liquidity inflows but not for allocation shifts. It is not only excess liquidity held by investors and companies that underpins strong performing assets in general, but also the pro-cyclical nature of banking. In a low default rate environment, lending activities accelerate, which might contribute to an overheating of the economy accompanied by rising inflation. From a purely macroeconomic viewpoint, private households have two alternatives to allocate liquidity: consuming or saving. The former leads to rising price inflation, whereas the latter leads to asset price inflation." - source Credit Crises, published in 2008, authored by Dr Jochen Felsenheimer and Philip Gisdakis
 Where we slightly differ from the author's take in terms of liquidity allocation is in the definition of "saving".  The "Savings Glut" view of economists such as Ben Bernanke and Paul Krugman needs to be vigorously rebuked. This incorrect view which was put forward to attempt to explain the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) by the main culprits was challenged by economists at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), particularly in one paper by Claudio Borio entitled "The financial cycle and macroeconomics: What have we learnt?". 
"The core objection to this view is that it arguably conflates “financing” with “saving” –two notions that coincide only in non-monetary economies. Financing is a gross cash-flow concept, and denotes access to purchasing power in the form of an accepted settlement medium (money), including through borrowing. Saving, as defined in the national accounts, is simply income (output) not consumed. Expenditures require financing, not saving. The expression “wall of saving” is, in fact, misleading: saving is more like a “hole” in aggregate expenditures – the hole that makes room for investment to take place. … In fact, the link between saving and credit is very loose. For instance, we saw earlier that during financial booms the credit-to-GDP gap tends to rise substantially. This means that the net change in the credit stock exceeds income by a considerable margin, and hence saving by an even larger one, as saving is only a small portion of that income." - source BIS paper, December 2012
Their paper argues that it was unrestrained extensions of credit and the related creation of money that caused the problem which could have been avoided if interest rates had not been set too low for too long through a "wicksellian" approach dear to Charles Gave from Gavekal Research. 

Borio claims that the problem was that bank regulators did nothing to control the credit booms in the financial sector, which they could have done. We know how that ended before.

But, guess what: We have the same problem today and suprise, it's worse.

Look at the issuance levels reached in recent years and the amount of cov-lite loans issued (again...). Look at mis-allocation of capital in the Energy sector and its CAPEX bubble.
Look at the $9 trillion debt issued by Emerging Markets Corporates.
We could go on and on.

Now the credit Fed induced credit bubble is bursting again. One only has to look at what is happening in credit markets (à la 2007). By the way Financial Conditions are tightening globally and the process has started in mid 2014. CCC companies are now shut out of primary markets and default rates will spike. Credit always lead equities...The "savings glut" theory of Ben Bernanke and the FED is hogwash:
"Asset price inflation in general, is not a phenomenon which is limited to one specific market but rather has a global impact. However, there are some specific developments in certain segments of the market, as specific segments are more vulnerable against overshooting than others. Therefore, a strong decline in asset prices effects on all risky asset classes due to the reduction of liquidity.
This is a very important finding, as it explains the mechanism behind a global crisis. Spillover effects are liquidity-driven and liquidity is a global phenomenon. Against the background of the ongoing integration of the financial markets, spillover effects are inescapable, even in the case there is no fundamental link between specific market segments. How can we explain decoupling between asset classes during financial crises? During the subprime turmoil in 2007, equity markets held up pretty well, although credit markets go hit hard." - source Credit Crises, published in 2008, authored by Dr Jochen Felsenheimer and Philip Gisdakis
As a reminder, a liquidity crisis always lead to a financial crisis. That simple, unfortunately.

This brings us to lead you towards some illustration of rising instability and worrying price action and the formation of "Rogue Waves" we have been witnessing as of late in many segments of the credit markets.

  • A couple of illustrations of on-going nonlinear "Rogue Waves" in the financial world of today
Rogue waves present considerable danger for several reasons: they are rare, unpredictable, may appear suddenly or without warning, and can impact with tremendous force. Looking at the meteoric rise in US High yield spreads in the Energy sector is an illustration we think about the destructive power of a High Yield "Rogue Wave":

- source Thomson Reuters Datastream (H/T Eric Burroughs on Twitter)

When it comes to the "short gamma" investor crowd and with Contingent Convertibles aka "CoCos" making the headlines, the velocity in the explosion of spreads has been staggering:
- graph source Barclays (H/T TraderStef on Twitter)
When it comes to the unfortunate truth about wider spreads, what the flattening of German banking giant Deutsche bank is telling you is that it's cost of capital is going up, this is what a flattening of credit curve is telling you:
- source Thomson Reuters Datastream (H/T Eric Burroughs on Twitter)
Also the percentage of High Yield bonds trading at Distressed levels is at the highest level since 2009 according to S&P data:
    2015: 20.1%*
    2013: 11.2%
    2011: 16.8%
    2009: 23.2%
    - source H/T - Lawrence McDonald - Twitter feed
In our book a flattening of the High Yield curve is a cause for concern as illustrated by the one year point move on the US CDS index CDX HY (High Yield) series 25:

- source CMA part of S&P Capital IQ

This is a sign that cost of capital is steadily going up. Also the basis being the difference between the index and the single names continues to be as wide as it was during the GFC. A basis going deeper into negative territory is a main sign of stress.

We have told you recently we have been tracking the price action in the Credit Markets and particularly in the CMBS space. What we are seeing is not good news to say the least and is a stark reminder of what we saw unfold back in 2007. On that subject we would like to highlight Bank of America Merrill Lynch's CMBS weekly note from the 12th of February entitled "The unfortunate truth about wider spreads":
"Key takeaways
• We anticipate that spread volatility, liquidity stress and credit tightening will persist. Look for wider conduit spreads.
• While CMBX.BBB- tranche prices fell sharply this week we think further downside exists, particularly in series 6&7.
As investors ponder the likelihood that economic growth may slow and that CRE prices may have risen too quickly (Chart 3), recent CMBX price action indicates that a growing number of investors may have begun to short it since it is a liquid, levered way to voice the opinion that CRE is considered to be a good proxy for the state of the economy.

In the past, this type of activity began by investors shorting tranches that were most highly levered to a deteriorating economy and could fall the most if fundamentals eroded. This includes the lower rated tranches of CMBX.6-8, which, as of last night’s close, have seen the prices for their respective BBB-minus and BB tranches fall by 13-17 points for CMBX.6 (Chart 4), 14-20 points for CMBX.7 (Chart 5) and 17-19 points for CMBX.8 (Chart 6) since the beginning of the year.
We agree that underwriting standards loosened over the past few years, which, all else equal, could imply loans in CMBX.8 have worse credit metrics compared to either the CMBX.6 or CMBX.7 series. Despite this, and although prices have already fallen considerably, for several reasons we think it makes sense to short the BBBminus tranche from either CMBX.6 or CMBX.7 instead of the CMBX.8. First, the dollar price of the BBB-minus tranche from CMBX.6 and CMBX.7 is materially higher that of CMBX.8 (Chart 7). 
Additionally, although the CMBX.8 does have more loans with IO exposure than series 6 or 7 do, we think this becomes more meaningful when considering maturity defaults. By contrast, the earlier series not only have lower subordination attachment points at the BBB-minus tranche, but they also have more exposure to the retail sector, which could realize faster fundamental deterioration if the economy does contract." - source Bank of America Merrill Lynch
Now having read seen the movie "The Big Short" and also read the book and also recently read in Bloomberg about Hedge Fund pundits thinking about shorting Subprime Auto-Loans, as the next new "big kahuna" trade, we would like to make another suggestion.  If you want to make it big, here is what we suggest à la "Big Short", given last week we mentioned that Italian NPLs have now been bundled up into a new variety of CDOs according to Euromoney's article entitled "Italy's bad bad bank" from February 2016 and that the Italian state guarantees the senior debt of such operations and thinks it is unlikely ever to have to honour the guarantee (as equity and subordinated debt tranches will take the first hit from any shortfall to the price the SPV paid for the loans), maybe you want to find someone stupid enough to sell you protection on the senior tranche of these "new CDOs". In essence, like in the "Big Short", if the whole of the capital structure falls apart, your wager might make a bigger return because of the assumed low probability of such a "tail risk" to ever materialize. and will be cheaper to implement in terms of negative carry than, placing a bet on the lower part of the capital structure. This is just a thought of course...

Moving back to the disintegration of the CMBS space, Bank of America Merrill Lynch made some additional interesting points on the fate of SEARS and CMBS:
"To this point, Sears’s management announced this week that revenues for the year ending January 31, 2016, decreased to about $25.1 billion (Chart 8) and that the company would accelerate the pace of store closings, sell assets and cut costs.
Why could CMBX.6 be more negatively impacted by the negative Sears news than some of the other CMBX series? Among the more recently issued CMBX series (6-9), CMBX.6 has the highest percentage of retail exposure. When we focus solely on CMBX.6 and CMBX.7, which have the highest percentage exposure to retail among the postcrisis series, we see that although the headline exposure to retail properties is similar, CMBX.6 has considerably more exposure to B/C quality malls than CMBX.7 does" - source Bank of America Merrill Lynch
Sorry to be a credit "party spoiler" but if U.S. Retail Sales are really showing a reassuring rebound in January according to some pundits with Core sales were 0.6% higher after declining 0.3% in December and the best rise since last May, according to official data from the Commerce Department, then, we wonder what's all our fuss about CMBS price action and SEARS dwindling earnings? Have we lost the plot?

Not really this is all part of what is known as the overshooting phenomenon.

  • The overshooting phenomenon
The overshooting phenomenon is closely related to the bubble theory we have discussed earlier on through the comments of both authors of the book "Credit Crisis. The overshooting paper  mentioned below in the book is of great interest as it was written by Rudi Dornbusch, a German economist who worked for most of his career in the United States, who also happened to have had Paul Krugman and Kenneth Rogoff as students:
"Closely linked to the bubble theory, Rudiger Dornbusch's famous overshooting paper set a milestone for explaining "irrational" exchange rate swings and shed some light on the mechanism behind currency crises. This paper is one of the most influential papers writtten in the field of international economics, while it marks the birth of modern international macroeconomics. Can we apply some of the ideas to credit markets? The major input from the Dornbusch model is not only to better understand exchange rate moves; it also provides a framework for policymakers. This allow us to review the policy actions we have seen during the subprime turmoil of 2007.
The background of the model is the transition from fix to flexible exchange rates, while changes in exchange rates did not simply follow the inflation differentials as previous theories suggest. On the contrary, they proved more volatile than most experts expected they would be. Dornsbusch explained this behavior of exchange rates with sticky prices and an instable monetary policy, showing that overshooting of exchange rates is not necessarily linked to irrational behavior of investors ("herding"). Volatility in FX markets is a necessary adjustment path towards a new equilibrium in the market as a response to exogenous shocks, as the price of adjustment in the domestic markets is too slow.
The basic idea behind the overshooting model is based on two major assumptions. First, the "uncovered interest parity" holds. Assuming that domestic and foreign bonds are perfect substitutes, while international capital is fully mobile (and capital markets are fully integrated), two bonds (a domestic and a foreign one) can only pay different interest rates if investors expect compensating movement in exchange rates. Moreover, the home country is small in world capital markets, which means that the foreign interest rate can be taken as exogenous. The model assumes "perfect foresight", which argues against traditional bubble theory. The second major equation in the model is the domestic demand for money. Higher interest rates trigger rising opportunity costs of holding money, and hence lower demand for money. In the contrary, an increase in output raises  demand for money while demand for money is proportional to the price level. 
In order to explain what overshooting means in this context, we have to introduce additional assumptions. First of all, domestic prices do not immediately follow any impulses from the monetary side, while they adjust only slower over time, which is a very realistic assumption. Moreover, output is assumed to be exogenous, while in the long run, a permanent rise in money supply causes a proportional rise in prices and in exchange rates. The exogenous shock to the system is now defined as unexpected permanent increase in money supply, while prices are sticky in the short term. And as also output is fixed, interest rates (on domestic bonds) have to fall to equilibrate the system. As interest-rate parity holds, interest rates can only fall if the domestic currency is expected to appreciate. As the assumption of the model is that in the long run rising money supply must be accompanied by a proportional depreciation in the exchange rate must be larger than the long term depreciation! That said the exchange rate must overshoot the long-term equilibrium level. The idea of sticky prices is in the current macroeconomic discussion fully accepted, as it is a necessary assumption to explain many real-world data.
This is exactly what we need to explain the link to the credit market. The basic assumption of the majority of buy-and-hold investors is that credit spreads are mean reverting. Ignoring default risk, spreads are moving around their fair value through the cycle. Overshooting is only a short-term phenomenon and it can be seen as a buying opportunity rather than the establishment of a lasting trend. This is true, but one should not forget that this is only true if we ignore default risk. This might be a calamitous assumption. Transferring this logic to the first subprime shock in 2007, it is exactly what happened as an initial reaction regarding structured credit investments. For example, investment banks booked structured credit investments in marked-to-model buckets (Level 3 accounting) to avoid mark-to-market losses.  
... 
A credit crisis can be the trigger point of overshooting in other markets. This is exactly what we have observed during the subprime turmoil of 2007.
This is a crucial point, especially from the perspective of monetary policy makers. Providing additional liquidity would mean that there will be further distortions. Healing a credit crunch at the cost of overshooting in other markets. Consequently liquidity injections can be understood as a final hope rather than the "silver bullet" in combating crises. In the context of the overshooting approach, liquidity injections could help to limit some direct effects from credit crises, but they will definitely trigger spillover effects onto other markets. In the end, the efficiency of liquidity injections by central banks depends on the benefit on the credit side compared to the cost in other markets. In any case, it proved not to be the appropriate instrument as a reaction to the subprime crisis in 2007" - source Credit Crises, published in 2008, authored by Dr Jochen Felsenheimer and Philip Gisdakis
On that subject we would like to highlight again Bank of America Merrill Lynch's CMBS weekly note from the 12th of February entitled "The unfortunate truth about wider spreads":
"As spreads widened over the past few weeks, a significant number of conversations we’ve had with investors have revolved around the concern that the recent spread widening may not represent a transient opportunity to add risk at wider levels, but instead could represent a new reality earmarked by tighter credit standards, lower liquidity and higher required returns for a given level of risk. While it may be easy to look at CRE fundamentals and dismiss the recent spread widening as being due to market technicals, it is important to realize that while that may be true today, if investors are pricing in what they expect could occur in the future, there may be some validity to the recent spread moves. As a case in point, given the recent new issue CMBS spread widening, breakeven whole loan spreads have widened substantially over the past two months (Chart 16).
Not only do wider whole loan breakeven spreads result in higher coupons to CMBS borrowers, which, effectively tightens credit standards, but it also can reduce the profitability of CMBS originators, which may cause some of them to exit the business. As a case in point, this week Redwood Trust, Inc. announced it is repositioning its commercial business to focus solely on investing activities and will discontinue commercial loan originations for CMBS distribution. Marty Hughes, the CEO of Redwood said:
"We have concluded that the challenging market conditions our CMBS conduit has faced over the past few quarters are worsening and are not likely to improve for the foreseeable future. The escalation in the risks to both source and distribute loans through CMBS, as well as the diminished economic opportunity for this activity, no longer make our commercial conduit activities an accretive use of capital." 
If, as we wrote last week, CRE portfolio lenders also tighten credit standards, it stands to reason that some proportion of borrowers that would have previously been able to successfully refinance may no longer be able to do so. The upshot is that it appears that we have entered into a phase where it becomes increasingly possible that negative market technicals and less credit availability form a feedback loop that negatively affects CRE fundamentals.
To this point, although a continued influx of foreign capital into trophy assets in gateway markets can support CRE prices in certain locations, it won’t help CRE prices for properties located in many secondary or tertiary markets. If borrowers with “average” quality properties located away from gateway markets are faced with higher borrowing costs and more stringent underwriting standards, the result may be fewer available proceeds and wider cap rates." - source Bank of America Merrill Lynch
This is another sign that credit will no doubt overshoot to the wide side and that you will, rest assured see more spillover in other asset classes. Given credit leads equities, you can expect equities to trade "lower" for "longer" we think.

Furthermore, Janet Yellen's recent performance is confirming indeed the significant weakening of the Fed "put" as described in Bank of America Merrill Lynch's note:
"With Fed Chair Yellen’s Humphry Hawkins testimony, in which she stressed the notion that the Fed’s decision to raise rates is not on a predetermined course, the probability that the Fed would raise interest rates at its March 2016 plummeted as did the probability of rate hikes over the next year. During her testimony, however, the Fed Chair mentioned that the current global turmoil could cause the Fed to alter the timing of upcoming rate hikes, not abandon them. 
As a result, risky asset prices broadly fell and a flight to quality ensued due to the uncertainty of the timing of future rate hikes, the notion that the Fed put may be further out of the money than was previously anticipated and the prospect that a growing policy divergence among global central banks could contribute to a U.S. recession. While delaying the next rate hike may be viewed positively in the sense that it could help keep risk free rates low, which would allow a greater number of borrowers to either refinance or acquire new properties, we think it is likely that many investors will view it as a canary in the coalmine that presages slower economic growth, more capital market volatility, wider credit spreads and lower asset prices.
Ultimately, the framework that has been put in place by regulators over the past few years effectively severely limits banks’ collective abilities to provide liquidity during periods of stress. As global economic concerns have increased, investors and dealers alike have become increasingly aware of the extremely limited amount of liquidityavailable, which has manifested through a surge  in liquidity stress measures (Chart 21) and wider spreads across risky asset classes.
 - source Bank of America Merrill Lynch
When it comes to rising risk, it certainly looks to us through the "credit lense" that indeed it certainly feels like 2007 and that once again we are heading towards a Great Financial Crisis version 2.0. For us, it's a given.
When it comes to the much talked about Kyle Bass significant "short yuan" case, we would like to offer our views through the lens of the Nash Equilibrium Concept in our next point.

  • The Yuan Hedge Fund attack through the lense of the Nash Equilibrium Concept
Hyman Capital’s Kyle Bass  has recently commented on the $34 trillion experiment and his significant currency play against the Chinese currency (a typical old school Soros type of play we think).
Indirectly, our HKD peg break idea which  we discussed back in September t2015 our conversation "HKD thoughts - Strongest USD peg in the world...or most convex macro hedge?", we indicated that the continued buying pressure on the HKD had led the Hong-Kong Monetary Authority to continue to intervene to support its peg against the US dollar. At the time, we argued that the pressure to devalue the Hong-Kong Dollar was going to increase, particularly due to the loss of competitivity of Hong-Kong versus its peers and in particular Japan, which has seen many Chinese turning out in flocks in Japan thanks to the weaker Japanese Yen. This Yuan trade is of interest to us as we won the "best prediction" from Saxo Bank community in their latest Outrageous Predictions for 2016 with our call for a break in the HKD currency peg as per our September conversation and with the additional points made in our recent "Cinderella's golden carriage".

We also read with interest Saxo Bank's French economist Christopher Dembik's take on the Yuan in his post "The Chinese yuan countdown is on".

Overall, we think that if the Yuan goes, so could the Hong Dollar peg. Therefore we would like again to quote once again the two authors of the book "Credit Crisis" and their Nash Equilibrium reasoning in order to substantiate the probability of this bet paying off:
"Financial panic models are based on the idea of a principle-agent: There is a government which is willing to maintain the current exchange rate using its currency reserves. Investors or speculators are building expectations regarding the ability of the government to maintain the current exchange-rate level. An as answer to a speculative attack on the currency, the government will buy its own currency using its currency reserves. There are three possible outcomes in this situation. First, currency reserves are big enough to combat the speculative attack successfully, and the government is able to keep the current exchange rate. In this case there will be no attack as speculators are rational and able to anticipate the outcome. Second, the reserves of central banks are not large enough to successfully avert the speculative attack, even if only one speculator is starting the attack. Thus, the attack will occur and will be successful. The government has to adjust the exchange rate. Third, the attack will only be successful if speculators join forces and start to attack the currency simultaneously. In this case, there are two possible equilibriums, a "good one" and a "bad one". The good one means the government is able to defend the currency peg, while the bad one means that the speculators are able to force the government to adjust the exchange rate. In this simple approach, the amount of currency reserves is obviously the crucial parameter to determine the outcome, as a low reserve leads to a speculative attack while a high reserve prevents attacks. However, the case of medium reserves, in which a concerted action of speculators is needed is the most interesting case. In this case, there are two equilibriums (based on the concept of the Nash equilibrium): independent from the fundamental environment, both outcomes are possible. If both speculators believe in the success of the attack, and consequently both attack the currency, the government has to abandon the currency peg. The speculative attack would be self-fulfilling. If at least one speculator does not believe in the success, the attack (if there is one) will not be successful. Again, this outcome is also self-fulfilling. Both outcomes are equivalent in the sense of our basic equilibrium assumption (Nash). It also means that the success of an attack depends not only on the currency reserves of the government, but also on the assumption what the other speculator is doing. This is interesting idea behind this concept: A speculative attack can happen independent from the fundamental situation. In this framework, any policy actions which refer to fundamentals are not the appropriate tool to avoid a crisis. " - source Credit Crises, published in 2008, authored by Dr Jochen Felsenheimer and Philip Gisdakis
If indeed the amount of currency reserves is obviously the crucial parameter when it comes to assessing the pay off for the Yuan bet, we have to agree with Deutsche Bank recent House View note from the 9th of February 2016 entitled "Still deep in the woods" that problems in China remains unresolved:
"The absence of new news has helped divert attention away from China – but the underlying problem remains unresolved
  • After surprise devaluation in early January, China has stopped being a source of new bad news
  • Currency stable since, though authorities no longer taking cues from market close to set yuan level*
  • Macro data soft as expected, pointing to a gradual deceleration not a sharp slowdown
  • Underlying issue of an overvalued yuan remains unresolved, current policy unsustainable long-term
−At over 2x nominal GDP growth, credit growth remains too high
−FX intervention to counter capital outflows – at the expense of foreign reserves

- source Deutsche Bank

When it comes to the risk of a currency crisis breaking and the Yuan devaluation happening, as posited by the Nash Equilibrium Concept, it all depends on the willingness of the speculators rather than the fundamentals as the Yuan attacks could indeed become a self-fulfilling prophecy in the making.

This self-fulfilling process is as well a major feature of credit crises and a prominent feature of credit markets (CDS) as posited again in Chapter 5 of the book from Dr Jochen Felsenheimer and Philip Gisdakis:
"Self-fulfilling processes are a major characteristics of credit crises and we can learn a lot from the idea presented above. The self-fulfilling process of a credit crisis is that short-term overshooting might end up in a long-lasting credit crunch - assuming that spreads jump initially above the level that we would consider "fundamentally justified; for instance reflected in the current expected loss assumption. That said, the implied default rate is by far higher than the current one (e.g., the current forecast of the future default rate from rating agencies or from market participants in general). However the longer the spreads remains at an "overshooting level", the higher the risk that lower quality companies will encounter funding problems, as liquidity becomes more expensive for them. this can ultimately cause rising default rate at the beginning of the crisis; a majority of market participants refer to it as short-term overshooting. Self fulfilling processes are major threat in a credit crisis, as was also the case during the subprime meltdown. If investors think that higher default rates are justified, they can trigger rising default rates just by selling credit-risky assets and causing wider spreads. This is independent from what we could call the fundamentally justified level!
The other interesting point is that the assumption of concerted action is not necessary in credit markets to trigger a severe action. If we translate the role of the government (defending a currency peg) into credit markets, we can define a company facing some aggressive investors who can send the company into default. Buying protection on an issuer via Credit Default Swaps (CDS) leads to wider credit spreads of the company, which can be seen as an impulse for the self-fulfilling process described above. If some players are forced to hedge their exposure against a company by buying protection on the name, the same mechanism might be put to work." - source Credit Crises, published in 2008, authored by Dr Jochen Felsenheimer and Philip Gisdakis
As we highlighted above with the flattening of MS München and/or Deutsche Bank and the flattening of the CDX HY curve, the flattening trend means that the funding costs for many companies is rising across all maturities:
"Such a technically driven concerted action of many players, consequently can also cause an impulse for a crisis scenario, as in the case for currency markets in financial panic models" - source Credit Crises, published in 2008, authored by Dr Jochen Felsenheimer and Philip Gisdakis
So there you go, you probably understand by now the disappearance of MS München due to a conjunction of "Rogue Waves":

"The laws of probability, so true in general, so fallacious in particular." - Edward Gibbon, English historian
And this dear readers is the story of VaR in a world of rising "positive correlations" but we are ranting again...

Stay tuned!


 
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